Why cognitivism?

Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of ‘Practical Knowledge.’ In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one’s intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.     

On the role of indeterminism in libertarian free will

In a recent paper in this journal, “How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?” Christopher Evan Franklin critically examines my libertarian view of free will and attempts to improve upon it. He says that while Kane's influential [view] offers many important advances in the development of a defensible libertarian theory of free will and moral responsibility?…?[he made] “two crucial mistakes in formulating libertarianism” – one about the location of indeterminism, the other about its role – “both of which have helped fan the flame of the luck argument”. In this paper, I respond to Franklin's criticisms, arguing that, so far from making it significantly more difficult to answer objections about luck and control, as he claims, giving indeterminism the location and role I do makes it possible to answer such objections and many other related objections to libertarian free will. A central theme of this paper will emerge in my responses: In order to make sense of freedom of will in general and to do justice to the complex historical debates about it, one must distinguish different kinds of control agents may have over events and correspondingly different kinds of freedom they may possess.     

Reasoning,biases and dual processes: The lasting impact of Wason (1960)

Wason (1960) published a relatively short experimental paper, in which he introduced the 2-4-6 problem as a test of inductive reasoning. This paper became one of the most highly cited to be published in the Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology and is significant for a number of reasons. First, the 2-4-6 task itself was ingenious and yielded evidence of error and bias in the intelligent participants who attempted it. Research on the 2-4-6 problem continues to the present day. More importantly, it was Wason's first paper on reasoning and one which made strong claims for bias and irrationality in a period dominated by rationalist writers like Piaget. It set in motion the study of cognitive biases in thinking and reasoning, well before the start of Tversky and Kahneman's famous heuristics and biases research programme. I also show here something for which Wason has received insufficient credit. It was Wason's work on this task and his later studies of his four card selection task that led to the first development of the dual process theory of reasoning which is so dominant in the current literature on the topic more than half a century later.     

On the futility of psychiatric diagnostic manuals (DSMs) and the return of personal agency

This article critiques the most recent version of the American Psychiatric Association's (1994) Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-IV). After pointing to the procedures employed in constructing the Manual, I note that unreliability of diagnosis is still a major problem and, more important, little attention has been paid to validity. Based on the mechanistic Kraepelinian model, the Manual contributes to the increasing medicalization of distress and directs clinicians to search for causes of unwanted behavior in biochemical anomalies. The person as agent is not part of the DSM diagnostic program. As an alternative to the DSM-IV, I propose a contextualist approach to understanding unwanted conduct. The person is treated as an agent who employs strategic actions to maintain a self-narrative. Strategic actions that fail to influence relevant others to supply warrants of social validation become the targets of clinical interventions.     

Arguments in the practical reasoning underlying constructed probability responses

Reasoning is an important cognitive activity in probability assessment, and one that has been understudied. This proposition motivates the paper's three general aims. First, based on research in rhetoric, we present a theoretical means of analyzing the arguments constructed during the reasoning that occurs in probability assessment. Second, from verbal protocol data, we establish that subjects constructed arguments in forming beliefs and assessing the associated probabilities. Third, we analyze the data for the structure of subject's arguments, including argument content and form. Subjects used a limited amount of relevant evidence and used a variety of argument forms that could be characterized by the nature of the knowledge that subjects brought to bear in forming the arguments. Subjects predominantly used causal reasoning, but also employed hierarchical category knowledge, resemblance relationships, and arguments from authority. These findings form a basis for expanding our accounts of probability assessment and for improving assessment practice.     

How our brains reason logically

The aim of this article is to strengthen links between cognitive brain research and formal logic. The work covers three fundamental sorts of logical inferences: reasoning in the propositional calculus, i.e. inferences with the conditional “if...then”, reasoning in the predicate calculus, i.e. inferences based on quantifiers such as “all”, “some”, “none”, and reasoning with n-place relations. Studies with brain-damaged patients and neuroimaging experiments indicate that such logical inferences are implemented in overlapping but different bilateral cortical networks, including parts of the fronto-temporal cortex, the posterior parietal cortex, and the visual cortices. I argue that these findings show that we do not use a single deterministic strategy for solving logical reasoning problems. This account resolves many disputes about how humans reason logically and why we sometimes deviate from the norms of formal logic.

What Makes People Revise Their Beliefs Following Contradictory Anecdotal Evidence?: The Role of Systemic Variability and Direct Experience

The extent to which belief revision is affected by systematic variability and direct experience of a conditional (if A then B) relation was examined in two studies. The first used a computer generated apparatus. This presented two rows of 5 objects. Pressing one of the top objects resulted in one of the bottom objects being lit up. The 139 adult participants were given one of two levels of experience (5 or 15 trials) and one of two types of apparatus. One of these was completely uniform, while the other had an element that randomly alternated in its result. Following the testing of the apparatus, participants were asked to rate their certainty of the action of the middle element, which was always uniform (the AB belief). Then they were told of an observation inconsistent with this belief. Participants were then asked whether they considered the AB belief or the anecdotal observation to be more believable. Results showed that increased experience decreased the tendency to reject the AB belief, when the apparatus did not have any randomness. However, the presence of a single element showing random variation in the system strongly increased rejection of this belief. A second study looked at the effect of a single random element on a mechanical system as well as an electronic system using graphical representations. This confirmed the generality of the effect of randomness on belief revision, and provided support for the effects of embedding a belief into a system of relations. These results provide some insight into the complex factors that determine belief revision.     

高中生考试焦虑的团体辅导干预研究

通过对高一、高二学生被试实验组13人进行为期一周的考试焦虑团体辅导、控制组14人进行一般性团体辅导,探讨团体辅导对高中生考试焦虑水平的改善作用。结果表明,经过干预训练后,实验组被试的考试焦虑水平显著低于控制组被试、对考试重要性的认识显著优于控制组被试,但在考试策略上不存在显著差异。这意味着考试焦虑的团体辅导干预能有效地降低考试焦虑水平、提升对考试重要性的合理认识程度。     

8 OOO名河北青少年预防艾滋病基本知识掌握情况调查与分析

对8000名河北青少年进行问卷调查,表明大部分青少年对艾滋病的传播途径、预防等知识有所了解,也有一定数量的青少年对艾滋病基本知识的了解不够全面和准确.今后的艾滋病预防宣传教育需要在广度、深度上加强,注重知识性、影响性和实效性,在宣传教育上注重社会、学校、家庭教育的结合.     

时间序列关系推理研究概述

时间序列关系推理是对事件发生的先后顺序关系的推理,是日常生活思维的重要方面。已有的研究关注3类推理问题,探查了不同任务变式下成人时间序列关系推理过程和推理策略,研究结果多支持心理模型理论。未来的研究应探明3类问题的性质,从心理逻辑理论的角度深化策略的研究结果,进一步揭示推理的机制。