Attention can operate on semantic objects defined by individual Chinese characters

Attention can select perceptual objects, but it is less clear whether attention can operate on objects defined by higher level cognition, such as semantic associations. Recent studies have shown that attention may be based on objects defined by Chinese two-character compound words, suggesting that attention can operate on semantic objects. In the present study, object-based attention (OBA) effect was investigated at the level of individual Chinese characters, and the role of character structure and radical order in OBA was explored by using a spatial cueing paradigm. In Experiment 1, we found OBA effect for conditions that had legal radical order, but not for other conditions in which the radical order information was disrupted. Character structure, however, had no influence on the OBA effect. In Experiment 2, we observed OBA effect for all conditions after enhancing the radical order and character structure information by adding perceptual cues. The results extend previous findings of a “semantic object”-based attention effect from the two-character word level to the individual character level. Moreover, we found that radical order but not character structure was important for this semantic OBA effect. We conclude that visual attention can be based on semantic objects at the level of individual characters, and that the development of semantic objects is affected by the perceptual grouping of the radicals.     

Contingency Horizon: on Private Events and the Analysis of Behavior

Skinner’s radical behaviorism incorporates private events as biologically based phenomena that may play a functional role with respect to other (overt) behavioral phenomena. Skinner proposed four types of contingencies, here collectively termed the contingency horizon, which enable certain functional relations between private events and verbal behavior. The adequacy and necessity of this position has met renewed challenges from Rachlin’s teleological behaviorism and Baum’s molar behaviorism, both of which argue that all “mental” phenomena and terminology may be explained by overt behavior and environment–behavior contingencies extended in time. A number of lines of evidence are presented in making a case for the functional characteristics of private events, including published research from behavior analysis and general experimental psychology, as well as verbal behavior from a participant in the debate. An integrated perspective is offered that involves a multiscaled analysis of interacting public behaviors and private events.     

Rigidity of the far‐right? Motivated social cognition in a nationally representative sample of Hungarians on the eve of the far‐right breakthrough in the 2010 elections

We investigated the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis in the context of the far‐right breakthrough in the 2010 Hungarian parliamentary elections. This hypothesis suggests that psychological characteristics having to do with need for security and certainty attract people to a broad‐based right‐wing ideology. A nationally representative sample (N = 1000) in terms of age, gender and place of residence was collected by means of the random walking method and face‐to‐face interviews. Voters of JOBBIK (n = 124), the radically nationalist conservative far‐right party, scored lower on System Justifying Belief, Belief in a Just World (Global) and higher on Need for Cognition than other voters. Our results contradict the “rigidity of the right” hypothesis: JOBBIK voters scored, on many measures, opposite to what the hypothesis would predict.     

Functional relations and cognitive psychology: Lessons from human performance and animal research

We consider requirements for effective interdisciplinary communication and explore alternative interpretations of “building bridges between functional and cognitive psychology.” If the bridges are intended to connect radical behaviourism and cognitive psychology, or functional contextualism and cognitive psychology, the efforts are unlikely to be successful. But if the bridges are intended to connect functional relationships and cognitive theory, no construction is needed because the bridges already exist within cognitive psychology. We use human performance and animal research to illustrate the latter point and to counter the claim that the functional approach is unique in offering a close relationship between science and practice. Effective communication will be enhanced and, indeed, may only occur if the goal of functional contextualism extends beyond just “the advancement of functional contextual cognitive and behavioral science and practice” to “the advancement of cognitive and behavioral science and practice” without restriction.     

A Model for Structural Changes of Belief

The paper suggests a way of modeling belief changes within the tradition of formal belief revision theories. The present model extends the scope of traditional proposals, such as AGM, so as to take care of “structural belief changes” – a type of radical shifts that is best illustrated with, but not limited to, instances of scientific discovery; we obtain AGM expansions and contractions as limiting cases. The representation strategy relies on a non-standard use of a semantic machinery. More precisely, the model seeks to correlate knowledge states with interpretations of a given formal language L, in such a way that the epistemic state of an agent at a given time gives rise to a picture of how things could be, if there weren’t anything else to know. Interpretations of L proceed along supervaluational ideas; hence, the model as a whole can be seen as a particular application of supervaluational semantics to epistemic matters. Presented by Hannes Leitgeb     

"良知坎陷":牟宗三的思想脉络与理论开展

在牟宗三哲学发展中,"良知坎陷"说有认识论、历史文化论和存有论三义。"良知坎陷"说的理论开展,既表现为存有论意义上的理论综合,也体现在以"道德实践"对"坎陷"所作的理论规定。在"良知坎陷"说中,存在着文化诉求与哲学思考的思想纠结。由于对"坎陷"之辩证义的独特规定,牟宗三存有论意义的"良知坎陷"既不同于黑格尔绝对精神的辩证开展,也改造了康德现象与物自身超越区分的理论架构,展露出"彻底的唯心论"的基本意蕴,具有新的理论意义。     

Minimal Empiricism Without Dogmas

John McDowell has defended a position called minimal empiricism, that aims to avoid the oscillation between traditional empiricism’s commitment to a set of contents working as external justifiers for our system of beliefs and a coherentist position where our thought receives no constraint from the world. We share McDowell’s dissatisfaction with both options, but find his minimal empiricism committed to the idea of a tribunal of experience where isolated contents are infused into our network of inferences. This commitment is prone to sceptical attacks and waters down McDowell’s holism. We propose to retain McDowell’s partial re-enchantment of nature—without appealing to McDowell’s Kantian conception of experience—, and argue that it is sufficient to avoid the oscillation and to make sense of the objectivity of thought.

Not Scotist

Abstract

Several lines of recent scholarship have identified developing Protestant thought as Scotist and, specifically, have contended a dominance of the Scotist concept of the univocity of being in early modern Protestantism. The present essay examines early-modern Reformed metaphysics and theology and demonstrates that the contention is unfounded. Rather, the more typical approach to the language of being and related issues of predication concerning God and creatures in Reformed circles was advocacy of the analogia entis, often understood in a classical Thomist manner as an analogy of proportionality.     

Ricoeur and the pre-political

We argue that Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative and alienation provides a largely untapped, though potentially fruitful way of re-thinking the question of political agency within the context of globalization. We argue that the political agency of many around the world has been placed in an exceedingly fragile position due to the rapid pace of globalization, the movement of multi-national corporations from their previous national headquarters, etc. We use Ricoeur’s work to argue that the alienation of globalization is not something that can be simply overcome either in a unified world-state or a retreat to protectionist nationalism, because institutional mediation—and consequently alienation—is in some sense constitutive of all politics: the world of political representation operates by its own set of rules, which are at least partially disconnected from the represented world. Using the work of Mouffe, a radical democratic theorist, we then flesh out an ideal of agonistic citizenship (which recognizes both the need for and the inevitability of discursive struggle in politics) in a number of overlapping communities of interest, rather than tying political participation solely to the sovereign government of my state. The state will remain important, but because globalization has disenfranchised so many from their participation in “local” modes of self-governance (tied to the state in which they live), we have a responsibility to re-envision what political participation means outside the traditional context of the state. Rather than merely citizens of a particular state, we need to begin thinking of ourselves politically—and then acting—as “citizens” of Green Peace, Human Rights Watch, Doctors Without Borders, or whatever other supra-local concrete universals or communities of interest to which we belong, investing the time and energy there that we might previously have invested solely in our state’s government. (By implication, we must also ensure that these organizations work in transparent democratic ways themselves.) We believe that by re-plotting our narratives of political engagement in this way, we can positively respond to the alienation created by globalization, while avoiding both the extremes of “McWorld” (hyperglobalism) and “Jihad” (complete skepticism towards, or war against globalization) that Benjamin Barber and David Held have recently described.

Beyond perceptual symbols: A call for representational pluralism

Recent evidence from cognitive neuroscience suggests that certain cognitive processes employ perceptual representations. Inspired by this evidence, a few researchers have proposed that cognition is inherently perceptual. They have developed an innovative theoretical approach that rests on the notion of perceptual simulation and marshaled several general arguments supporting the centrality of perceptual representations to concepts. In this article, I identify a number of weaknesses in these arguments and defend a multiple semantic code approach that posits both perceptual and non-perceptual representations.