Why philosophy and history matter: A conversation with Ann Taves

The article picks up some ideas that Ann Taves presents in her book Religious Experience Reconsidered, and looks at possible conversations that are not fleshed out in detail in Taves' book. In particular, it is argued that the disciplinary confrontation with philosophy and with historiography is of crucial importance if the disciplines of cognitive science and psychology of religion want to become in the future what they pretend to be nowda serious alternative and complement to the study of religion as we know it from other contexts, such as cultural studies and historiography     

The Contribution of Professor Ninian Smart to Religious Education

Religious Experience Reconsidered was premised on the idea that experience is a site of contested meaning and value for subjects (and scholars). Although the concept of specialness has drawn considerable attention, my goal in writing the book was to update efforts to use attribution theory to bridge between religious studies and the psychology of religion. I intended the focus on micro-social processes to complement analysis at the macro-social level. The need for a broader, more generic second order term, such as specialness, emerged in the context of working out an attributional approach and can and should be extended more broadly. While anything can be set apart as special and an analysis of the politics of deeming is essential, we can still ask if there is empirical evidence to suggest that humans are more likely to set some things apart than others within or across cultures. When we take experience as a site for study, we do not have to limit ourselves to describing the range of views held by our subjects, but can also legitimately seek to explain experience in terms that make sense to us as researchers. The breaking of taboos against explaining experience in naturalistic terms will only have apocalyptic consequences if we assume a special/ordinary binary; viewed on a continuum, we can still find special meaning and value in experiences that are not protected by taboos.     

The richness of ordinary life: Religious justification among Chile's business elite

Based on the analysis of 75 in-depth interviews with managers and businessmen of Chile's main economic conglomerates, this article is concerned with the justification, on religious and moral grounds, of the establishment of a neo-liberal economic model during Augusto Pinochet's regime (1973-1989) and, most importantly, with the representation of business as a religious vocation. The value granted to wealth creation as a path to salvation, as formulated by the conservative religious movements Opus Dei and the Legionaries of Christ, is one possible response to the Church's call in Vatican II for the greater involvement of the laity in their cultures and societies. In the context of an increase in pluralism during the 1960s and 1970s, the perceived shift of the Catholic Church to the Left, and the threat that the political project of Salvador Allende's socialist government (1970-1973) posed to the elite's centenary lifestyle, the practice of more conservative forms of Catholicism has allowed for a restoration of the historical bond between the elite and its religious tradition. The case of Chile's elite can be seen as an example of an increase in pluralism which does not lead to a weakening of religious belief and practice, but to their strengthening.     

Religious Experience Reconsidered as an example of theoretical assertiveness in the study of religion

The publication of Religious Experience Reconsidered is one more indication that the incoherent mixture of coyness and braggadocio that for decades has characterized the study of religion and other disciplines, is finally giving way to honest theoretical assertiveness. Taves’ book is a careful treatment of experience deemed religious that manages to do justice to the recurrent features of what people tend to experience in such contexts, while also taking into consideration the culture-bound components of those experiences. What is especially welcome is that instead of seeking to establish a bland middle ground, she has pursued an independent path, making use of scholarship in a variety of disciplines, especially psychology of religion.     

Lgbt Catholics: a paradigmatic case of intra-confessional pluralism

ABSTRACT

I will reflect on the reconciliation between “subjective” life and “objective” doctrine experienced by Catholic lgbt couples. Even though their particular experience cannot be considered as universal it can nevertheless constitute a case study for theological reflection. I will propose a theological model for the integration of lgbt Catholics into Christian communities. The case of lgbt Catholics also helps us address the theoretical difficulties of religious pluralism. Their experience of faith is an example of “lived pluralism”. In the lexicon of religious pluralism, this experience is an intra-system or intra-theistic diversity, but it also touches upon the meta-theological issue of the model of reason that is to be applied to every system. I believe that every possible case of pluralism is worth considering if we want to theorize this concept. This may lead us to consider pluralism as a premise from which to start, articulated at different levels.     

Relationship between religious characteristics and responses to vigilantism

Religious characteristics are often related to attitudes about legal issues (e.g., death penalty). This study investigated whether U.S. university students’ religious beliefs (i.e., fundamentalism, devotionalism, evangelism) and religious motivations (i.e., intrinsic, extrinsic religiosity) were associated with responses to vigilantism (i.e., whether the vigilante is justified, should be legally responsible, should receive a lighter sentence). Participants read three scenarios describing vigilantism in response to different crimes (murder, drug dealing, child molestation). More punitive responses to vigilantism were associated with being low in fundamentalism, extrinsic religiosity, and evangelism, and with being high in devotionalism and intrinsic religiosity. Motivations were more frequent predictors of responses to vigilantism than beliefs. Results are the first step in explaining relationships between religious characteristics and responses to vigilantism.     

The Embodied God: Core Intuitions About Person Physicality Coexist and Interfere With Acquired Christian Beliefs About God,the Holy Spirit,and Jesus

Why are disembodied extraordinary beings like gods and spirits prevalent in past and present theologies? Under the intuitive Cartesian dualism hypothesis, this is because it is natural to conceptualize of minds as separate from bodies; under the counterintuitiveness hypothesis, this is because beliefs in minds without bodies are unnatural—such beliefs violate core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and consequently have a social transmission advantage. We report on a critical test of these contrasting hypotheses. Prior research found that among adult Christian religious adherents, intuitions about person psychology coexist and interfere with theological conceptualizations of God (e.g., infallibility). Here, we use a sentence verification paradigm where participants are asked to evaluate as true or false statements on which core knowledge intuitions about person physicality and psychology and Christian theology about God are inconsistent (true on one and false on the other) versus consistent (both true or both false). We find, as predicted by the counterintuitiveness hypothesis but not the Cartesian dualism hypothesis, that Christian religious adherents show worse performance (lower accuracy and slower response time) on statements where Christian theological doctrines about God's physicality (e.g., incorporeality, omnipresence) conflict with intuitions about person physicality. We find these effects for other extraordinary beings in Christianity—the Holy Spirit and Jesus—but not for an ordinary being (priest). We conclude that it is unintuitive to conceptualize extraordinary beings as disembodied, and that this, rather than inherent Cartesian dualism, may explain the prevalence of beliefs in such beings.     

Feeling Good,but Lacking Autonomy: Closed-Mindedness on Social and Moral Issues in New Religious Movements

According to previous research, New Religious Movements (NRMs) seem to have a positive effect on the mental health of members who join NRMs with some previous affective, cognitive or other vulnerabilities. The present study investigates the other, less positive, side of the psychology of NRMs, i.e. elements that may be an obstacle to optimal development, such as rigidity and low autonomy. In comparison to non-NRM members, members of various NRMs in Belgium (N = 120) were found to be low in quest religious orientation (Altemeyer and Hunsberger, Int J Psychol Religion 2:113–133, 1992), to privilege conservation values to the detriment of openness to change values (Schwartz, Advances in experimental social psychology (vol 25, pp. 1–65). Orlando, FL: Academic Press, 1992), to show submissiveness to authority in hypothetical situations (projective measure), and to highly moralize judgments of transgression relative to conventional domains (Turiel, The development of social knowledge: Morality and social convention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). Discussion points out the idea that rigidity and restriction of autonomy may be the price to be paid for the structuring role NRMs play with regard to previous vulnerabilities.

Can religious arguments persuade?

In his famous essay “The Ethics of Belief,” William K. Clifford claimed “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” (Clifford’s essay was originally published in Contemporary Review in 1877; it is presently in print in Madigan (1999)). One might claim that a corollary to Clifford’s Law is that it is wrong, always, everywhere, and for anyone, to withhold belief when faced with sufficient evidence. Seeming to operate on this principle, many religious philosophers—from St. Anselm to Alvin Plantinga—have claimed that non-believers are psychologically or cognitively deficient if they refuse to believe in the existence of God, when presented with evidence for His existence in the form of relevant experience or religious arguments that are prima facie unassailable. Similarly, many atheists fail to see how believers can confront the problem of evil and still assert their belief in a benevolent, omnipotent, and omniscient Creator. In this paper, I propose to explain why religious arguments so often fail to persuade (I take the term ‘religious argument’ to include arguments whose conclusions are either assertions or denials of religious claims). In doing so, I first offer an account of persuasion and then apply it to religious arguments. I go on to argue that at least some religious arguments commit a form of question-begging, which I call “begging the doxastic question.”~An argument begs the doxastic question, on my account, when a subject would find the argument persuasive only if she antecedently believes the argument’s conclusion. This form of question begging is not, strictly speaking, a case of circularity and thus, is not a fallacy; rather, it would explain why one coming to the argument would fail to be persuaded by it unless he already accepted its conclusion. This has the effect, when applied to religious argumentation, that religious arguments are rarely persuasive, which raises the further question: what good are religious arguments? I end by suggesting some non-persuasive functions of religious argument. Finally, I suggest that a full understanding of religious argumentation should give evidentialists pause, for religious beliefs look less like belief states that are sensitive to evidentiary states and more like framework principles or fundamental commitments.