利益冲突

探讨利益冲突的概念及其要素,影响利益冲突的可能因素。利益冲突的危害,并在探讨这些问题基础上提出处理利益冲突的若干措施。     

On Wittgenstein's Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy

In 1931 Wittgenstein wrote: ‘the limit of language manifests itself in the impossibility of describing the fact that corresponds to (is the translation of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence’. Here, Wittgenstein claims, ‘we are involved?…?with the Kantian solution of the problem of philosophy’. This paper shows how this remark fits with Wittgenstein's early account of the substance of the world, his account of logic, and ultimately his view of philosophy. By contrast to the currently influential resolute reading of the Tractatus, the paper argues that the early Wittgenstein did not aim at destroying the idea of a limit of language, but that the notion lies at the very heart of Wittgenstein's early view. In doing so, the paper employs and defends the Kantian interpretation of Wittgenstein's early philosophy.     

Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief

What are the conditions under which suspension of belief—or suspension, for short—is justified? Process reliabilists hold that our beliefs are justified if and only if these are produced or sustained by reliable cognitive processes. But they have said relatively little about suspension. Perhaps they think that we may easily extend an account of justified belief to deal with justified suspension. But it's not immediately clear how we may do so; in which case, evidentialism has a distinct advantage over reliabilism. In this paper, I consider some proposals as to how process reliabilists might seek to account for justified suspension. Although several of these proposals do not work, two are promising. The first such proposal appeals to the notion of propositional justification; the second involves weaving evidentialist elements into reliabilism. I'll argue that the second proposal is better than the first.     

Bad–good constraints on a polarity correspondence account for the spatial–numerical association of response codes (SNARC) and markedness association of response codes (MARC) effects

Performance in numerical classification tasks involving either parity or magnitude judgements is quicker when small numbers are mapped onto a left-sided response and large numbers onto a right-sided response than for the opposite mapping (i.e., the spatial–numerical association of response codes or SNARC effect). Recent research by Gevers et al. [Gevers, W., Santens, S., Dhooge, E., Chen, Q., Van den Bossche, L., Fias, W., & Verguts, T. (2010). Verbal-spatial and visuospatial coding of number–space interactions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 139, 180–190] suggests that this effect also arises for vocal “left” and “right” responding, indicating that verbal–spatial coding has a role to play in determining it. Another presumably verbal-based, spatial–numerical mapping phenomenon is the linguistic markedness association of response codes (MARC) effect whereby responding in parity tasks is quicker when odd numbers are mapped onto left-sided responses and even numbers onto right-sided responses. A recent account of both the SNARC and MARC effects is based on the polarity correspondence principle [Proctor, R. W., & Cho, Y. S. (2006). Polarity correspondence: A general principle for performance of speeded binary classification tasks. Psychological Bulletin, 132, 416–442]. This account assumes that stimulus and response alternatives are coded along any number of dimensions in terms of – and + polarities with quicker responding when the polarity codes for the stimulus and the response correspond. In the present study, even–odd parity judgements were made using either “left” and “right” or “bad” and “good” vocal responses. Results indicated that a SNARC effect was indeed present for the former type of vocal responding, providing further evidence for the sufficiency of the verbal–spatial coding account for this effect. However, the decided lack of an analogous SNARC-like effect in the results for the latter type of vocal responding provides an important constraint on the presumed generality of the polarity correspondence account. On the other hand, the presence of robust MARC effects for “bad” and “good” but not “left” and “right” vocal responses is consistent with the view that such effects are due to conceptual associations between semantic codes for odd–even and bad–good (but not necessarily left–right).     

Effects of Dark Tetrad traits on utilitarian moral judgement: The role of personal involvement and familiarity with the victim

The aim of this study was to re‐examine relations between dark traits and utilitarian moral judgement in sacrificial moral dilemmas by taking into account two contextual characteristics of dilemmas: the actor’s role in sacrificing (personal or impersonal involvement in inflicting harm) and the actor’s familiarity with the victim (a known or an unknown person). Results showed that all dark traits, except for psychopathy, obtained significant main and positive effects on utilitarian moral judgement. However, psychopathy and sadism obtained interaction effects with dilemma type, indicating the importance of the specific context of moral judgement in individuals with these traits. Furthermore, among all dark traits, only sadism showed an incremental contribution to utilitarian judgement over empathy and HEXACO traits, with the highest contribution to dilemmas that include personal harm. Results highlighted the role of enjoyment of cruelty in utilitarian moral judgement.     

Effects of immediacy of feedback on estimations and performance

We investigated the role of anticipation of feedback in performance and estimation about own performance. We submitted 155 participants to a test of verbal aptitude, and we requested them to give estimations of their own performance and the performance of other participants. There were two treatments: immediate feedback and delayed feedback. Participants in the immediate‐feedback group were informed that they would receive feedback on their performance immediately after finishing the test, whereas participants in the delayed‐feedback group were informed that they would receive feedback a week after taking the test. The immediate‐feedback group performed better than the delayed‐feedback group. Furthermore, the former underestimated their own performance. On the other hand, participants on the delayed‐feedback group made unbiased estimations. We present a mathematical model based on construal‐level theory, decision affect theory, temporal discounting, and Moore and Healy's model of overestimation. The model suggests that the source of differences in performance and in estimations of own performance is a construal of the feedback situation that modifies the expected utility of the task.     

Spinoza: une lecture d'Aristote

Does (affirmative) judgement have a logical dual, negative judgement? Whether there is such a logical dualism was hotly debated at the beginning of the twentieth century. Frege argued in ‘Negation’ (1918/9) that logic can dispense with negative judgement. Frege's arguments shaped the views of later generations of analytic philosophers, but they will not have convinced such opponents as Brentano or Windelband. These philosophers believed in negative judgement for psychological, not logical, reasons. Reinach's ‘On the Theory of Negative Judgement’ (1911) spoke to the concerns of these philosophers. While Frege took the distinction between affirmative and negative judgement to be logically redundant, Reinach argued that it is the result of confusing judgement with a different mental act. In this article, I present Reinach's arguments against the ‘old logical dualism’ in context, analyse them and discuss Reinach's innovative use of the notion of focus in the theory of judgement. Recently, there has been a revival of the view that sentential negation is grounded in a prior mental act of rejection. In the final section, I argue that Reinach's analysis of rejection poses a challenge for the revivalists.     

How women's sexual orientation guides accuracy of interpersonal judgements of other women

This research examines how women's sexual orientation guides the accuracy of judgements of other women. One hundred ten judges (67 straight and 43 lesbian women) watched videotapes of 9 targets (4 straight and 5 lesbian) and made judgements about the targets' thoughts, emotions, personality, and sexual orientation. Accuracy scores were created for each judge by comparing judgements to criterion data gathered about targets. Straight judges were significantly more accurate at judging thoughts and marginally more accurate at judging emotions compared to lesbian judges. There were no significant differences in judging personality. Straight targets' thoughts and personality were more easily assessed than lesbian targets' while lesbians' emotions were more easily judged than straight targets'. Lesbian judges were more accurate at judging sexual orientation regardless of their tendency to categorize women as lesbian compared to straight judges. Findings support past research on the accurate perception of sexual orientation and contribute to understanding how sexual orientation guides person perception.     

Children's strategic compensation for size underconstancy: Dependence on distance and relation to reasoning ability

When asked to judge the size of a distant object, older children are more likely than younger ones to report deliberately inflating their judgements to compensate for size underconstancy (Granrud, in press). The current investigation examined whether use of this strategy depends on object distance and whether it is related to individual differences in reasoning, knowledge about size perception, or cognitive style. In two studies, children in Grades 1–3 estimated the size of a distant (61 m away) and near (6.1 m away) disc. In each, half of the children reported inflating their judgement of the distant disc to compensate for a tendency to underestimate its size, but only a few reported using this strategy for the near disc. Self-reported strategy users tended to either judge the distant disc accurately or to overestimate its size, whereas the other children tended to underestimate its size. Strategy reporters obtained higher scores on a test of verbal reasoning, but did not differ from the other children in reflectivity-impulsivity. In Study 1, strategy reporters also showed a better understanding of how distance affects the apparent size of objects in photographs. This understanding was strongly related to verbal reasoning ability. In Study 2, visuospatial reasoning ability was also found to predict who would report strategy use, and this predictive relation was independent of verbal reasoning ability.     

Individual differences in strategies for syllogistic reasoning

Current theories of reasoning such as mental models or mental logic assume a universal cognitive mechanism that underlies human reasoning performance. However, there is evidence that this is not the case, for example, the work of Ford (1995), who found that some people adopted predominantly spatial and some verbal strategies in a syllogistic reasoning task. Using written and think-aloud protocols, the present study confirmed the existence of these individual differences. However, in sharp contrast to Ford, the present study found few differences in reasoning performance between the two groups, in terms of accuracy or type of conclusion generated. Hence, reasoners present an outward appearance of ubiquity, despite underlying differences in reasoning processes. These findings have implications for theoretical accounts of reasoning, and for attempts to model reasoning data. Any comprehensive account needs to account for strategic differences and how these may develop in logically untrained individuals.