The “Ages” of Ogden Nash

This essay looks at the way Ogden Nash, America's Genius of Light Verse, saw his life and times in the 30's, 40's, and 50's. It focuses on a group of poems in which the author mentions his age at the time of writing and explores their insights. They move from young adulthood to retirement and thus become Nash's equivalent of Shakespeare's Ages of Humanity. The author notes how his study of Nash has provided insights in living and illustrates this through poems of his own. In following this particular journey through the stages of life, we might well discover ways of mining the gold in our own experience.     

Genes and Citizens: Can Moral Philosophy Learn from Evolutionary Biology?

The claim that moral philosophers have something to learn from recent neo-Darwinian theory cannot be sustained – at least, not in the case of the three theses characteristic of the latter on which I concentrate. The first thesis, reductionism, is open to some serious, and familiar, objections. Neo-Darwinism can escape those objections only by weakening its position to a point at which it can no longer be described as distinctively reductionist. The second, atavism, mistakenly attempts to generalise from the apparent persistence of` ‘vestigial’ behaviour patterns. Third, neo-Darwinists are frequently guilty of a number of confusions over the relation between fact and value. In conclusion, I point out that neo-Darwinism derives a certain ideological dynamic from the misleading supposition that patterns of explanation which succeed in one area necessarily apply in others. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Linda问题：“齐当别”抉择模型的解释

大量有关人类归因判断的研究表明,人类经常违反理性概率公理。Tversky和Kahneman（1983）使用Linda问题等特定场景的研究发现,人们系统性地表现出违反理性推断标准,判断合取事件发生概率大于其组成事件发生概率,称之为合取谬误,并用人们使用代表性启发式判断概率来解释该现象产生的原因。然而使用启发式观点对合取谬误现象进行解释过于模糊不清。该文首先介绍了合取谬误现象及其解释模型,然后应用Li（1994,2004）提出的不确定情形下决策理论——“齐当别”抉择模型对Linda问题中合取谬误产生的原因进行了新的解释     

Emerging Infectious Diseases: Coping with Uncertainty

The world’s scientific community must be in a state of constant readiness to address the threat posed by newly emerging infectious diseases. Whether the disease in question is SARS in humans or BSE in animals, scientists must be able to put into action various disease containment measures when everything from the causative pathogen to route(s) of transmission is essentially uncertain. A robust epistemic framework, which will inform decision-making, is required under such conditions of uncertainty. I will argue that this framework should have reasoning at its center and, specifically, that forms of reasoning beyond deduction and induction should be countenanced by scientists who are confronted with emerging infectious diseases. In previous articles, I have presented a case for treating certain so-called traditional informal fallacies as rationally acceptable forms of argument that can facilitate scientific inquiry when little is known about an emerging disease. In this article, I want to extend that analysis by highlighting the unique features of these arguments that makes them specially adapted to cope with conditions of uncertainty. Of course, such a view of the informal fallacies must at least be consistent with the reasoning practices of scientists, and particularly those scientists (viz. epidemiologists) whose task it is to track and respond to newly emerging infectious diseases. To this end, I draw upon examples of scientific reasoning from the UK’s BSE crisis, a crisis that posed a significant threat to both human and animal health.

Crossing at a red light: Behaviour of individuals and groups

The present study examines the road behaviour of individual pedestrians at an intersection with a traffic signal compared to groups of pedestrians at the same intersection.In total, 1392 pedestrians were unobtrusively observed in an urban setting at a pedestrian street crossing of undivided streets; 842 were female (60.5%) and 550 were male (39.5%). The observations took place between 7:30 and 8:30 in the morning. Chi-square test revealed the males crossed on red more frequently than females. Logistic regression predicting red-light crossing for pedestrians arriving during a red-light phase indicated that, apart from gender, the tendency to cross on red was greater when there were fewer people waiting at the curb, either when a pedestrian arrived, or joining after arrival. The discussion refers to the theoretical explanations concerning the theory of ‘social control’ and to some practical implications of the results, such as using the positive value of social control in media campaigns and adjusting the red light duration in order to encourage people to obey the traffic light.     

Naturalizing Ethics: the Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency

Moral agency is a central feature of both religious and secular conceptions of human beings. In this paper I outline a scientific naturalistic model of moral agency making use of current findings and theories in sociobiology,developmental psychology, and social cognitive theory. The model provides answers to four central questions about moral agency: (1) what it is, (2) how it is acquired, (3) how it is put to work, and (4) how it is justified. I suggest that this model can provide religious and secular moral theories with a basis for a common understanding of moral agency.     

Causal conjunction fallacies: The roles of causal strength and mental resources

In two experiments we tested the prediction derived from Tversky and Kahneman's (1983) work on the causal conjunction fallacy that the strength of the causal connection between constituent events directly affects the magnitude of the causal conjunction fallacy. We also explored whether any effects of perceived causal strength were due to graded output from heuristic Type 1 reasoning processes or the result of analytic Type 2 reasoning processes. As predicted, Experiment 1 demonstrated that fallacy rates were higher for strongly than for weakly related conjunctions. Weakly related conjunctions in turn attracted higher rates of fallacious responding than did unrelated conjunctions. Experiment 2 showed that a concurrent memory load increased rates of fallacious responding for strongly related but not for weakly related conjunctions. We interpret these results as showing that manipulations of the strength of the perceived causal relationship between the conjuncts result in graded output from heuristic reasoning process and that additional mental resources are required to suppress strong heuristic output.     

Carry on winning: The gamblers’ fallacy creates hot hand effects in online gambling

People suffering from the hot-hand fallacy unreasonably expect winning streaks to continue whereas those suffering from the gamblers’ fallacy unreasonably expect losing streaks to reverse. We took 565,915 sports bets made by 776 online gamblers in 2010 and analyzed all winning and losing streaks up to a maximum length of six. People who won were more likely to win again (apparently because they chose safer odds than before) whereas those who lost were more likely to lose again (apparently because they chose riskier odds than before). However, selection of safer odds after winning and riskier ones after losing indicates that online sports gamblers expected their luck to reverse: they suffered from the gamblers’ fallacy. By believing in the gamblers’ fallacy, they created their own hot hands.     

On a Neg‐Raising Fallacy in Determining Enthymematicity: If She Did not Believe or Want …

Many arguments that show p to be enthymematic (in an argument for q) rely on claims like “if one did not believe that p, one would not have a reason for believing that q.” Such arguments are susceptible to the neg‐raising fallacy. We tend to interpret claims like “X does not believe that p” as statements of disbelief (X's belief that not‐p) rather than as statements of withholding the belief that p. This article argues that there is a tendency to equivocate in arguments for the enthymematicity of arguments (e.g., Lewis Carroll's paradox, Hume's problem) as well as in arguments for the enthymematicity of action explanations (e.g., arguments for psychologism and for explanatory individualism). The article concludes with a warning, because the equivocation is often helpful in teaching and because neg‐raising verbs include philosophically vital verbs: desire, want, intend, think, suppose, imagine, expect, feel, seem, appear.     

Are People Naïve Probability Theorists? A Further Examination of the Probability Theory + Variation Model

Two experiments tested predictions derived from the Probability Theory + Variation (PTV) model. PTV model assumes that judgments follow probability theory, but systematic errors arise from noise in the judgments. Experiment 1 compared the PTV model to a configural weighted averaging model in joint probability judgment and found more support for the PTV model in diagnostic cases. Specifically, noise was negatively correlated with semantic coherence and conjunction and disjunction fallacies increased when order effects produced more noise in conjunctions and disjunctions. Consistent with both models, judgments adhered stochastically to the addition law. Contrary to the integration rules of the PTV model, we failed to find increased noise in disjunctions compared to conjunctions. Experiment 2 tested predictions of the PTV model for conditional probability judgment. Consistent with the PTV model, noise was negatively correlated with semantic coherence in conditional probabilities and judgments adhered stochastically to Bayes' theorem. Conversion errors were generally more prevalent than conditional reversals, a finding that is not fully consistent with the PTV model. In general, the quantitative fit of the PTV model was relatively better for overlapping and subset problems compared to identical, independent and mutually exclusive problems, especially for semantic coherence. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.