The SNARC effect does not imply a mental number line

In this study, we directly contrast two approaches that have been proposed to explain the SNARC effect. The traditional direct mapping account suggests that a direct association exists between the position of a number on the mental number line and the location of the response. On the other hand, accounts are considered that propose an intermediate step in which numbers are categorized as either small or large between the number magnitude and the response representations. In a magnitude comparison task, we departed from the usual bimanual left/right response dimension and instead introduced the unimanual close/far dimension. A spatial-numerical association was observed: small numbers were associated with a close response, while large numbers were associated with a far response, regardless of the movement direction (left/right). We discuss why these results cannot be explained by assuming a direct mapping from the representation of numbers on a mental number line to response locations and discuss how the results can be explained by the alternative accounts.     

"Don't try this at home": toddlers' imitation of new skills from people on video

Imitation of people on educational television is a potential way for very young children to learn new skills. Although toddlers in previous studies exhibited a “video deficit” in learning, 24-month-olds in Study 1 successfully reproduced behaviors modeled by a person who was on video as well as they did those modeled by a person who was present in the room (even after a 24-h delay). Neither displaced filming context nor cuts between actions affected toddlers’ imitation from video. Shortening the demonstration in Study 2 affected imitation in the video condition but not in the live condition. In Study 3, 24-month-olds who viewed the original longer videos on their family TV screens (with which they had a viewing history) imitated significantly less than those who viewed the videos on the laboratory monitor. Imitation of a live modeler was the same across settings (home or lab). Implications for toddlers’ judgments of reliable information sources and for the design of educational television programs are discussed.     

Dispositifs médicaux : responsabilité civile du mandataire après l’entrée en vigueur des règlements 2017/745 et 2017/746

The new European regulation of medical devices presents today a considerable stake for the economic operators. In addition to strengthening their requirements, the 2017/745 and 2017/746 regulations describe with greater precision their respective roles. Compensation for damage caused by medical devices is also a major challenge for the European legislator. In addition to an obligation of insurance towards the manufacturer, he has defined a regime of strict responsibility of the agent, modeled on the directive 85/374/EEC on responsibility for defective products.     

CHARLES LYELL,UNIFORMITARIANISM, AND INTERPRETIVE PRINCIPLES

I examine the development of Charles Lyell's principle of uniformity and its influence on the development of modern geology and biology and argue that distinguishing between philosophical starting points and empirical findings is essential for clarity in the discussion between science and religion. First, I explore Lyell's arguments against catastrophism and how these were both empirically and religiously motivated. I then consider how David Hume's empiricism, theory of causation, and rejection of miracles influenced Lyell. Using these insights, Lyell formulated his principle of uniformity, which he believed was based on current empirical findings, and rejected explanatory hypotheses that used the biblical Flood or other catastrophist accounts as violations of uniform causation and introductions of theological concepts into empirical science. I next examine the influence of Lyell's principle on Charles Darwin. Although Lyell opposed Darwinism for most of his life, Darwin relied heavily on Lyell, as is evidenced by references throughout The Origin of Species. I contend that the most important aspect of Lyell's principle for Darwin is that it makes natural evil (the struggle for survival) a process that has always been occurring rather than something introduced after the Fall as recorded in Genesis. Finally, I discuss the role that uniformity plays for Lyell, Darwin, and modern science as an interpretive principle rather than as an inference from empirical data, and I conclude by noting that keeping the distinction in mind between interpretive principles and empirical findings will help clarify debates between science and religion.     

Experience,action and representations: Critical realism and the enactive theory of vision

This paper defends a dynamic model of the way in which perception is integrated with action, a model I refer to as ‘the navigational account’. According to this account, employing vision and other forms of distance perception, a creature acquires information about its surroundings via the senses, information that enables it to select and navigate routes through its environment, so as to attain objects that satisfy its needs. This form of perceptually guided activity should be distinguished from other kinds of semi-automatic responses to visual stimuli that do not necessarily involve conscious experiences. It essentially involves inner states, which involve both the awareness of phenomenal qualities, and also a representational component. The navigational account is compared here with the enactive approach to perception, which opposes the view that perceptual experiences are inner states. This paper argues that a full account of perception raises a number of different questions. One central explanatory project concerns questions about the kinds of processes that currently enable a creature to identify and respond appropriately to distant objects: the answer, it is argued, lies in acknowledging the role of conscious inner representations in guiding navigational behaviour through complex environments. The fact that perception and action are interdependent does not conflict with the claim that inner representational states comprise an essential stage in visual processing.

The symbol detachment problem

In situated and embodied approaches it is commonly assumed that the dynamics of sensorimotor engagement between an adaptive agent and its environment are crucial in understanding natural cognition. This perspective permits to address the symbol grounding problem, since the aboutness of any mental state arising during agent-environment engagement is guaranteed by their continuous coupling. However, cognitive agents are also able to formulate representations that are detached from the current state of affairs, such as expectations and goals. Moreover, they can act on their representations before—or instead of—acting directly on the environment, for example building the plan of a bridge and not directly the bridge. On the basis of representations, actions such as planning, remembering or imagining are possible that are disengaged from the current sensorimotor cycle, and often functional to future-oriented conducts. A new problem thus has to be acknowledged, the symbol detachment problem: how and why do situated agents develop representations that are detached from their current sensorimotor interaction, but nevertheless preserve grounding and aboutness? How do cognitive agents progressively acquire a range of capabilities permitting them to deal not only with the current situation but also with alternative, in particular future states of affairs? How do they develop the capability of acting on their representations instead of acting directly on the world? In a theoretical and developmental perspective, we propose that anticipation plays a crucial role in the detachment process: anticipatory representations, originally detached from the sensorimotor cycle for the sake of action control, are successively exapted for bootstrapping increasingly complex cognitive capabilities.     

Modeling recognition memory using the similarity structure of natural input

The natural input memory (NIM) model is a new model for recognition memory that operates on natural visual input. A biologically informed perceptual preprocessing method takes local samples (eye fixations) from a natural image and translates these into a feature-vector representation. During recognition, the model compares incoming preprocessed natural input to stored representations. By complementing the recognition memory process with a perceptual front end, the NIM model is able to make predictions about memorability based directly on individual natural stimuli. We demonstrate that the NIM model is able to simulate experimentally obtained similarity ratings and recognition memory for individual stimuli (i.e., face images).     

Representation facilitates reasoning: what natural frequencies are and what they are not

A good representation can be crucial for finding the solution to a problem. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (Psychol. Rev. 102 (1995) 684; Psychol. Rev. 106 (1999) 425) have shown that representations in terms of natural frequencies, rather than conditional probabilities, facilitate the computation of a cause's probability (or frequency) given an effect--a problem that is usually referred to as Bayesian reasoning. They also have shown that normalized frequencies--which are not natural frequencies--do not lead to computational facilitation, and consequently, do not enhance people's performance. Here, we correct two misconceptions propagated in recent work (Cognition 77 (2000) 197; Cognition 78 (2001) 247; Psychol. Rev. 106 (1999) 62; Organ. Behav. Hum. Decision Process. 82 (2000) 217): normalized frequencies have been mistaken for natural frequencies and, as a consequence, "nested sets" and the "subset principle" have been proposed as new explanations. These new terms, however, are nothing more than vague labels for the basic properties of natural frequencies.     

Items on the left are better remembered

Neurologically intact individuals show a spatial processing bias in perception tasks, specifically showing a bias towards the left in bisecting lines. We present evidence for a novel finding that a leftwards bias occurs in short-term memory for recently presented arbitrary bindings of visual features. Three experiments are reported, two of which involve a total of over 60,000 participants with a small number of trials for each. Experiment 3 involved a larger number of trials for each of 144 participants. Participants reproduced from immediate memory arrays of shape–colour–location bindings. In all three experiments, significantly more errors were observed in reproduction of items presented on the right of the array than on the left. Results could not be accounted for by perceptual errors, or by order of presentation or order of reproduction. Findings suggest that items presented on the left are better remembered, indicating a spatial asymmetry in forming or retrieving feature bindings in visual short-term memory.