Choice is Not True or False: The Domain of Rhetorical Argumentation

Leading contemporary argumentation theories such as those of Ralph Johnson, van Eemeren and Houtlosser, and Tindale, in their attempt to address rhetoric, tend to define rhetorical argumentation with reference to (a) the rhetorical arguer’s goal (to persuade effectively), and (b) the means he employs to do so. However, a central strand in the rhetorical tradition itself, led by Aristotle, and arguably the dominant view, sees rhetorical argumentation as defined with reference to the domain of issues discussed. On that view, the domain of rhetorical argumentation is centered on choice of action in the civic sphere, and the distinctive nature of issues in this domain is considered crucial. Hence, argumentation theories such as those discussed, insofar as they do not see rhetoric as defined by its distinctive domain, apply an understanding of rhetoric that is historically inadequate. It is further suggested that theories adopting this understanding of rhetoric risk ignoring important distinctive features of argumentation about action.

A microgenetic model of paragrammatisms produced by a schizophrenic speaker

A series of papers appearing in Brain and Language ask whether schizophrenic language irregularities can be understood in linguistic terms. This literature is reviewed and the contrary positions of different authors are highlighted. The clinical presentation of a schizophrenic male is described. In a single interview he produced a set of paragrammatical errors which are noteworthy insofar as they indicate sustained epochs of diminished expressivity. In this sense, they differ from schizophasic deviance, which is described by Lecours and Vanier-Clement (Brain and Language, 3, 516-565, 1976) as an enhanced expressivity cooccurring with intact language competence. They are also partially decodable, which distinguishes them from the schizophrenic segments discussed by Chaika. Analyses of the paragrammatisms indicate disruptions at three discrete representational levels. One involves the formation of abstract speaker intentions, while the second organizes syntagms into some serial form, and the third level takes content words belonging to a particular syntagm and positions them in a syntactic frame. A microgenic model of these representational planes is proposed that is based on the theoretical perspective of Brown, as well as Garrett's investigations of normal speech errors. The model is justified insofar as the paragrammatisms indicate "linguistic regressions" back to more "thought-like" linguistic representations. Moreover, a recapitulation of specific linguistic mappings is demonstrated to occur between processing levels. This microgenetic model represents an extension of previous work in aphasiology insofar as it targets combinatorial rather than selectional processes as primary planes of disruption.     

The Open-Ended Legacy of Ralph Wendell Burhoe

Through cultivating my thinking, along with that of many others, Ralph Burhoe taught me to understand myself in relational terms. He helped me to appreciate religious traditions on scientific grounds and to see how religion adapts to changing conditions even as it continues to provide meaning and guidance to the wider culture. He restored my belief in an ever-present sovereign God when God is understood in terms of function and system.     

The classification of children's knowledge: development on the balance-scale and inclined-plane tasks

R.S. Siegler (1981, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 46 C2, Serial No. 189) has shown that performance on several Piagetian tasks is governed by similar rule structures. The purpose of the first study was to extend his analysis to the inclined-plane task, replicate his original observations about development on the balance-scale task, and determine the consistency in children's rule usage across tasks. We found that Siegler's (1981) binary decision representations adequately characterized development on these tasks, and there was fair correspondence of rule classifications across tasks. An alternative classification procedure, used to diagnose the rules of children who failed our original classification criteria, showed that most of these children's performance patterns were very similar to Siegler's rule patterns. In the second experiment, we improved the diagnosticity of our rule-assessment protocol in light of F. Wilkening and N. H. Anderson's (1982, Psychological Bulletin, 92, 215-237) criticisms, and observed that many Rule III children's predictions were associated with those of integration rules on both tasks. Despite these methodological improvements, many children, especially 5- to 7-year-olds, evidenced use of centration and lexicographic strategies, suggesting that these classifications are not simply an artifact of problem sampling. Some of the problems associated with the classification of children's knowledge are discussed.     

ANTIVOLUNTARISM AND THE BIRTH OF AUTONOMY

Traditionalist and radical orthodox critiques of the Enlightenment assert that the modern discourse on moral self‐government constitutes a radical break with the theocentric model of morality which preceded it. Against this view, this paper argues that the conceptions of autonomy emerged from the effort to reconcile commitments within the Christian tradition. Through an analysis of the moral thought of the Cambridge Platonist Ralph Cudworth, this paper contends that distinctively Christian theological concerns concerning moral accountability to God and the character of divine‐human moral relationships produced a theory of moral autonomy which anticipates that of Kant. This paper highlights the role of anti‐voluntarism in the creation of this moral standpoint, and argues that the resultant moral view is an “internalization” of the voluntarist model of sovereignty.     

A Concept Divided: Ralph Johnson's Definition of Argument

Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000) is a major contribution to the field of informal logic, but the concept of argument that is central to its project suffers from a tension between the components that comprise it. This paper explores and addresses that tension by examining the implications of each of five aspects of the definition of argument.     

TURNING STONES INTO BREAD: DEVELOPING SYNERGISTIC SCIENCE/RELIGION APPROACHES TO THE WORLD FOOD CRISIS

The Institute on Religion in an Age of Science (IRAS) has a long history of delivering conferences addressing topics of interest in the field of science and religion. The following papers from the 2013 summer conference on “The Scientific, Spiritual, and Moral Challenges in Solving the World Food Crisis” are, in keeping with the eclectic nature of these conferences, very different in content and approach. Such differences underline the challenges of synergistically combining scientific and religious insights to increase understanding of global problems and their possible solutions. This in turn reflects deeper questions about the purpose and nature of the science/religion dialogue. These papers suggest various ways in which the two perspectives can be combined in the pursuit of building better understandings of food‐related issues, as well as highlighting difficulties and limitations which need to be addressed if the fruits of such dialogue are to make a wider impact. As such they serve as useful pointers for how this type of science/religion interaction might be further developed and deployed.     

"Miles within Millimeters" and Other Awe–Inspiring Facts about Our "Mortarboard" Human Cortex

Consideration of the amazing organized intricacy of human cortical anatomy entails a deeper appreciation of nature that is fully consistent with a mature religious spirit. A brain seems at first glance to be a mere lump of grayish claylike stuff, but facts of basic neuroanatomy compel us to consider that this particular kind of stuff may really contain all the richly tangible and richly ghostly inner essences of emotion, thought, and behavior. Humans are the "college graduates" of evolution. The human cortex is 3,400 times the volume of, yet only slightly thicker (about 3 millimeters) than, that of the mouse. This remarkable sheet is as thin as a graduation-day "mortarboard" cap, but its 2,600 square centimeter area is four times as large (about 20 × 20 inches if a square; both metric and English units used deliberately). Zooming in, there are about 50 billion cortical neurons; though named after "pyramids," they are more like tiny "magic trees," with branches and roots so long and fine that there are 1 or 2 miles of these electrically scintillating fibers within each cubic millimeter of cortex. Cortical neurons communicate intimately: viewed from above, beneath a single square millimeter 100,000 nerve cells intertwine; each such neuron makes 5,000 or more connections with others. These and many additional amazing facts about brain tissue, together with some conjectures about dense connectedness in the mathematics of graph theory, help to bear out the groundwork prepared by such pioneers as Ralph Wendell Burhoe that the spirit and knowledge of science might rejoin that of religion. If it takes enchanted matter to contain consciousness, this is a kind of enchantment that science may well be able to penetrate for eventual thoroughgoing understanding. Inevitable by-products will be greater reverence for nature and greater awe at the mystery of nature's origin.     

Johnson on the Metaphysics of Argument

This paper responds to two aspects of Ralph Johnson's Manifest Rationality (2000). The first is his critique of deductivism. The second is his failure to make room for some species of argument (e.g., visual and kisceral arguments) proposed by recent commentators. In the first case, Johnson holds that argumentation theorists have adopted a notion of argument which is too narrow. In the second, that they have adopted one which is too broad. I discuss the case Johnson makes for both claims, and possible objections to his analysis.