Peirce, Perry and the Lost History of Critical Referentialism

This paper traces a lost genealogical connection between Charles S. Peirce’s later theory of signs and contemporary work in the philosophy of language by John Perry. As is shown, despite some differences, both accounts offer what might be termed a multi-level account of meaning. Moreover, it is claimed that by adopting a ‘Peircian turn’ in his theory, Perry might overcome alleged shortcomings in his account of cognitive significance.

A pragmatic defense of Millianism

A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, as applied to the various cases, satisfies the criterion of success: that for every sentence in context, it is a counter-example to Millianism to the extent that it has pragmatic effects (matching speakers’ intuitions).     

Existence questions

I argue that thinking of existence questions as deep questions to be resolved by a distinctively philosophical discipline of ontology is misguided. I begin by examining how to understand the truth-conditions of existence claims, by way of understanding the rules of use for ‘exists’ and for general noun terms. This yields a straightforward method for resolving existence questions by a combination of conceptual analysis and empirical enquiry. It also provides a blueprint for arguing against most common proposals for uniform substantive ‘criteria of existence’, whether they involve mind-independence, possession of causal powers, observability, etc., and thus for showing that many arguments for denying entities (numbers, ordinary objects, fictional characters, propositions…) on grounds of their failure to meet one or more of these proposed existence criteria are mistaken.

Pragmatic expectations and linguistic evidence: Listeners anticipate but do not integrate common ground

When listeners search for the referent of a speaker’s expression, they experience interference from privileged knowledge, knowledge outside of their ‘common ground’ with the speaker. Evidence is presented that this interference reflects limitations in lexical processing. In three experiments, listeners’ eye movements were monitored as they searched for the target of a speaker’s referring expression in a display that also contained a phonological competitor (e.g., bucket/buckle). Listeners anticipated that the speaker would refer to something in common ground, but they did not experience less interference from a competitor in privileged ground than from a matched competitor in common ground. In contrast, interference from the competitor was eliminated when it was ruled out by a semantic constraint. These findings support a view of comprehension as relying on multiple systems with distinct access to information and present a challenge for constraint-based views of common ground.     

Misconvergence to the stimulus plane causes apparent displacement of the stimulus elements seen monocularly1

Abstract: When one binocularly views a group of vertical lines through a ring, the outermost line segments (one on each side) seen within the ring are seen monocularly while the segments of the same lines outside the ring are seen binocularly. The monocular segments appear to be displaced outward with respect to the center of the ring and with respect to the corresponding binocular segments outside the ring. Three experiments examined the extent and direction of this illusory displacement as a function of viewing distance, fixation disparity created by varying the angles of the two arms of a haploscope, and fixation disparity created by a stereoscope and different Nonius stimuli. The results of the experiments confirmed the hypothesis that the apparent displacement is due to misconvergence in accordance with Wells‐Hering's laws of visual direction.     

Reference dependence in iterative choices

Valuation of goods often proceeds from a series of hypothetical pairwise choices. We examine reference dependence on the outcome of such evaluations in a large-scale study in which respondents make a series of choices between areas that differ on cost of living and the quality of lakes and rivers. We uncover three substantial reference effects. First, we find that respondents’ choices are altered by being told the national value of water quality. For these people, consistent with prospect theory, changes in water quality below the 65% referenced national standard are treated as losses and given more weight while identical changes above 65% are treated as gains and given less weight. Second, we find that the sequence of iterative choices matters in a surprising way. The iterations proceed by encouraging switching either by degrading the chosen alternative or improving the item chosen. We show that improving the item not chosen produces the greatest switching, a result consistent with prospect theory, but only if the item changed in the iteration becomes the reference alternative. Finally, we find a strong starting reference effect. That is, we show that the trade-off in the first choice reflected in the change in cost of living divided by the change in water quality has a substantial impact on the final valuation. We assess the relative impact of these three reference effects and suggest ways of dealing with them for valuation of non-market goods.     

The reference class problem is your problem too

The reference class problem arises when we want to assign a probability to a proposition (or sentence, or event) X, which may be classified in various ways, yet its probability can change depending on how it is classified. The problem is usually regarded as one specifically for the frequentist interpretation of probability and is often considered fatal to it. I argue that versions of the classical, logical, propensity and subjectivist interpretations also fall prey to their own variants of the reference class problem. Other versions of these interpretations apparently evade the problem. But I contend that they are all “no-theory” theories of probability - accounts that leave quite obscure why probability should function as a guide to life, a suitable basis for rational inference and action. The reference class problem besets those theories that are genuinely informative and that plausibly constrain our inductive reasonings and decisions. I distinguish a “metaphysical” and an “epistemological” reference class problem. I submit that we can dissolve the former problem by recognizing that probability is fundamentally a two-place notion: conditional probability is the proper primitive of probability theory. However, I concede that the epistemological problem remains.     

Contributions of the dorsal hippocampus and the dorsal subiculum to processing of idiothetic information and spatial memory

It is well established that the dorsal hippocampal formation is crucial for spatial memory in rats. However, little is known about the distinct functions of the dorsal hippocampus and the dorsal subiculum. To examine the role of the dorsal hippocampus and the dorsal subiculum, Long-Evans rats with excitotoxic lesions (NMDA) of the dorsal hippocampus (DH), the dorsal subiculum (DS), or both (DHDS), and controls were trained on a nonmatching-to-place task. Then, to identify the strategy used by each group, they were tested on the same task in the dark with the T-maze being rotated between the sample and the test runs. In the light, rats with combined lesions were impaired. In the dark, groups DH, DS, and controls performed near chance level except in trials without rotation, suggesting the use of a sense of direction. The same rats were trained on a radial-arm maze task. In the light, where proximal visual cues were accessible, combined lesions affected performance whereas in the dark, it was impaired by all lesions. This experiment demonstrated that the dorsal subiculum and the dorsal hippocampus play a crucial role in processing idiothetic information and/or in maintenance of this information in memory.     

预见性的本体论指归

囿于认识论或价值论范围,把有关预见性的一切解释置于本体论解释的视野之外,预见性的本体论根据之追究就会被无端地“搁置”起来,从而处在被“荒漠化”的境地,本体论意义之显现也就会被严实地“遮蔽”起来,即使偶有论及也只处在被“边缘化”的地带。本文由自我认识的诠解引发关于自我认识的预见性研究的本体论和方法论意义,进而集中解说自我认识何以具有预见性,自我认识的预见性有什么特点和表现形式,其存在变化是否具有客观基础暨本体论指归。