On the (In)Compatibility of Attitudes Toward Peace and War

Although attitudes toward peace and war are usually treated as two opposite poles of one dimension, in this article we argue that they may represent two distinct dimensions. To investigate this idea, we developed and tested a new balanced measure, the Attitudes Toward Peace and War (APW) Scale, in three studies (N = 4,742) in the United States and Denmark. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses showed that attitudes toward peace and war formed two distinct, though negatively related, factors. Structural equation modeling showed that antecedents of attitudes toward peace included egalitarian ideological beliefs, the values of international harmony and equality, and empathic concern for others, and consequences included intentions to engage in peace‐related activities. On the other hand, antecedents of attitudes toward war included authoritarian ideological beliefs, the values of national strength and order, and less personal distress, and consequences included intentions to engage in warlike activities. Results also showed that political affiliation had an impact on the relationship between peace and war attitudes, with conservatives less likely to find the attitudes incompatible. The findings support the view that attitudes toward peace and war represent two distinct dimensions.     

Inside the terrorist mind: The relevance of ideology

Abstract

The extremely violent activities perpetrated by terrorists initially led to attempts to analyse terrorism as a form of psychopathology. This approach has been quickly replaced by a perspective on terrorism as a group activity propelled to action by an ideology. Ideologies differ in their strength, in turn determined by ideological contents and the adherents' motivations in embracing those contents. Ideological strength may, in turn, determine the extremity of actions (including terrorism) warranted by the ideology in question. Based on this analysis, a broad view on counter-terrorist possibilities is offered related to (1) undermining the perception that terrorism is an effective tool for attaining the group's objectives, and (2) its replacement by a credible alternative (and peaceful) means for doing so.     

Who do we trust? Differences in types of trust and beliefs in conspiracy theories between vaccinated and unvaccinated Europeans across 17 European countries

A plethora of research has highlighted that trust in science, political trust, and conspiracy theories are all important contributors to vaccine uptake behavior. In the current investigation, relying on data from 17 countries (N = 30,096) from the European Social Survey we examined how those who received (and wanted to receive the COVID-19 vaccine) compared to those who did not differ in their trust in: science, politicians and political parties, international organizations and towards people in general. We also examined whether they differed in how much they believed in conspiracy theories. Those who received (or wanted to receive) the COVID vaccine scored significantly higher in all forms of trust, and lower in conspiracy theory beliefs. A logistic regression suggested that trust in science, politicians, international organizations, as well as belief in conspiracy theories were significant predictors, even after accounting for key demographic characteristics.     

Parochial Altruism and Political Ideology

Parochial altruism refers to the propensity to direct prosocial behavior toward members of one's own ingroup to a greater extent than toward those outside one's group. Both theory and empirical research suggest that parochialism may be linked to political ideology, with conservatives more likely than liberals to exhibit ingroup bias in altruistic behavior. The present study, conducted in the United States and Italy, tested this relationship in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, assessing willingness to contribute money to charities at different levels of inclusiveness—local versus national versus international. Results indicated that conservatives contributed less money overall and were more likely to limit their contribution to the local charity while liberals were significantly more likely to contribute to national and international charities, exhibiting less parochialism. Conservatives and liberals also differed in social identification and trust, with conservatives higher in social identity and trust at the local and national levels and liberals higher in global social identity and trust in global others. Differences in global social identity partially accounted for the effects of political ideology on donations.     

Don't Tell Me What I Don't Want to Hear! Politicization and Ideological Conflict Explain Why Citizens Have Lower Trust in Climate Scientists and Economists Than in Other Natural Scientists

Studies suggest that citizens have higher trust in some groups of scientists than in others. However, we still know little about the causes of these trust gaps. The current study fills this knowledge gap by examining Norwegian citizens' trust in climate scientists, economists, and so-called “less politicized natural scientists.” I argue that trust in climate scientists and economists is lower than trust in less politicized natural scientists because the former fields are politicized, while the latter are not. Politicization strengthens ideological conflicts between citizens' ideology and research produced by climate scientists and economists, which leads to lower trust in these groups of scientists. I test this argument by running regression analyses on data from a representative survey of the Norwegian population. The results support the argument: Citizens have significantly higher trust in less politicized natural scientists than in both climate scientists and economists, and these differences can be explained by ideological biases in trust. Citizens with a proeconomic growth ideology have significantly lower trust in climate scientists than in less politicized natural scientists, and citizens with a left-wing economic ideology have significantly lower trust in economists than in less politicized natural scientists.     

Paradoxes of social consciousness under socialism

Born in 1943. Professor of philosophy at the University of Poznan, together with Jerzy Kmita continued the work of Jerzy Giedymin in the Poznan School of a Marxian methodology of science (idealizational theory of science, categorial theory of dialectics, humanistic interpretation, and since the rise of the Solidarity movement the theory of non-Marxian historical materialism). Editor ofPoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities (Rodopi, Amsterdam) and author of numerous articles and monographs.