See the devil and tame him

Born in 1921, professor of philosophy at the University of Warsaw and art theory in the Polish Academy of Sciences; has published twelve books and more than three hundred articles (bibliography in volume 14 of A. Mercier (ed.).Philosophers on Their Own Work. Bern: 1990) ranging over the history of aesthetics, Marxist and Soviet aesthetics, and issues related to the status of the arts in contemporary Western culture.     

Brexit or Bremain? A person and social analysis of voting decisions in the EU referendum

The period following UK's European Union referendum in 2016 foreshadows significant social and political change in the UK. The current research draws on social psychological theories to empirically examine the drivers of voting decisions during the referendum. We report the results of a prospective study using structural equation modelling with data (N = 244) collected just before, and self‐reported voting behaviour immediately following (N = 197), the European Union referendum. We employ a person and social approach to examine the additive roles of worldview, conservatism, social identity, and intergroup threat as predictors of voting intentions and behaviour. Results showed that person factors (worldview and conservatism) predicted voting intentions through social factors (European identity and realistic threat) and that intentions predicted behaviour. The results highlight the importance of addressing threat‐based intergroup rhetoric and the potential of common in‐group identity to mitigate psychological threat.     

The Patriarchal Mind as the Ignored Root of Interpersonal and Social Pathologies

The article begins with an integrative theory of neurosis and with the notion of the “patriarchal mind,” which I conceive as the psycho-social foundation of what we call “civilisation” and proceed to characterize as a despotic and repressive activity of the father on the mother and on the child in the family, and also of an analogous relation between the intellect on the emotional and on the instinctual sub-selves in the individual mind. Next, I propose that patriarchy entails four interrelated problems: (1) violent authority; (2) the eclipse of caring; (3) the repression of instinct; and (4) the invalidation of intuition; and point out that since these are evident in our well-recognized social problems, these may be traced down to the “patriarchal complex” that in turn defines patriarchal society. Finally, I develop the idea that not only is the patriarchal mind is embodied in each of the known interpersonal or character pathologies, but that each of these pathologies contributes to the systemic and cultural presence of the patriarchal mind. The corollary of this analysis is that the healing of both our interpersonal and social pathologies will depend on the healing of the patriarchal mind, which is conceivably possible to bring about through a specially designed education oriented to the balanced development of “three-brained beings,” in whom a balance has been achieved between the intellectual, emotional, and instinctive sub-selves that constitute our mind.     

Commentary on neoliberal ideology in work and organizational psychology

I welcome the paper on Neoliberal ideology in WOP as a valuable critique of Work and Organizational Psychology (WOP) encouraging practitioners and researchers to think carefully about what they are trying to achieve and how they make sense of the world of work.     

试论管仲人才思想中的民本因素--以《管子》为中心

民本思想是齐文化的重要组成部分,也是管仲施政思想的基石,其言论．行动中都展示着民本思想的精华。而体现管仲思想的《管子》一书,对人才思想有较系统的论述。本文试以管仲为例,以《管子》一书为中心,来探析其人才思想中的民本因素,即“任其所长,不任其所短”的人才原则,包括其产生原因、表现方式、对后世所带来的社会影响等。     

Eliminating national stereotypes: Direct versus indirect disconfirmation of beliefs in covariation

Two modes of disconfirmation of national stereotypes were compared. It was hypo-thesized that stereotypes should be revised either by stereotype-inconsistent cases from the primary target (i.e., direct disconfirmation) or by instances which belong to an alternative target but possess features stereotypic of the primary target (indirect disconfirmation). It was further predicted that politically liberal individuals would show greater change in their national stereotypes than conservatives. Two experiments were conducted in which the salience of directly and indirectly disconfirming information regarding different nations was manipulated. The results indicated that indirect disconfirmation generally had as much impact as direct disconfirmation, but that the effects were particularly visible among liberal participants. Conservatives tended to respond in a reactive manner which preserved or exaggerated their original views. A new theoretical framework for the study of stereotype change and implications for its application were discussed.     

On the Relation Between Religiosity and the Endorsement of Conspiracy Theories: The Role of Political Orientation

Religious and conspiracy beliefs share the feature of assuming powerful forces that determine the fate of the world. Correspondingly, they have been theorized to address similar psychological needs and to be based on similar cognitions, but there exist little authoritative answers about their relationship. We delineate two theory-driven possibilities. If conspiracy theories and religions serve as surrogates for each other by fulfilling similar needs, the two beliefs should be negatively correlated. If conspiracy and religious beliefs stem from the same values and cognitions, this would speak for a positive correlation that might be diminished—for example—by controlling for shared political ideologies. We approached the question with a meta-analysis (N = 10,242), partial correlations from large Christian-dominated datasets from Germany, Poland, and the United States (N = 12,612), and a preregistered U.S. study (N = 500). The results indicate that the correlations between religiosity and conspiracy theory endorsement were positive, and political orientation shared large parts of this covariance. Correlations of religiosity with the more need-related conspiracy mentality differed between countries. We conclude that similarities in the explanatory style and ideologies seem to be central for the relation between intrinsic religiosity and endorsing conspiracy theories, but psychological needs only play a minor role.     

Why do U.S. conservatives take fewer COVID-19 precautions? The role of worry,perceived risk,and governmental trust

Research suggests a U.S. political ideology gap for taking COVID-19 precautions, but we do not know the role of cognitive risk (assessed here as perceived risk) and affective risk (assessed here as worry) in explaining why conservative Americans participated in fewer recommended precautions (e.g., mask wearing) and whether governmental trust attenuates the effect. We predicted that conservatives (compared with liberals) would take fewer precautions because they thought they were less at risk and were less worried about COVID-19, but that this would be more pronounced for those with low governmental trust. In this study, U.S. adults (representative sample: N = 738; M_age = 46.8; 52% women; 78% white) who had not had COVID-19 took two online surveys 2 weeks apart during the first wave of the pandemic (April 2020). Participants reported ideology, perceived risk of getting or dying of COVID-19, worry about COVID-19, and trust in the CDC and state officials at baseline. At follow-up, participants reported on COVID-19 precautions: (1) prevention behavior participation (e.g., mask wearing) and (2) behavioral willingness for future behaviors (e.g., vaccination). Results showed that, politically conservative Americans took fewer precautions due to lower worry (but unexpectedly not due to lower perceived risk). As predicted, when trust was high, the ideology gap was muted for predicting precautions as well as for predicting perceived risk and worry. In sum, conservatives worried less about COVID-19 which predicted fewer precautions, but trust in governmental institutions reduced this ideological gap. Improving governmental trust could be one fruitful path to increasing COVID-19 precautions.     

Swapping Gender Traditionalism: Christianity,Buddhism, and Gender Ideology in South Korea

South Korea provides an ideal setting for studying religion and gender because Western and local religions are both prominent, and Confucianist beliefs still shape gender norms. Using the 2018 Korean General Social Survey, this study examines the extent to which two dimensions of gender traditionalism in South Korea–Confucian patriarchal ideology (i.e., belief in the subordination of women for Confucian patriarchy) and separate spheres ideology (i.e., belief that men are better suited to work and women to domestic responsibilities)—vary across Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants, and the nonaffiliated. The findings show that Christians have the lowest endorsement for Confucian patriarchal ideology while supporting separate spheres ideology as much as Buddhists, who are most gender traditional in both dimensions. The results illustrate the dynamics between religion and gender norms in South Korea's context, demonstrating how Christianity combines Western modernization with gender-essentialist traditionalism, while Buddhism maintains Confucian patriarchal values.     

Education in the Jewish State

This essay argues that schooling in Israel is tied too closely to ideology. This results in an indoctrinary orientation that contributes to divisiveness and imperils Israeli democracy. After reviewing and critiquing the roots of this orientation, I advance an alternative that understands education as an agent of the good rather than ideology. Israeli schooling requires a vision of goodness broad enough to encompass competing conceptions of Jewish life espoused by the majority as well as non-Jewish orientations affirmed by various minorities. Such a vision can be grounded, I contend, in a democratic Jewish theology that emphasizes God as teacher rather than tyrant.