ADAM SMITH ON THE EMERGENCE OF MORALS: A REPLY TO EUGENE HEATH

In this paper I argue that there is an affinity between Reid and Husserl, or at least between Reid and what I shall call the ‘Austrian’ Husserl as opposed to the ‘German’ Husserl. The first is a realist, the scourge of psychologism, a sober and painstaking analyst of the various kinds of intentional experience, for whom such analysis is just an extension of ontology. The second is a radical idealist, closer to Fichte than to Kant. In describing the structures of ‘transcendental’ consciousness he takes himself to be describing the ‘origin’ of the world and everything in it, including himself as a psychophysical entity. He sees the history of philosophy as being determined by an inner telos, such that it culminates in his own transcendental phenomenology, of which he is the mere instrument.     

FREGE IN CONTEXT

Although the Cambridge Professor of Mental Philosophy and Logic James Ward was once one of Britain's most highly regarded Psychologists and Philosophers, today his work is unjustly neglected. This is because his philosophy is frequently misrepresented as a reactionary anti-naturalistic idealist theism. In this article, I argue, first, that this reading is false, and that by viewing Ward through the lens of pragmatism we obtain a fresh interpretation of his work that highlights the scientific nature of his philosophy and his original and promising theory of ‘evolutionary Kantianism’, with its applications to the philosophy of mind, epistemology, and metaphysics. Second, I show that reading Ward as a pragmatist provides us with (1) a more complex history of the reception of pragmatism at Cambridge at the turn of the twentieth century than the straightforwardly hostile one traditionally told; and (2) a more detailed understanding of the wide range of philosophical problems to which pragmatism was deemed at this time to have an appropriate application.     

Hilda Oakeley on Idealism,History and the Real Past

In the early twentieth century, Hilda Diana Oakeley (1867–1950) set out a new kind of British idealism. Oakeley is an idealist in the sense that she holds mind to actively contribute to the features of experience, but she also accepts that there is a world independent of mind. One of her central contributions to the idealist tradition is her thesis that minds construct our experiences using memory. This paper explores the theses underlying her idealism, and shows how they are intricately connected to the wider debates of her period. I go on to explain how the parts of Oakeley's idealism are connected to further areas of her thought – specifically, her views on history and her growing block theory of time – to provide a sense of Oakeley's philosophy as a system. As there is no existing literature on Oakeley, this paper aims to open a path for further scholarship.     

Knowledge and Power in Plato’s Political Thought

Abstract

Plato justifies the concentration and exercise of power for persons endowed with expertise in political governance. This article argues that this justification takes two distinctly different sets of arguments. The first is what I shall call his ‘ideal political philosophy’ described primarily in the Republic as rule by philosopher‐kings wielding absolute authority over their subjects. Their authority stems solely from their comprehension of justice, from which they make political judgements on behalf of their city‐state. I call the second set of arguments Plato’s ‘practical political philosophy’ underlying his later thought, where absolute rule by philosopher‐kings is undermined by the impure character of all political knowledge. Whereas the complete comprehension of justice sanctions the absolute political power of those with this expertise, partial knowledge of justice disallows for such a large investment of power. Plato’s practical political philosophy argues for a mixed theory of governance fusing the institutions of monarchy with democracy in the best practical city‐state. Thus, Plato comes to realize the insurmountable difficulties of his ideal political thought, preferring a more practical political philosophy instead.     

Solov'ëvs Letzte Philosophie – Eine Annäherung an Kant?

In his last, uncompleted essayTeoreticheskaja filosofija (1897–1899)Vladimir Solov'ëv seems to acknowledge thecentral statements of Kant's epistemology andphilosophy of subjectivity in a manner whichhas lead many interpretators to think that hewanted to revise substantially his earlierphilosophy. A closer look at Solov'ëv'sarguments show, however, that this is not thecase: his critique of the Cartesian concept ofsubjectivity does not allow him to embraceKantianism, either. So it must be stated thateven Solov'ëv does not, in the last instance,abandon the primarily Anti-Kantian positions ofRussian idealism.     

从理想主义到经验主义——试论传统道德教化价值目标的现代性转向

建立在宗法血缘等级和农耕文明之上的、以儒家文化为中心的伦理教化传统具有浓郁的道德理想主义质素 ,并成为我们现代性历程中根深蒂固的思维方式。在走向市场经济秩序和社会主义民主法治建设的过程中 ,我们需要反思道德理想主义 ,又不陷入道德虚无主义 ;既不保守 ,也不激进 ;超越致用的思维 ,以辩证的心态来思考当代中国社会所面临的伦理价值问题。     

Rigidity of the far‐right? Motivated social cognition in a nationally representative sample of Hungarians on the eve of the far‐right breakthrough in the 2010 elections

We investigated the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis in the context of the far‐right breakthrough in the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary elections. This hypothesis suggests that psychological characteristics having to do with need for security and certainty attract people to a broad‐based right‐wing ideology. A nationally representative sample (N = 1000) in terms of age, gender and place of residence was collected by means of the random walking method and face‐to‐face interviews. Voters of JOBBIK (n = 124), the radically nationalist conservative far‐right party, scored lower on System Justifying Belief, Belief in a Just World (Global) and higher on Need for Cognition than other voters. Our results contradict the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis: JOBBIK voters scored, on many measures, opposite to what the hypothesis would predict.     

Editors’ Introduction to ‘Hegel and Sellars’: A Special Issue of International Journal of Philosophical Studies

ABSTRACT

In our Introduction to the special issue on Hegel and Sellars, we explain why there needs to be a more detailed analysis of the similarities and differences between Hegel and Sellars. Sellars is usually regarded as closer to Kant than to Hegel, but this obscures the more Hegelian features of his theoretical and practical philosophy. We briefly describe each article in the special issue.     

Die Wüste Des Realen: Slavoj Žižek Und Der Deutsche Idealismus

Part of Slavoj iek's philosophical background is located in German idealism. In this article, his relation to German idealism is critically assessed, and the key to this assessment is found in iek's favorite medium: film. In film, reality can only appear as a new image, replacing an old reality as fictitious, the real itself, however, remains unreachable by thought. At this point, a parallel with German idealism appears: it was Kant who turned reality into a desert, and Hegel and Schelling who tried to retrieve it. Siding with Adorno and Heidegger, iek reaches a negative conclusion that does justice to neither German idealism nor indeed Schelling. His use of German idealism is one-sided and selective, regardless of the fact that it allows him to formulate an adequate critique of Western society. Perceiving a parallel between iek's conception of cinema and Kantian imagination [Einbildungskraft], the final conclusion is that he approaches German idealism not in terms of its conceptual system-character, but in terms of sensual multiplicity, not seeking unity in it, but precisely fragmentation.     

Functional relations and cognitive psychology: Lessons from human performance and animal research

We consider requirements for effective interdisciplinary communication and explore alternative interpretations of “building bridges between functional and cognitive psychology.” If the bridges are intended to connect radical behaviourism and cognitive psychology, or functional contextualism and cognitive psychology, the efforts are unlikely to be successful. But if the bridges are intended to connect functional relationships and cognitive theory, no construction is needed because the bridges already exist within cognitive psychology. We use human performance and animal research to illustrate the latter point and to counter the claim that the functional approach is unique in offering a close relationship between science and practice. Effective communication will be enhanced and, indeed, may only occur if the goal of functional contextualism extends beyond just “the advancement of functional contextual cognitive and behavioral science and practice” to “the advancement of cognitive and behavioral science and practice” without restriction.