Blueprint for a dynamic deontic logic

Extending the idiom of dynamic logic we outline a deontic logic in which deontic operators operate on terms rather than on formulæ. In a second step we distinguish between what we call real and deontic actions.     

How to reason without words: inference as categorization

The idea that reasoning is a singular accomplishment of the human species has an ancient pedigree. Yet this idea remains as controversial as it is ancient. Those who would deny reasoning to nonhuman animals typically hold a language-based conception of inference which places it beyond the reach of languageless creatures. Others reject such an anthropocentric conception of reasoning on the basis of similar performance by humans and animals in some reasoning tasks, such as transitive inference. Here, building on the modal similarity theory of Vigo [J Exp Theor Artif Intell, 2008 (in press)], we offer an account in which reasoning depends on a core suite of subsymbolic processes for similarity assessment, discrimination, and categorization. We argue that premise-based inference operates through these subsymbolic processes, even in humans. Given the robust discrimination and categorization abilities of some species of nonhuman animals, we believe that they should also be regarded as capable of simple forms of inference. Finally, we explain how this account of reasoning applies to the kinds of transitive inferences that many nonhuman animals display.     

时序知觉重复启动效应的作用机制

先前研究发现,时序判断任务在启动的靶刺激先出现时出现了重复启动效应的反转,这是以往的理论所不能单独解释的。通过两个实验对我们提出的双加工表征匹配调节假说加以实证检验,实验结果支持了该假说。因此,双加工表征匹配调节假说能较完整地综合解释时序知觉重复启动效应的作用机制     

选择、自我表达与选择扩散效应

自我表达会影响西方人的态度, 产生选择扩散效应。国外相关的跨文化研究发现东方人不存在该效应。通过4个实验研究中国文化下自我表达对选择态度的影响, 发现选择方式(主动、被动)和自我表达形式(直接、间接)对选择态度产生影响。无论是自己的主动选择还是强加的被动选择, 直接的自我表达会增加对所获对象的喜爱程度, 表现为对获得性的肯定。研究者认为, 两种选择方式下不同的心理加工过程导致了这种获得性：直接表达使个人态度暴露在外, 进行主动选择时要对他人的给予做出肯定回应; 而进行被动选择时, 人们要减缓因利益受损可能导致的失调, 同时中国文化下的面子策略也使人们增加对所获对象的喜爱程度。不过, 间接的自我表达对选择态度的影响不明显。研究者认为, 多个影响因素的相互消长使选择态度得以维持。     

Efficient search under constraints and not working memory resources supports creative action emergence in a convergent motor task

Creative (original and functional) solutions to problems can be facilitated by guiding search behavior. According to cognitive models, when solving convergent tasks (tasks with few solutions), high available working memory (WM) resources and capacity can guide creative solution emergence via repeated (persistent) search within a solution subcategory. However, no clear associations have been found of WM capacity on creative outcomes when tasks require the individual to enact solutions in divergent doing tasks. This study further tested constraints on WM resources on search behavior and creative outcomes in a convergent doing task. Novices to combat sports were asked to repeatedly strike a target with the intent to achieve an individualized target force. In order to manipulate available WM resources, every ten strikes, participants were asked to recall and then retain a sequence of 5 digits (high load group: n = 21) or 2 digits (low load group: n = 21). The task constraints favored the functionality (or appropriateness) of a qualitatively distinct, non-obvious solution. Functionality was assessed using the force registered for each strike. Originality was assessed in terms of how infrequently actions occurred. Finally, search behavior was quantified based on changes in which limb was used and changes in which part of the limb was used from one strike to the next. There were no significant effects of WM load on creativity outcomes, solution search, or task success. Rather, task success was related to efficient search and creativity. Future research should focus on constraints (other than WM resources) that promote efficient search.     

The Port-Royal Logic's Theory of Argument

This is a critical examination of Antoine Arnauld's Logic or the Art of Thinking (1662), commonly known as the Port-Royal Logic. Rather than reading this work from the viewpoint of post-Fregean formal logic or the viewpoint of seventeenth-century intellectual history, I approach it with the aim of exploring its relationship to that contemporary field which may be labeled informal logic and/or argumentation theory. It turns out that the Port-Royal Logic is a precursor of this current field, or conversely, that this field may be said to be in the same tradition.     

Examination of personality-ability relationships in the elderly: The role of the contextual (interface) assessment mode

Personality-ability relationships in old age were examined in 71 elderly persons. Two modes of assessment were used. One consisted of measuring intellectual abilities (17 tests) and personality (6 dimensions) by means of established instruments. Intellectual abilities covered were drawn from Horn and Cattell's model of psychometric intelligence. Personality dimensions included three measures of locus of control and one measure each for achievement motivation, anxiety, and morale. The second mode of assessment was aimed directly at the interface between cognitive abilities and personality. Six such interface (context-specific) scales, involving self-assessment and attributions dealing with intellectual functioning in the context of aging, were developed using the six traditional (transcontextual) personality scales as conceptual criteria. These newly developed interface scales exhibit satisfactory convergent and discriminant validity with their transcontextual parent scales of personality. The six parent personality measures and the six personality-ability interface scales were correlated, separately, with performance scores of psychometric intelligence. Relationships between the two domains (personality, ability) were substantial and of greater magnitude when personality was assessed in the context of the personality-ability interface. Because of the conjoint anchoring of the interface scales to both personality and ability, the findings provide a basis for beginning to clarify the nature of personality-ability relationships in old age. In addition, the results support the continuation of a measurement approach to the study of interdomain relationships that includes the use of direct assessments of the domain interface, in addition to traditionally distinct measures of different domains.     

A model of plausibility

Plausibility has been implicated as playing a critical role in many cognitive phenomena from comprehension to problem solving. Yet, across cognitive science, plausibility is usually treated as an operationalized variable or metric rather than being explained or studied in itself. This article describes a new cognitive model of plausibility, the Plausibility Analysis Model (PAM), which is aimed at modeling human plausibility judgment. This model uses commonsense knowledge of concept-coherence to determine the degree of plausibility of a target scenario. In essence, a highly plausible scenario is one that fits prior knowledge well: with many different sources of corroboration, without complexity of explanation, and with minimal conjecture. A detailed simulation of empirical plausibility findings is reported, which shows a close correspondence between the model and human judgments. In addition, a sensitivity analysis demonstrates that PAM is robust in its operations.     

Do We “do”?

A normative framework for modeling causal and counterfactual reasoning has been proposed by Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines (1993; cf. Pearl, 2000). The framework takes as fundamental that reasoning from observation and intervention differ. Intervention includes actual manipulation as well as counterfactual manipulation of a model via thought. To represent intervention, Pearl employed the do operator that simplifies the structure of a causal model by disconnecting an intervened-on variable from its normal causes. Construing the do operator as a psychological function affords predictions about how people reason when asked counterfactual questions about causal relations that we refer to as undoing, a family of effects that derive from the claim that intervened-on variables become independent of their normal causes. Six studies support the prediction for causal (A causes B) arguments but not consistently for parallel conditional (if A then B) ones. Two of the studies show that effects are treated as diagnostic when their values are observed but nondiagnostic when they are intervened on. These results cannot be explained by theories that do not distinguish interventions from other sorts of events.