Two Forms of the Straw Man

The authors identify and offer an analysis of a new form of the Straw Man fallacy, and then explore the implications of the prevalence of this fallacy for contemporary political discourse.     

Light Affine Set Theory: A Naive Set Theory of Polynomial Time

In [7], a naive set theory is introduced based on a polynomial time logical system, Light Linear Logic (LLL). Although it is reasonably claimed that the set theory inherits the intrinsically polytime character from the underlying logic LLL, the discussion there is largely informal, and a formal justification of the claim is not provided sufficiently. Moreover, the syntax is quite complicated in that it is based on a non-traditional hybrid sequent calculus which is required for formulating LLL.In this paper, we consider a naive set theory based on Intuitionistic Light Affine Logic (ILAL), a simplification of LLL introduced by [1], and call it Light Affine Set Theory (LAST). The simplicity of LAST allows us to rigorously verify its polytime character. In particular, we prove that a function over {0, 1}* is computable in polynomial time if and only if it is provably total in LAST.     

Light as a Solution to Puzzles AboutLight

Light is puzzling in modern physics–witness wave-particle duality, the two-slit experiment, and the invariant speed of light. These puzzles are not intrinsic to light but arise from overly narrow views of light. Disregarding the expansive, unitary nature of light that informs everyday experience, modern physics treats light as if it were self-bounded and separable. Further, physics assumes that light is not complicit with observations of light, that the two are separable. By likening light to light-illuminated entities, these attitudes set the stage for puzzles. When,however, conceptions of light are aligned with visual experience, those puzzles become occasions of understanding.This is because visual experience already embodies that aspect of light which physics finds so anomalous: nonseparability. Light's interactive vastness shows up wherever light shows up, and because no observer can back away from light or step outside its integrative embrace, different parts of light (photons) cannot be lifted out ofthe observation as distinct – i.e., distinctly-observed – entities. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Many questions Begs the Question (but questions do not Beg the Question)

The fallacy of many questions or the complex question, popularized by the sophism ‘Have you stopped beating your spouse?’ (when a yes-or-no answer is required), is similar to the fallacy of begging the question orpetitio principii. Douglas N. Walton inBegging the Question has recently argued that the two forms are alike in trying unfairly to elicit an admission from a dialectical opponent without meeting burden of proof, but distinct because of the circularity of question-begging argument and noncircularity of many questions. I offer a reconstruction of the many questions fallacy according to which it is just as circular as begging the question, concluding that many questions begs the question. The same analysis contradicts Walton's claim that questions can beg the question, drawing a distinction between questions as the instruments of question-begging, and as vehicles for categorical noninterrogative presuppositions that beg the question.     

Fallacies, Blunders, and Dialogue Shifts: Walton‘s Contributions to the Fallacy Debate

The paper examines Waltons concept of fallacy as it develops throughthree stages of his work: from the early series of papers co-authored withJohn Woods; through a second phase of involvement with thepragma-dialectical perspective; and on to the final phase in which heoffers a distinct pragmatic theory that reaches beyond the perceived limitsof the pragma-dialectical account while still exhibiting a debt to thatperspective and the early investigations with Woods. It is observed how Waltons model of fallacy is established in distinction to its competitors,and its various problems and successes are discussed.     

EXPLANATION, SOCIAL SCIENCE, AND THE STUDY OF RELIGION: A RESPONSE TO SEGAL WITH COMMENT ON THE ZYGON EXCHANGE

Abstract. In the issue of Zygon devoted to methodological reflection on the boundaries between natural science, social science, and theology (September 1990), Edward 0. Wilson pointed to the hierarchical tension between disciplines and antidisciplines. Working within this framework, Robert Segal outlined several “misconceptions of social science” held by religionists who fear it reduces, or “explains away” their subject. Philip Gorski, Nancey Murphy, and Kenneth Vaux suggested greater harmony but left Segal's challenge largely unaddressed. Religionists, says Segal, distrust social science because they think it ignores “the believer's point of view,” denies the “irreducibility” of religion, prefers materialist and mechanical explanations, and denies religious truth. Do religionists really claim all, or just some of these things? Are some perhaps not misconceptions, but accurate understandings of a real conflict? This article contends that distinctions need to be made; that at most, the humanistic assumptions of religionists compete with only one form of social science–reductionism; and further, that where conflict does arise, it is scientifically beneficial. Religionists differ from theologians, who argue from confessional premises, but the two are allied in opposing reductionism. Precisely because it is genuine, the debate with reductionist social science promises to advance understanding.     

So what? Profiles for relevance criticism in persuation dialogues

This paper discusses several types of relevance criticism within dialogue. Relevance criticism is a way one could or should criticize one's partner's contribution in a conversation as being deficient in respect of conversational coherence. The first section tries to narrow down the scope of the subject to manageable proportions. Attention is given to the distinction between criticism of alleged fallacies within dialogue and such criticism as pertains to argumentative texts. Within dialogue one may distigguish tenability criticism, connection criticism, and narrow-type relevance criticism. Only the last of these three types of criticism constitutes a charge of fallacy and carries with it a burden of proof. In the second it is observed that a full study of narrow-type relevance criticism would require the construction of complicated, many-layered, dialogue systems. Such a study can, however, be profitably preceded by setting up profiles of dialogue that help us discuss the ins and outs of certain types of move. This is illustrated with an example.     

Historical Origins of Argumentum ad Consequentiam

What are the historical origins of the argumentum ad consequentiam, the argument from (or literally, to) consequences, sometimes featured as an informal fallacy in logic textbooks? As shown in this paper, knowledge of the argument can be traced back to Aristotle (who did not treat it as a fallacy, but as a reasonable argument). And this type of argument shows a spotty history of recognition in logic texts and manuals over the centuries. But how it got into the modern logic textbooks as a fallacy remains somewhat obscure. Its modern genesis is traced to the logic text of James McCosh (1879).