Biased judgments of the effects of speed change on travel time,fuel consumption and braking: Individual differences in the use of simplifying rules producing the same biases

The main purpose of this study was to identify different cognitive rules that lead to a particular judgment bias. To fulfill this purpose, a new method Spectral analysis was introduced and applied. Participants judged time saved by driving faster, fuel saved by replacing a car and braking capacity at different speeds. These problems invite the time saving bias (e.g., time saved from speed increases at higher speeds overestimated), the miles per gallon, MPG illusion (misjudgment of fuel saved by replacing a car) and the braking capacity bias (overestimation of braking capacity after speed increase). The average results replicated the biases. Spectral analysis of individual participants and problems showed that a speed difference rule explained about half of the time saving judgments and about three fourth of the MPG judgments. A difference between speeds rule described about one third of the biased braking judgments and a ratio/proportion rule about one fifth of the time saving and MPG judgments. All rules give biased judgments in all three domains. The paper ends with a discussion of hierarchies of cognitive rules, applications of the results, and how to mitigate or avoid the biases and the risks associated with the biases.     

On the Argument for Divine Timelessness from the Incompleteness of Temporal Life

A promising argument for divine timelessness is that temporal life is possessed only moment by moment, which is incompatible with the existence of a perfect being.
Since the argument is based on the experience of time's passage, it cannot be circumvented by appeal to a tenseless theory of time.
Neither can the argument be subverted by appeals to a temporal deity's possession of a specious present of infinite duration.
Nonetheless, because the argument concerns one's experience of time's passage rather than the objective reality of temporal becoming itself, it is considerably weakened by the fact that an omniscient being possessing perfect memory and foreknowledge, need not find such experience to be an imperfection.     

Shifts of criteria or neural timing? The assumptions underlying timing perception studies

In timing perception studies, the timing of one event is usually manipulated relative to another, and participants are asked to judge if the two events were synchronous, or to judge which of the two events occurred first. Responses are analyzed to determine a measure of central tendency, which is taken as an estimate of the timing at which the two events are perceptually synchronous. When these estimates do not coincide with physical synchrony, it is often assumed that the sensory signals are asynchronous, as though the transfer of information concerning one input has been accelerated or decelerated relative to the other. Here we show that, while this is a viable interpretation, it is equally plausible that such effects are driven by shifts in the criteria used to differentiate simultaneous from asynchronous inputs. Our analyses expose important ambiguities concerning the interpretation of simultaneity judgement data, which have hitherto been underappreciated.     

Improving time discrimination in children and adults in a temporal bisection task: The effects of feedback and no forced choice on decision and memory processes

In children aged 5 and 8 years old as well as in adults, Experiment 1 tested the effect of feedback on temporal performance using a bisection task. Experiment 2 added a no-forced-choice condition by giving the participants the possibility of responding “I don't know”. The results of Experiment 1 showed that providing feedback increased the bisection point value (point of subjective equality) in all age groups and increased sensitivity to time in the youngest children. The results of Experiment 2 showed that the proportion of “I don't know” responses peaked at the probe duration close to the arithmetic mean of the two anchor durations and decreased as the distance from this central value increased in both the adults and the 8-year-olds. In the 5-year-olds, the proportion of “I don't know” responses was lower and remained constant whatever the probe duration values. Unlike in the youngest children, giving the adults and the 8-year-olds the opportunity to respond “I don't know” increased their sensitivity to time. The modelling of our data suggests that providing feedback in a temporal bisection task affects both the memory and the decision processes. However, whereas the feedback-related effect had a similar effect on decision processes across the age groups, it had an opposite effect on memory processes in the 5-year-olds and the older participants, decreasing the variability of the memory representation of the anchor durations in the former while increasing it in the latter. Finally, in bisection, feedback only improved temporal performance when the memory for duration was imprecise as in the case of the children.     

Similar effects of visual perception and imagery on simple reaction time

A longstanding issue is whether perception and mental imagery share similar cognitive and neural mechanisms. To cast further light on this problem, we compared the effects of real and mentally generated visual stimuli on simple reaction time (RT). In five experiments, we tested the effects of difference in luminance, contrast, spatial frequency, motion, and orientation. With the intriguing exception of spatial frequency, in all other tasks perception and imagery showed qualitatively similar effects. An increase in luminance, contrast, and visual motion yielded a decrease in RT for both visually presented and imagined stimuli. In contrast, gratings of low spatial frequency were responded to more quickly than those of higher spatial frequency only for visually presented stimuli. Thus, the present study shows that basic dependent variables exert similar effects on visual RT either when retinally presented or when imagined. Of course, this evidence does not necessarily imply analogous mechanisms for perception and imagery, and a note of caution in such respect is suggested by the large difference in RT between the two operations. However, the present results undoubtedly provide support for some overlap between the structural representation of perception and imagery.     

The effect of scene structure on time perception

The current experiments examined the hypothesis that scene structure affects time perception. In three experiments, participants judged the duration of realistic scenes that were presented in a normal or jumbled (i.e., incoherent) format. Experiment 1 demonstrated that the subjective duration of normal scenes was greater than subjective duration of jumbled scenes. In Experiment 2, gridlines were added to both normal and jumbled scenes to control for the number of line terminators, and scene structure had no effect. In Experiment 3, participants performed a secondary task that required paying attention to scene structure, and scene structure's effect on duration judgements reemerged. These findings are consistent with the idea that perceived duration can depend on visual–cognitive processing, which in turn depends on both the nature of the stimulus and the goals of the observer.     

Development of time sensitivity: Duration ratios in time bisection

This study investigated the development of children's abilities to discriminate durations as a function of their ratio and examined whether the ability to discriminate durations that differed by a very difficult ratio is related to the development of attention capacities. Children aged 5 and 8 years, as well as adults, performed a series of temporal bisection tasks with a ratio between the short and the long anchor duration that was changed to control the difficulty of the task (5:6, 2:3, and 1:2) in two duration ranges (<1 s and >3 s). In addition, they completed neuropsychological tests in order to assess their short-term memory, working memory, and visual attention abilities. The results showed that, at ratios of 2:3 and 1:2, most participants were able to discriminate the anchor durations in bisection. However, their sensitivity to time improved, whatever the duration range, both as the distance between the anchor durations increased and with increasing age. For the smallest duration ratio (5:6), few of the children were able to discriminate the anchor durations in the bisection task in comparison to adults. Hierarchical regression analyses performed on the neuropsychological tests revealed that, for the 2:3 ratio between anchor durations, the participants' visual attention scores explained a large part of the variance in time sensitivity. The children's lower temporal sensitivity was probably due to their limited visual attention abilities, thus explaining the difficulty they experienced in discriminating very close durations (5:6).