Effects of test sequence on anterograde and retrograde impairment of negative emotional scenes1

Abstract: The present study examined recognition for sequences of scenes depicting emotional compared with neutral events. In two experiments, participants were presented with a thematic series of 18 slides of scenes in which the content of two critical scenes in the middle of the series were either emotional (dead men's bodies) or neutral (an opera). A two‐item, forced‐choice recognition paradigm was used to test participants’ immediate memory performance of all 18 slides of scenes. In Experiment 1, anterograde and retrograde amnesic effects were observed for the emotional, but not the neutral scenes when a test sequence of scenes was used that did not match the original presentation order. In contrast, in Experiment 2 the test sequence matched the order seen during the original presentation, and both the anterograde and retrograde amnesic effects were not found. These results indicate that the reinstatement of the original event context is an important factor for the recognition of negative emotional memories.     

Thirty-five-month-old children have spontaneous memories despite change of context for retrieval

ABSTRACT

Many parents have experienced incidents in which their preschool child spontaneously (i.e., without prompting of any kind) recall a previously experienced event. Until recently, such spontaneous memories had only been examined in non-controlled settings (e.g., diary studies). Using a novel experimental paradigm, a previous study has shown that when young children are brought back to a highly distinct setting (same room, same experimenter, same furnishing), in which they previously experienced an interesting event (a Teddy or a Game event), spontaneous memories can be triggered. However, exactly which cues (or combination of cues) are effective for the children’s memory, remains unknown. Here, we used this novel paradigm to examine the possible impact of contextual cues at the time of retrieval. We manipulated whether the 35-month-old children returned to the same room (n?=?40) or to a different, but similarly furnished, room (n?=?40) after one week. The results revealed that although the children returning to a new room produced fewer spontaneous memories than the children returning to the same room, the difference was not significant. Interestingly, despite changing rooms, the children still produced spontaneous memories. Taken together the results may shed new light on the mechanisms underlying childhood amnesia.     

The use of safety behaviours to manage intrusive memories in depression

Cognitive models of clinical disorders conceptualise cognitive and behavioural safety-seeking behaviours as central to symptom persistence because they prevent disconfirmation of key maintaining beliefs. Despite growing evidence of the role of negative beliefs about intrusive memories in depression, it remains unclear why such beliefs persist. Accordingly, we examined whether safety behaviours in response to unhelpful beliefs about intrusive memories might play a role in their maintenance. Eighteen high dysphoric (i.e., BDI-II12) individuals who reported an intrusive negative autobiographical memory in the past week completed a battery of measures about their memory, associated negative beliefs and safety behaviours adopted in response to their beliefs. The most commonly endorsed beliefs reflected themes of wanting to control memories (e.g., ‘I should be able to rid my mind of this memory’) and self-deprecation about experiencing them (e.g., ‘Because I can’t control this memory, I am a weak person’). The beliefs prompted a range of safety behaviours, with cognitive distraction being the most common. The findings demonstrate that safety behaviours are common in response to maladaptive beliefs about intrusive memories. Treatment developments in this area are needed, and should incorporate strategies to challenge beliefs about memories, reduce the use of safety behaviours, and promote processing of intrusive memories.     

预警、重复学习和反馈对错误记忆的影响——错误记忆的信号检测论分析

本研究用信号检测论分析预警、重复学习和反馈三种变量对错误记忆的影响.实验1考察预警指导语的影响.实验2考察重复学习和反馈的影响.结果表明:预警对被试辨别力和反应偏向的影响不明显,对错误记忆影响也不显著;重复学习不能明显影响被试的反应标准,但可提高辨别力减弱错误记忆;反馈明显使被试倾向于使用更为宽松的反应标准,难以降低错误记忆.再认双加工模型和激活/监测理论能对实验结果做出合理的解释.     

Geometric analogue of holographic reduced representation

Holographic reduced representations (HRRs) are distributed representations of cognitive structures based on superpositions of convolution-bound n-tuples. Restricting HRRs to n-tuples consisting of ±1, one reinterprets the variable binding as a representation of the additive group of binary n-tuples with addition modulo 2. Since convolutions are not defined for vectors, the HRRs cannot be directly associated with geometric structures. Geometric analogues of HRRs are obtained if one considers a projective representation of the same group in the space of blades (geometric products of basis vectors) associated with an arbitrary n-dimensional Euclidean (or pseudo-Euclidean) space. Switching to matrix representations of Clifford algebras, one can always turn a geometric analogue of an HRR into a form of matrix distributed representation. In typical applications the resulting matrices are sparse, so that the matrix representation is less efficient than the representation directly employing the rules of geometric algebra. A yet more efficient procedure is based on ‘projected products’, a hierarchy of geometrically meaningful n-tuple multiplication rules obtained by combining geometric products with projections on relevant multivector subspaces. In terms of dimensionality the geometric analogues of HRRs are in between holographic and tensor-product representations.     

Filling in the Gaps: False Memories and Partisan Bias

While cognitive psychologists have learned a great deal about people's propensity for constructing and acting on false memories, the connection between false memories and politics remains understudied. If partisan bias guides the adoption of beliefs and colors one's interpretation of new events and information, so too might it prove powerful enough to fabricate memories of political circumstances. Across two studies, we first distinguish false memories from false beliefs and expressive responses; false political memories appear to be genuine and subject to partisan bias. We also examine the political and psychological correlates of false memories. Nearly a third of respondents reported remembering a fabricated or factually altered political event, with many going so far as to convey the circumstances under which they “heard about” the event. False-memory recall is correlated with the strength of partisan attachments, interest in politics, and participation, as well as narcissism, conspiratorial thinking, and cognitive ability.     

How accurate are memories of traffic accidents? Increased false memory levels among motorcyclists when confronted with accident-related word lists

Previous studies have found that false memories increase when people receive stimuli which is related to their knowledge base. In the current set of four experiments, we examined how accident experience affected false memory production among motorcyclists using different types of false memory word lists. Specifically, Experiments 1, 2, and 3 were conducted involving motorcyclists with and without accident experience, whereas Study 4 was conducted on non-motorcyclists without accident experience. In all experiments, participants were given associatively-related word lists known to foster false memory creation. Different types of word lists were used consisting of accident-related words, emotionally-negative words, and neutral words. Levels of false memory were measured using recall and recognition tests. We found consistent results in Experiments 1, 2, and 3 in which among motorcyclists, accident-related words produced higher levels of false memory than emotionally-negative and neutral words. This pattern was not observed in Experiment 4 where non-motorcyclists were involved. Our results shed light on the role of previous experience on false memory formation. One implication could be that the police should be careful with reports of motorcyclists' experiences about their accidents as motorcyclists may spontaneously come up with false, but related details concerning these experiences.     

“That one makes things small”: Experimentally induced spontaneous memories in 3.5-year-olds

We introduce a new method for examining spontaneous (unprompted) autobiographical memories in 3.5-year-old children, by inducing them in a laboratory setting. Thirty-eight 3.5-year-olds, who had previously participated in a study in our lab involving highly unique props, were brought back after a one-month delay to the same lab arranged as in the original study and with the same Experimenter present. While waiting for the Experimenter in front of the props, their spontaneous verbalizations about the previous unique experiment were recorded, scored, and compared to those of 29 naïve Controls of the same age. The children in the experimental group produced significantly more spontaneous verbalizations related to the to-be-remembered event measured on a variety of dimensions. The study introduces a promising new approach to investigating spontaneous memories in young children in a controlled lab setting. The findings are discussed in relation to involuntary autobiographical memories as examined in adults.     

True and intentionally fabricated memories

The aim of the experiment reported here was to investigate the processes underlying the construction of truthful and deliberately fabricated memories. Properties of memories created to be intentionally false (fabricated memories) were compared to properties of memories believed to be true (true memories). Participants recalled and then wrote or spoke true memories and fabricated memories of everyday events. It was found that true memories were reliably more vivid than fabricated memories and were nearly always recalled from a first-person perspective. In contrast, fabricated differed from true memories in that they were judged to be reliably older, were more frequently recalled from a third-person perspective, and linguistic analysis revealed that they required more cognitive effort to generate. No notable differences were found across modality of reporting. Finally, it was found that intentionally fabricated memories were created by recalling and then “editing” true memories. Overall, these findings show that true and fabricated memories systematically differ, despite the fact that both are based on true memories.     

When we feel good and bad about ourselves: Self-esteem memories across cultures

Young adults in the United States, Croatia, and China described personal episodes of times when they felt especially good or bad about themselves. These self-esteem memories were either recent (episodes that occurred during the previous 4 weeks) or remote (episodes that occurred between the ages of 10 and 15). Systematic content differences between memories of positive and negative self-worth were apparent primarily for remote rather than for recent memories. Across cultures, long-lasting positive memories frequently represented achievement themes, whereas negative memories frequently represented social themes. Links between achievement success and positive self-regard, and between social distress and negative self-regard, are explained using theories of self-esteem and autobiographical memory.