History and Analysis of Delayed Discovery Statutes of Limitations in Adult Survivor Litigation

Summary

In this chapter, attorney Mary R. Williams examines how while Childhood Sexual Abuse (CSA) cases share many of the types of facts for which delayed discovery, mental incapacity, equitable estoppel and other legal statutes of limitations doctrines were created, the combination of factors of CSA cases, including unusual social dynamics and long-term psychological effects, does not fit exactly with any of these legal doctrines. She explores the historical development of delayed discovery statutes of limitations, evaluates the different types of statutes and case law, and analyzes the problematic use of the concept of repression in legislation. This chapter interprets her ground-breaking state-by-state tabulations of delayed discovery statutes of limitations and reported appellate decisions on limitations in CSA actions, published in this volume as appendices A, B, and C.     

Updating beliefs in light of uncertain evidence: Descriptive assessment of Jeffrey's rule

Jeffrey (1983) proposed a generalisation of conditioning as a means of updating probability distributions when new evidence drives no event to certainty. His rule requires the stability of certain conditional probabilities through time. We tested this assumption (“invariance”) from the psychological point of view. In Experiment 1 participants offered probability estimates for events in Jeffrey's candlelight example. Two further scenarios were investigated in Experiment 2, one in which invariance seems justified, the other in which it does not. Results were in rough conformity to Jeffrey's (1983) principle.     

Relating developments in children's counterfactual thinking and executive functions

The performance of 93 children aged 3 and 4 years on a battery of different counterfactual tasks was assessed. Three measures: short causal chains, location change counterfactual conditionals, and false syllogisms—but not a fourth, long causal chains—were correlated, even after controlling for age and receptive vocabulary. Children's performance on our counterfactual thinking measure was predicted by receptive vocabulary ability and inhibitory control. The role that domain general executive functions may play in 3- to 4-year olds' counterfactual thinking development is discussed.     

False-belief understanding at age 5 predicts beliefs about learning in year 3 of primary school

This study examined the concurrent and longitudinal relationships between children's theory of mind (ToM) and their beliefs about learning. A sample of 63 children was tested for theory of mind and verbal ability at four time points: 5, 6, 7 and 8 years of age. In addition, at Time 4, children were administered a questionnaire investigating their beliefs about learning. Results showed longitudinal and concurrent relationships between ToM and constructivist, but not reproductive, beliefs about learning. Crucially, false-belief understanding at age 5 predicted unique variance in constructivist beliefs about learning at age 8, when controlling for subsequent levels of ToM. This relationship was not due to verbal ability. The authors discuss theoretical and practical implications of the longitudinal effect of theory of mind ability on constructivist beliefs about learning.     

Response demands and the recruitment of heuristic strategies in syllogistic reasoning

Two experiments investigated whether dealing with a homogeneous subset of syllogisms with time-constrained responses encouraged participants to develop and use heuristics for abstract (Experiment 1) and thematic (Experiment 2) syllogisms. An atmosphere-based heuristic accounted for most responses with both abstract and thematic syllogisms. With thematic syllogisms, a weaker effect of a belief heuristic was also observed, mainly where the correct response was inconsistent with the atmosphere of the premises. Analytic processes appear to have played little role in the time-constrained condition, whereas their involvement increased in a self-paced, unconstrained condition. From a dual-process perspective, the results further specify how task demands affect the recruitment of heuristic and analytic systems of reasoning. Because the syllogisms and experimental procedure were the same as those used in a previous neuroimaging study by Goel, Buchel, Frith, and Dolan (2000), the result also deepen our understanding of the cognitive processes investigated by that study.     

Temporal distinctiveness and repetition benefits in task switching: Disentangling stimulus-related and response-related contributions

Despite the popularity of the Wason selection task in the psychology of reasoning, doubt remains as to whether card choices actually reflect a process of reasoning. One view is that while participants reason about the cards and their hidden sides—as indicated by protocol analysis—this reasoning merely confabulates explanations for cards that were preconsciously cued. This hypothesis has apparently been supported by studies that show that participants predominantly inspect cards which they end up selecting. In this paper, we reanalyse the data of one such study, which used eye-movement tracking to record card inspection times (Ball, Lucas, Miles, & Gale, 2003). We show that while cards favoured by matching bias are inspected for roughly equal lengths of times, their selection rates are strongly affected by their logical status. These findings strongly support a two-stage account in which attention is necessary but not sufficient for card selections. Hence, reasoning does indeed affect participants' choices on this task.     

Negation: A theory of its meaning,representation, and use

This article presents a model-based theory of what negation means, how it is mentally represented, and how it is understood. The theory postulates that negation takes a single argument that refers to a set of possibilities and returns the complement of that set. Individuals therefore tend to assign a small scope to negation in order to minimize the number of models of possibilities that they have to consider. Individuals untrained in logic do not know the possibilities corresponding to the negation of compound assertions formed with if, or, and and, and have to infer the possibilities one by one. It follows that negations are easier to understand, and to formulate, when individuals already have in mind the possibilities to be negated. The paper shows that the evidence, including the results of recent studies, corroborates the theory.     

Resurgence of goal-directed actions and habits

This study investigated how goal-directed and habitual behaviors recover after extinction within the context of the resurgence effect, a form of relapse induced by the removal or worsening of alternative reinforcement. Rats were trained to press a target lever with one reinforcer (O1) for either minimal (4) or extended (16) sessions. An extinction test after the completion of O1 devaluation confirmed that minimal and extended training formed goal-directed and habitual behaviors, respectively. Then, pressing an alternative lever was reinforced with a second reinforcer (O2) while the target response was placed on extinction. When O2 was discontinued, the minimally trained target response resurged with goal-directed status as in the extinction test. However, the extinguished habitual behavior in the extensively trained rats did not recover as a habit but instead with goal-directed status, possibly due to the context specificity of habits or the introduction of a new response–reinforcer contingency. The critical finding that reinforcer devaluation consistently led to less resurgence regardless of the amount of acquisition training provides a clinical implication that coupling differential-reinforcement-of-alternative-behavior (DRA) treatments with the devaluation of the associated reinforcer of problematic behavior could effectively diminish its recurrence.     

Do beliefs about aggression predict physical aggression to partners?

Three hypotheses concerning the association between instrumental (I) and expressive (E) beliefs about aggression and physical aggression were assessed among a sample comprising students (n=40), women from a domestic violence shelter (n=29), and male prisoners (n=46), all of whom had committed at least one act of physical aggression to a partner. Participants completed an adapted version of the EXPAGG [Archer and Haigh (1997a): British Journal of Social Psychology 35:1–23] to measure I and E beliefs about aggression, the Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS) [Straus (1979): Journal of Marriage and the Family 41:75–88] for themselves and their partner, and measures of fear and injuries resulting from partner violence. I beliefs predicted self‐reported physical aggression to the partner, most CTS acts of physical aggression, and injuries to the partner, with only minor and limited associations for E beliefs. Correlations for the student and prisoner samples, and for men and women, showed different strengths. The findings supported a general link between I beliefs and aggression but offered no support for the predictions that the link would be restricted to men or to men who showed a persistent pattern of violence to their partners. Aggr. Behav. 29:41–54, 2003. © 2003 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.