A Quantitative Empirical Analysis of the Abstract/Concrete Distinction

This study presents original evidence that abstract and concrete concepts are organized and represented differently in the mind, based on analyses of thousands of concepts in publicly available data sets and computational resources. First, we show that abstract and concrete concepts have differing patterns of association with other concepts. Second, we test recent hypotheses that abstract concepts are organized according to association, whereas concrete concepts are organized according to (semantic) similarity. Third, we present evidence suggesting that concrete representations are more strongly feature‐based than abstract concepts. We argue that degree of feature‐based structure may fundamentally determine concreteness, and we discuss implications for cognitive and computational models of meaning.     

The functional role of emotions in aesthetic judgment

Exploring emotions, in terms of their evolutionary origin; their basic neurobiological substratum, and their functional significance in autonomous agents, we propose a model of minimal functionality of emotions. Our aim is to provide a naturalized explanation - mostly based on an interactivist model of emergent representation and appraisal theory of emotions - concerning basic aesthetic emotions in the formation of aesthetic judgment. We suggest two processes the Cognitive Variables Subsystem (CVS) which is fundamental for the accomplishment of the function of heuristic learning; and Aesthetic Appraisal Subsystem (AAS) which primarily affects the elicitation of aesthetic emotional meanings. These two subsystems (CVS and AAS) are organizationally connected and affect the action readiness of the autonomous agent. More specifically, we consider the emotional outcome of these two subsystems as a functional indication that strengthens or weakens the anticipation for the resolution of the dynamic uncertainty that emerges in the particular interaction.     

Stepping off the pendulum: Why only an action-based approach can transcend the nativist–empiricist debate

We argue that the nativist–empiricist debate in developmental psychology is distorted, both theoretically and methodologically, by a shared framework of assumptions concerning the nature of representation. In particular, both sides of the debate assume models of representation that make the emergence of representation impossible. This, in turn, distorts conceptions of cognitive development by forcing developmentally new representation to be constructed out of some already available (innate) foundation of atomistic representations – it forces a foundationalism. Contemporary nativists and empiricists differ with respect to the size and scope of such foundations, but are equally committed to some form of foundationalism. In further consequence, this foundationalism distorts methodologies by rendering any form of developmental emergence of representation impossible, and, thus, renders control conditions in experiments for such kinds of development (and their precursors) crucially irrelevant. We end by outlining an approach to modeling representation that is not committed to foundationalism because it explicitly models representational emergence. This is an action-based approach, with similarities to Piaget's model.     

Young children’s analogical problem solving: Gaining insights from video displays

This study examined how toddlers gain insights from source video displays and use the insights to solve analogous problems. The sample of 2- and 2.5-year-olds viewed a source video illustrating a problem-solving strategy and then attempted to solve analogous problems. Older, but not younger, toddlers extracted the problem-solving strategy depicted in the video and spontaneously transferred the strategy to solve isomorphic problems. Transfer by analogy from the video was evident only when the video illustrated the complete problem goal structure, including the character’s intention and the action needed to achieve a goal. The same action isolated from the problem-solving context did not serve as an effective source analogue. These results illuminate the development of early representation and processes involved in analogical problem solving. Theoretical and educational implications are discussed.     

Operation-specific encoding in single-digit arithmetic

Solving simple arithmetic problems involves three stages: encoding the problem, retrieving or calculating the answer, and reporting the answer. This study compared the event-related potentials elicited by single-digit addition and multiplication problems to examine the relationship between encoding and retrieval/calculation stages. Results showed that the operation effect appeared as early as the encoding of the first operand and continued to the retrieval/calculation stage: compared to addition, multiplication elicited larger negative potentials in the left anterior electrodes and larger positive potentials in the right posterior electrodes. The consistency of this operation effect across the first two stages of arithmetic processing suggests that encoding of arithmetic problems can be modulated by the nature of representation of the to-be-retrieved arithmetic facts, and thus these two stages are additive rather than interactive.     

Modality switching costs emerge in concept creation as well as retrieval

Theories of embodied cognition hold that the conceptual system uses perceptual simulations for the purposes of representation. A strong prediction is that perceptual phenomena should emerge in conceptual processing, and, in support, previous research has shown that switching modalities from one trial to the next incurs a processing cost during conceptual tasks. However, to date, such research has been limited by its reliance on the retrieval of familiar concepts. We therefore examined concept creation by asking participants to interpret modality-specific compound phrases (i.e., conceptual combinations). Results show that modality switching costs emerge during the creation of new conceptual entities: People are slower to simulate a novel concept (e.g., auditory jingling onion) when their attention has already been engaged by a different modality in simulating a familiar concept (e.g., visual shiny penny). Furthermore, these costs cannot be accounted for by linguistic factors alone. Rather, our findings support the embodied view that concept creation, as well as retrieval, requires situated perceptual simulation.     

Understanding dynamic and static displays: using images to reason dynamically

We examined expert meteorologists as they created a weather forecast while working in a naturalistic environment. We examined the type of external representation they chose to examine (a static image, a sequence of static images, or a dynamic display) and the kind of information they extracted from those representations (static or dynamic). We found that even though weather is an extremely dynamic domain, expert meteorologists examined very few animations, examining primarily static images. However, meteorologists did extract large amounts of dynamic information from these static images, suggesting that they reasoned about the weather by mentally animating the static images rather than letting the software do it for them.     

Representationalism and the phenomenology of mental imagery

This paper sketches a phenomenological analysis of visual mental imagery and uses it to criticize representationalism and the internalist-versus-externalist framework for understanding consciousness. Contrary to internalist views of mental imagery imagery experience is not the experience of a phenomenal mental picture inspected by the mind’s eye, but rather the mental simulation of perceptual experience. Furthermore, there are experiential differences in perceiving and imagining that are not differences in the properties represented by these experiences. Therefore, externalist representationalism, which maintains that the properties of experience are the external properties represented by experience, is an inadequate account of conscious experience.     

Facilitation of learning of a simultaneous discrimination between rotated patterns by bumblebees

The failure to discriminate between a pattern consisting of four orthogonal bars and the same pattern rotated by 45° has been interpreted in the literature as evidence against pictorial representations in honeybees. This study determines whether prior training can facilitate the discrimination. In Experiment 1, one group of bumblebees was trained with a rewarding spiral pattern (S+) vs. its unrewarding 45° rotation (S−). A second group was trained with two different patterns, the spiral (S+) and the chevron (S−). Both groups were then tested with the spiral and its rotation, both of which were unrewarding. The first group failed in the discrimination while the second succeeded. The same was true when the training period was defined by choice frequency instead of time (Experiment 2). The facilitation due to prior experience was pattern specific (Experiments 3 and 4). These results show perceptual learning in bumblebees and weaken the case against pictorial representations.