Episodic future thinking in children compared to adolescents

Episodic thinking involves the ability to re-create past and to construct future personal events, which contain event-specific (episodic) and general (semantic) details. The richness of episodic thought for past events improves as children move into adolescence. The current study aims to examine changes in episodic future thinking and to establish the cognitive underpinning of these changes. Typically developing children (n = 14) and adolescents (n = 15) were tested using an adapted version of the Child Autobiographical Interview (CAI) that required generation of past and future personally relevant events. Relational memory and executive skills were also examined. Significant developmental gains were found in richness of events recall across temporal directions (past and future) and across different types of details (episodic and semantic). Developmental gains in richness of past events were also shown to correspond to developmental gains in generation of future events. Moreover, developmental changes in relational memory and (to a lesser extent) executive functions were found to relate to increases in the amount of episodic (but not semantic) details provided. Our study highlighted the similarities between past and future episodic thinking in typically developing children and adolescents. It also raises a possibility that children with developmental and neurological disorders with impaired relational memory and/or executive skills may be at risk of difficulties with episodic thinking.     

Counter-Closure

The focus of this paper is the prima facie plausible view, expressed by the principle of Counter-Closure, that knowledge-yielding competent deductive inference must issue from known premises. I construct a case that arguably falsifies this principle and consider five available lines of response that might help retain Counter-Closure. I argue that three are problematic. Of the two remaining lines of response, the first relies on non-universal intuitions and forces one to view the case I construct as exhibiting a justified, true belief to which none of the usual diagnoses of knowledge failure in Gettier cases apply. The second line involves claiming that Fake Barns and its ilk are misdiagnosed by epistemological orthodoxy as Gettier cases. We are thus confronted by a trilemma: either the case I discuss undermines the first-blush plausible principle of Counter-Closure; or the case I discuss instantiates a novel kind of Gettier case; or a popular conception of a key range of alleged Gettier cases must be rejected. No matter which horn we choose, the case points to a philosophically curious conclusion.     

Physicians' Silent Decisions: Because Patient Autonomy Does Not Always Come First

Physicians make some medical decisions without disclosure to their patients. Nondisclosure is possible because these are silent decisions to refrain from screening, diagnostic or therapeutic interventions. Nondisclosure is ethically permissible when the usual presumption that the patient should be involved in decisions is defeated by considerations of clinical utility or patient emotional and physical well-being. Some silent decisions—not all—are ethically justified by this standard. Justified silent decisions are typically dependent on the physician's professional judgment, experience and knowledge, and are not likely to be changed by patient preferences. We condemn the inappropriate exclusion of the patient from the decision-making process. However, if a test or treatment is unlikely to yield a net benefit, disclosure and discussion are at times unnecessary. Appropriate silent decisions are ethically justified by such considerations as patient benefit or economy of time.     

Coping mediates between social support,neuroticism, and depression after earthquake and examination stress among adolescents

Abstract

The objective of this study was to investigate the mediating role of coping strategies in the relationships between neuroticism, social support, and depression in two groups of adolescents: earthquake group and examination group. Adolescents facing earthquake stress (earthquake group, N=219) completed measures of neuroticism, perceived social support, coping strategies, and self-rating depression. Similarly, adolescents facing examination stress (examination group, N=241) completed the same measures. Results indicated that the earthquake group reported more use of secondary control engagement coping, whereas the examination group reported more use of primary control engagement coping. In addition, neuroticism was more strongly associated with coping in earthquake group and coping strategies explained significantly larger part of the relationship between neuroticism and depression. In contrary, perceived social support was more strongly associated with coping in examination group, and coping strategies explained significantly larger part of the relationship between perceived social support and depression.     

Experimentally testing Taylor's stress,coping and adaptation framework

Abstract

Taylor (1995) constructed a comprehensive framework of stress and adaptation, which considers internal and external resources/impediments as moderators, based on previous studies and models. However, most past research used correlation designs and has not taken into account all of the framework's components within one study. This study tested the effects of the event (minor, major), primary appraisal (benign, severe), coping (problem-focused coping (PFC) versus emotion-focused coping), external resources (with/without social support), and internal impediments (hostility), on estimated distress (dependent variable) in written imagined stressful daily scenarios. All components except hostility were experimentally manipulated within subjects in the scenarios. The scenarios were rated by 281 Dutch students. The variables event, appraisal, and social support significantly and independently affected estimated distress. Event and appraisal synergistically interacted in relation to estimated distress. Finally, appraisal interacted with coping such that the distress-reducing effects of PFC occurred only in benign events, while coping did not affect estimated distress in severely appraised events. This study experimentally tested most components of Taylor's framework, and showed that events, appraisal, and social resources were independent determinants of estimated distress, and that appraisal interacts in a complex manner with the event and with coping.     

Belief–logic conflict resolution in syllogistic reasoning: Inspection-time evidence for a parallel-process model

An experiment is reported examining dual-process models of belief bias in syllogistic reasoning using a problem complexity manipulation and an inspection-time method to monitor processing latencies for premises and conclusions. Endorsement rates indicated increased belief bias on complex problems, a finding that runs counter to the “belief-first” selective scrutiny model, but which is consistent with other theories, including “reasoning-first” and “parallel-process” models. Inspection-time data revealed a number of effects that, again, arbitrated against the selective scrutiny model. The most striking inspection-time result was an interaction between logic and belief on premise-processing times, whereby belief – logic conflict problems promoted increased latencies relative to non-conflict problems. This finding challenges belief-first and reasoning-first models, but is directly predicted by parallel-process models, which assume that the outputs of simultaneous heuristic and analytic processing streams lead to an awareness of belief – logic conflicts than then require time-consuming resolution.     

Two facets of cognitive control in analogical mapping: The role of semantic interference resolution andgoal-driven structure selection

The study used scene analogies to investigate two component processes of analogical thinking: resolution of semantic interference, which emerges when the proper mapping between analogically matching objects is incoherent with their categorical features (e.g., stereotypical functions), and goal-driven selection of the key relational structure, by directing attention to the most promising objects which constitute that structure among many other candidate objects. We manipulated interference by placing in corresponding scenes the objects from one category in different relational roles. Selection was loaded by including additional, relationally irrelevant objects in a scene. We also manipulated relational complexity and the presence of salient objects (people) in relations. Increased load on both interference resolution and selection decreased the accuracy of analogical mapping, but these factors did not interact. Moreover, the factors yielded opposite patterns of interaction with relational complexity. Finally, salience eased selection, but tended to negatively influence interference resolution. In summary, inference resolution and selection seem to constitute two relatively independent facets of cognitive control involved in analogical thinking. Selection may act before mapping occurs, while interference influences analogy making only if an interfering object takes part in mapping.