The influence of partial‐match cues on event‐based prospective memory

In event‐based prospective memory tasks people form an intention to respond when an environmental cue signals that conditions are appropriate to fulfil an intended activity. In the ongoing activity the authors embedded partial‐match cues that only partially, but not completely, satisfied the conditions required to make a prospective response. The consequence of encountering these partial‐match cues was to increase responses to appropriate prospective memory cues encountered later. This outcome occurred both with semantic and orthographic cues, but only the former led to longer processing latencies of the partial‐match cues. This asymmetry suggests that partial‐match cues may not need to be processed consciously in order to benefit event‐based prospective memory. A parametric manipulation of the number of partial‐match cues resulted in numerically but not statistically better prospective memory. Consequently, partial‐match cues may function as overt reminders of the intention to respond or they may serve to engage participants in self‐initiated remindings of the intention.     

Belief in memories may be relinquished as often for adulthood as for childhood events,but for different reasons

ABSTRACT

The age distribution of nonbelieved memories (NBMs) reported by young and older adults typically reflects a large proportion of events dated to childhood. The present study aimed to further investigate the age of origin of NBMs by using instructions that include an NBM related to adulthood. Participants aged from 40 to 80 years were asked to describe an NBM, to explain why they had stopped believing their memory, and to rate its phenomenal characteristics. Participants also described and rated an age-matched believed memory (BM). The results revealed a similar proportion of nonbelieved events experienced in childhood and adulthood, thus calling into question the hypothesis that NBMs are mainly related to childhood events. We also found that NBMs might emerge for different reasons depending on the time of events. Additional analyses indicated that, overall, the influence of temporal distance on the ratings of phenomenal characteristics was similar for BMs and NBMs.     

Involuntary autobiographical memories in dysphoric mood: A laboratory study

The frequency and characteristics of involuntary autobiographical memories were compared in 25 stable dysphoric and 28 non-dysphoric participants, using a new laboratory-based task (Schlagman & Kvavilashvili, 2008). Participants detected infrequent target stimuli (vertical lines) in a simple vigilance task and recorded any involuntary autobiographical memories that came to mind, mostly in response to irrelevant words presented on the screen. Dysphoric participants reported involuntary memories as frequently and as quickly as non-dysphoric participants and their memories were not repetitive intrusive memories of negative or traumatic events. Additional content analysis showed that dysphoric participants did not recall more memories of objectively negative events (e.g., accidents, illnesses, deaths) than non-dysphoric participants. However, significant group differences emerged in terms of a mood congruency effect whereby dysphoric participants rated their memories as more negative than non-dysphoric participants. Moreover, the proportion of negatively rated involuntary memories was related to lower mood ratings at the end of the session in the dysphoric but not in the non-dysphoric group. Finally, groups did not differ on several memory characteristics such as vividness, specificity (high in both groups) and rates of rehearsal (low in both groups). Theoretical and practical implications of these findings for research on depression and autobiographical memory are discussed.     

Individual differences in recognising involuntary autobiographical memories: Impact on the reporting of abstract cues

This study examined individual differences in the ability to recognise involuntary autobiographical memories. We hypothesised that individuals may not always recognise involuntary memories which are cued by abstract experiences (e.g., thoughts or language), while they are better able to recognise those which are cued by concrete sensory/perpetual experiences. We hypothesised that individuals without formal training in psychology would be more prone to these recognition failures than individuals with training in psychology. We tested the hypothesis by comparing the results of general first-year undergraduate students, graduate students in psychology and graduates students in other disciplines after each had participated in a two-week diary study of their naturally occurring involuntary memories. The results showed undergraduate participants and non-psychology graduate participants reporting fewer involuntary memories being triggered by abstract cues than the graduate psychology participants, while the groups did not differ in the report of memories triggered by sensory/perpetual cues. The implications of the findings are discussed.     

Early memories in young adults from separated and non-separated families

Two studies investigated the earliest memories of New Zealand European young adults (N = 80, Study 1 and N = 120, Study 2) from separated and non-separated families. Participants' earliest memories were assessed for age, for density (how far apart the memories were, Study 2) and for narrative coherence of the memories. Questionnaires were designed to investigate the role of changes in family structure, for example, in the number of adults in the participants' households and the timing of the parental separation. Study 2 further investigated stress and painful divorce-related feelings as additional variables in adjustment after divorce. No overall differences in age of earliest memory emerged between young adults from separated and non-separated parents. Within the group from separated parents, however, memories were earlier when parents separated early in the child's life (<age 7), which related to having extended family ties and more coherent memory narratives from early childhood (Study 2). Participants from separated families reported earlier but sparser memories when they reported higher levels of stress and painful feelings about the separation. The development of early autobiographical memories and the offset of childhood amnesia are discussed via transition and social interaction theories of autobiographical memory.     

A comparison of the quality of intrusive memories in post-traumatic stress disorder and depression

As in post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), intrusive memories (IMs) also play an important role in depression. Evidence about the comparative quality of IMs in PTSD and depression is limited and inconsistent. A total of 28 adults with PTSD, 29 with depression, and 30 controls identified intrusive and voluntary segments of narrative memories of key events. Self-report and language measures of memory quality were obtained. Depressed and PTSD participants reported higher frequency of IMs and higher IM-related interference than controls. IMs in PTSD participants were distinguished from depressed and control participants by higher self-rated distress, higher self-rated sensory quality, and a higher proportion of sensory words in the narrative. The depressed and control groups did not differ on IM quality. PTSD IM segments had more sensory content than voluntary segments and fewer temporal markers. The IM segments of the depressed and control groups had fewer temporal markers than the voluntary segments. Depression severity predicted fewer sensory words in the IM after considering peri-event dissociation and arousal but did not add to the prediction of other IM qualities. A strong sensory quality is a distinctive feature of IMs in PTSD but not in depression. Basic sensory processes contribute to the intrusiveness of remembering in PTSD but not in depression.     

Priming voluntary autobiographical memories: Implications for the organisation of autobiographical memory and voluntary recall processes

The goal of this study was to show that voluntary autobiographical memories could be primed by the prior activation of autobiographical memories. Three experiments demonstrated voluntary memory priming with three different approaches. In Experiment 1 primed participants were asked to recall memories from their elementary school years. In a subsequent memory task primed participants were asked to recall memories from any time period, and they produced significantly more memories from their elementary school years than unprimed participants. In Experiment 2 primed participants were asked to recall what they were doing when they had heard various news events occurring between 1998 and 2005. Subsequently these participants produced significantly more memories from this time period than unprimed participants. In Experiment 3 primed participants were asked to recall memories from their teenage years. Subsequently these participants were able to recall more memories from ages 13–15 than unprimed participants, where both had only 1 second to produce a memory. We argue that the results support the notion that episodic memories can activate one another and that some of them are organised according to lifetime periods. We further argue that the results have implications for the reminiscence bump and voluntary recall of the past.     

安乐死合法化的哲学辩护——以自由主义哲学为视角

安乐死问题一直都是一个争议性话题。从学理上,安乐死可以分为自愿安乐死和无意愿安乐死。自由主义的伦理学分为义务论和功利主义。以自由主义哲学观来审视两类安乐死合法化问题:自愿安乐死体现病人自由意志的选择,是人格尊严之自主性的结果;无意愿安乐死是由利益相关人代为选择,符合社会利益的最大化。通过严格立法来规范安乐死行为,也应成为我国法律的理性选择。     

The frequency of involuntary autobiographical memories and future thoughts in relation to daydreaming,emotional distress,and age

We introduce a new scale, the Involuntary Autobiographical Memory Inventory (IAMI), for measuring the frequency of involuntary autobiographical memories and involuntary future thoughts. Using the scale in relation to other psychometric and demographic measures provided three important, novel findings. First, the frequency of involuntary and voluntary memories and future thoughts are similarly related to general measures of emotional distress. This challenges the idea that the involuntary mode is uniquely associated with emotional distress. Second, the frequency of involuntary autobiographical remembering does not decline with age, whereas measures of daydreaming, suppression of unwanted thoughts and dissociative experiences all do. Thus, involuntary autobiographical remembering relates differently to aging than daydreaming and other forms of spontaneous and uncontrollable thoughts. Third, unlike involuntary autobiographical remembering, the frequency of future thoughts does decrease with age. This finding underscores the need for examining past and future mental time travel in relation to aging and life span development.