ROCKMORE ON ANALYTIC PRAGMATISM

Abstact: This article responds critically to Tom Rockmore's essay “On Classical and Neo‐Analytic Forms of Pragmatism,” which appeared in Metaphilosophy in 2005. Rockmore charges analytic pragmatism with having a conflicted epistemology, relying on incoherent appropriations of Hegel, and maintaining an unpragmatic commitment to metaphysical realism. We rebut these charges by arguing that what Rockmore sees as conflicted in analytic pragmatist epistemology is simply fallibilism, that appropriations of Hegel needn't be as global as Rockmore claims, and that commitments to metaphysical realism need not disqualify philosophers from being pragmatists.     

On the Philosophical Relevance of Marx＇s Views Today

This paper revisits some of Marx＇s central philosophical ideas with the attempt to understand the thinker＇s real place in the history of the Western philosophical tradition. It does not only show that the philosophical dimension is central to Marx＇s economic and political works, and therefore his contributions to philosophy merit special investigation, but it also argues that Marx is a descendant of classic German philosophy, and thus his views should be assessed in the context of the development of the philosophical ideas that emerged within that tradition.     

Engineering Eden: Does Earthly Pursuit of Eternal Life Threaten the Future of Religion?

The eternal life promised by many religions is mirrored by the drastically longer lifespans proposed by radical life extension (RLE) and transhumanism (H+). RLE and H+ represent extreme contingents of longevity research among the broader scientific initiatives to extend the length and quality of human life. In striving toward literal immortality, these movements offer an “alternative” to the spiritual eternity that functions as a religious solution to fear of death and loss. In this article, we probe the question of whether a radically extended—even eternal—life through advancements in biotechnology could replace religion as a means of managing this terror of death.     

Kant and the Problem of Recognition: Freedom,Transcendental Idealism,and the Third-Person

Kant wants to show that freedom is possible in the face of natural necessity. Transcendental idealism is his solution, which locates freedom outside of nature. I accept that this makes freedom possible, but object that it precludes the recognition of other rational agents. In making this case, I trace some of the history of Kant’s thoughts on freedom. In several of his earlier works, he argues that we are aware of our own activity. He later abandons this approach, as he worries that any awareness of our activity involves access to the noumenal, and thereby conflicts with the epistemic limits of transcendental idealism. In its place, from the second Critique onwards, Kant argues that we are conscious of the moral law, which tells me that I ought to do something, thus revealing that I can. This is the only proof of freedom consistent with transcendental idealism, but I argue that such an exclusively first-personal approach precludes the (third-personal) recognition of other rational agents. I conclude that transcendental idealism thus fails to provide an adequate account of freedom. In its place, I sketch an alternative picture of how freedom is possible, one that locates freedom within, rather than outside of nature.     

Reclaiming alterity: strangeness and the queering of Islam in medieval and early modern Spain

ABSTRACT

This essay argues for the reclamation of radical alterity or the intentional embracing of difference/otherness/strangeness by Muslims as a location of solidarity with marginalized communities, who have been historically ostracized due to sexuality. As the initial social location of Islam vis-á-vis medieval and early modern Christendom, the rehabilitation of Muslim alterity/otherness today serves as a location for solidarity with other marginalized groups such as members of the LGBTQ community. The chosen historical timeframe of medieval and early modern Spain helps to situate this conversation both inside and on the fringes of European Christendom. This essay seeks to accomplish this by mining both Muslim and Christian sources in medieval and early modern Iberia with special attention being paid to discourses located at the intersections of Islamophobia and sexuality. The texts discussed allow for a more thorough investigation of Muslim alterity in the Iberian context, while serving as a launch point for deeper discussions of contemporary religious and sexual hierarchies.     

Missed Opportunities: Speculation on What Japanese Psychology Could Have Been

Takasuna (Integr. Physiol. Behav. Sci. 41, 2007) mentioned the ease with which evolutionary theory was accepted by Japanese psychologists, and certainly this is admirable. He also mentioned the stubborn force which had to be used to gain an understanding of the (thoroughly Western) subjective–objective distinction. Alas, during the formative years of Japanese psychology, there was much philosophical work afoot attempting to destroy that distinction. It is speculated that only a small change of which books were translated, or with which Americans early Japanese psychologists trained under, would have made Japan into a haven for these still underdog theories.     

论医学浮躁:抹不去的伤痕

我国医学科研和医学事业中的浮躁,是历史留下的时代伤痕。现代社会的生活节奏也在催生医学浮躁,浮躁的后果是严重影响医学事业的发展;医学浮躁与医学不端行为既有联系,又有区别;用群众运动的办法对待医学科研和医学事业是错误的;浮躁的认识根源是主观唯心主义。应从历史中吸取教训。     

汉字部件水平的重复知盲效应

本研究采用不同部件特点的汉字材料考察在汉字部件水平的重复知盲效应。实验1探究在一组刺激序列中,当两个关键刺激R1和R2的相同部件在不同位置时对重复知盲效应的影响。实验1结果表明,不同条件的重复知盲效应存在显著差异,但其中两个关键字中相同部件的位置相同时与部件位置不同时之间的重复知盲效应无显著差异,这表明部件位置对重复知盲现象无显著影响。实验2探究当关键刺激R1和R2为部件包含关系时的重复知盲效应。实验2结果表明,当一个关键刺激为独体字,且是另一个关键刺激的部件时存在重复知盲效应,其效应的大小会受到具有包含关系的两个关键字（合体字和独体字）在刺激序列中出现顺序的影响,当第二个关键刺激为独体字时的重复知盲效应要显著强于第二个关键刺激为合体字条件。研究结论是不同的汉字部件特点会影响重复之盲效应,这表明重复知盲现象很可能发生在在线的知觉加工过程。     

Liberal naturalism,objectivity and the autonomy of the mental

ABSTRACT

The paper distinguishes between two different ways of cashing out the general insight that often goes by the name of ‘liberal naturalism’. The objective is to show how these two different argumentative strategies undergird two fundamentally different approaches to the project of elucidating the specificity of mental phenomena. On one approach, the central concern of such a project is the ontological status of subjective conscious phenomena; on the other, the central concern is the irreducibility of parochial capacities in the adoption of intentional stances. I begin by tracing out some of the origins of this important divergence and then focus on the motivations of the latter approach. I show that there is a tension between its motivations and the way that it has been used to rehabilitate idealist themes from the post-Kantian tradition.     

Users’ resistance towards radical innovations: The case of the self-driving car

In this paper we unpack and examine attitudes and potential barriers of end-users towards the self-driving car. We explore whether drivers have (mental) barriers and/or show resistance towards the self-driving car and, given such barriers and resistance are identified, investigate the main underlying reasons. Further, we suggest potential strategic implications for automotive companies and avenues to overcome, or at least mitigate, drivers’ barriers. The paper contributes to a better understanding of end-users’ opinions on radical innovations such as the self-driving car and strives to add value by linking scientific insights from both psychology as well as innovation literature. Only a limited number of studies so far have dealt with the potential barriers of users towards the self-driving car; therefore, it is our intent to provide first empirical evidence to trigger further research and foster a broader discussion on this relevant topic.