The role of discourse context in developing word form representations: a paradoxical relation between reading and learning

To acquire representations of printed words, children must attend to the written form of a word and link this form with the word's pronunciation. When words are read in context, they may be read with less attention to these features, and this can lead to poorer word form retention. Two experiments with young children (ages 5-8 years) confirmed this hypothesis. In our experiments, children attempted to read words they could not previously read, during a self-teaching period, either in context or in isolation. Later they were tested on how well they learned the words as a function of self-teaching condition (isolation or context). Consistent with previous research, children read more words accurately in context than in isolation during self-teaching; however, children had better retention for words learned in isolation. Furthermore, this benefit from learning in isolation was larger for less skilled readers. This effect of poorer word retention when words are learned in context is paradoxical because context has been shown to facilitate word identification. We discuss factors that may influence this effect of context, especially the role of children's skill level and the demands of learning new word representations at the beginning of reading instruction.     

The interpretation of classically quantified sentences: a set-theoretic approach

We present a set-theoretic model of the mental representation of classically quantified sentences (All P are Q, Some P are Q, Some P are not Q, and No P are Q). We take inclusion, exclusion, and their negations to be primitive concepts. We show that although these sentences are known to have a diagrammatic expression (in the form of the Gergonne circles) that constitutes a semantic representation, these concepts can also be expressed syntactically in the form of algebraic formulas. We hypothesized that the quantified sentences have an abstract underlying representation common to the formulas and their associated sets of diagrams (models). We derived 9 predictions (3 semantic, 2 pragmatic, and 4 mixed) regarding people's assessment of how well each of the 5 diagrams expresses the meaning of each of the quantified sentences. We report the results from 3 experiments using Gergonne's (1817) circles or an adaptation of Leibniz (1903/1988) lines as external representations and show them to support the predictions.     

Can one written word mean many things? Prereaders' assumptions about the stability of written words' meanings

Results of three experiments confirmed previous findings that in a moving word task, prereaders 3 to 5 years of age judge as if the meaning of a written word changes when it moves from a matching to a nonmatching toy (e.g., when the word "dog" moves from a dog to a boat). We explore under what circumstances children make such errors, we identify new conditions under which children were more likely correctly to treat written words' meanings as stable: when the word was placed alongside a nonmatching toy without having been alongside a matching toy previously, when two words were moved from a matching toy to a nonmatching toy, and when children were asked to change what the print said. Under these conditions, children more frequently assumed that physical forms had stable meanings as they do with other forms of external representation.     

The nucleus basalis and memory codes: auditory cortical plasticity and the induction of specific, associative behavioral memory

Receptive field (RF) plasticity develops in the primary auditory cortex (ACx) when a tone conditioned stimulus (CS) becomes associated with an appetitive or aversive unconditioned stimulus (US). This prototypical stimulus-stimulus (S-S) association is accompanied by shifts of frequency tuning of neurons toward or to the frequency of the CS such that the area of best tuning of the CS frequency is increased in the tonotopic representation of the ACx. RF plasticity has all of the major characteristics of behavioral associative memory: it is highly specific, discriminative, rapidly induced, consolidates (becomes stronger and more specific over hours to days) and can be retained indefinitely (tested to two months). Substitution of nucleus basalis (NB) stimulation for a US induces the same associative RF plasticity, and this requires the engagement of muscarinic receptors in the ACx. Pairing a tone with NB stimulation actually induces specific, associative behavioral memory, as indexed by post-training frequency generalization gradients. The degree of acquired behavioral significance of sounds appears to be encoded by the number of neurons that become retuned in the ACx to that acoustic stimulus, the greater the importance, the greater the number of re-tuned cells. This memory code has recently been supported by direct neurobehavioral tests. In toto, these findings support the view that specific, learned auditory memory content is stored in the ACx, and further that this storage of information during learning and the instantiation of the memory code involves the engagement of the nucleus basalis and its release of acetylcholine into target structures, particularly the cerebral cortex.     

Universality and context-specificity in early executive function development

A renewed interest in early executive function (i.e., EF or the conscious control of thought and behavior) development has led several research groups to suggest that EF may be emerging and is less coordinated (e.g., showing few relations between tasks) in the first few years (Devine et al., 2019; Gago Galvagno et al., 2021; Johansson et al., 2016; Miller & Marcovitch, 2015; Ribner et al., 2022). This potentially universal development in EF does not exclude the possibility that EF may also differ across context (e.g., Gago Galvagno et al., 2021; Lohndorf et al., 2019; Tran et al., 2015) reflecting unique strengths and development built within one’s sociocultural environment. The present paper explores potential universal and context-specific early EF developments by focusing on three aims: (1) reviewing work on EF within the first two years of life that may speak to potential universality in the measurement, structure, growth, stability, and conceptualization of early EF (2) reviewing research that may speak to how the sociocultural context may play a role in context-specific development within early EF and (3) examining potential developmental EF frameworks for understanding universal and context-specific developments of early EF within context.     

再论儿童绘画中空间概念基线的发展

作者曾在1988年《心理科学通讯》第3期上发表“对三至六岁幼儿绘画中空间概念基线问题的探讨”一文。现在这篇文章进一步肯定了前文得到的初步结论,同时论证了儿童绘画中空间概念基线发展的具体过程。     

Token-mediated tool-use by a tufted capuchin monkey (Cebus apella)

This research examined token-mediated tool-use in a tufted capuchin monkey (Cebus apella). We conducted five experiments. In experiment 1 we examined the use of plastic color-coded chips to request food, and in experiments 2–5 we examined the use of color-coded chips to request tools. Our subject learned to use chips to request tools following the same general pattern seen in great apes performing analogous tasks, that is, initial discrimination followed by an understanding of the relationship among tokens, tools, and their functions. Our findings are consistent with the view that parallel representational processes underlie the tool-related behavior of capuchins and great apes. Received: 11 March 1998 / Accepted after revision: 19 August 1998     

Rod Cocking's legacy: The development of psychological distancing

Thirty years of work on psychological distancing is discussed in this article. The psychological construct of psychological distance was applied to the development of children's developing representational abilities over 30 years ago [Sigel, I. E. (1970). The distancing hypothesis: A causal hypothesis for the acquisition of representational thought. In: M. R. Jones (Ed.), Miami symposium on the prediction of behavior, 1968: Effect of early experiences (pp. 99–118). Coral Gables, FL: University of Miami Press]. The construct has changed knowledge in three areas: (1) changes in the child's developmental status as a result of reflection on general properties of interactions with the world as well as maturation, (2) the effects of different modes of formal instruction in schooling on the development of children's thinking, and (3) the relationship of one's beliefs about how development occurs to behaviors with children that create “distancing experiences” for children. The distancing construct itself has been broadened further as the notion of psychological distance has been applied to areas as diverse as delay of gratification, divorce, video game play, and resolution of interpersonal conflicts [Cocking, R. R., & Renninger, K. A. (Eds.) (1993). The development and meaning of psychological distance. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum]. The distancing construct was evident in Rod Cocking's own program of psychological inquiry. However, much of his legacy to the field lies in his Educational Testing Service (ETS) work that extended the usefulness of this construct for other researchers working in a variety of domains of development and in his ability to see the implications of research from this perspective for the lives of children.     

Constructing and Testing Theological Models

In order for theology to have a cognitive dimension, it is necessary to have procedures for testing and critically evaluating theological models. We make use of certain features of scientific models to show how science has been able to move beyond the poles of foundationalism, represented by logical positivism, and antifoundationalism or relativism, represented by the sociologists of knowledge. These ideas are generalized to show that constructing and testing theological models similarly offers a means by which theology can move beyond confessionalism and postmodernism. Our starting point is Paul Tillich's concept of God as the ground of being and the different levels of consciousness and thinking that accompany his understanding of theology. The ontological argument of Anselm is shown to play a key role, not as a proof for the existence of God but as a means for testing theological models. An example of a theological model, drawn from the domain of philosophy of science, is presented to show how theological models are constructed and tested.