自由回忆中元记忆监控的作用及其影响因素

采用“类信号检测论方法”,通过两个实验,研究了在记忆信息提取过程中元记忆的预见性监测判断（Feeling-of-knowing）和元控制的作用及其影响因素。实验一探讨了识记材料的难易、识记遍数对元监测判断以及输出控制中的反应标准是否有影响;实验二探讨了严格和宽松的奖惩条件对输出控制中反应标准的影响。用计算机随机呈现识记用的词表材料,识记之后让被试进行FOK等级判断和自由回忆,再用“类信号检测论”方法统计实验数据,分析各种条件下回忆成绩、FOK判断等级,计算出相应的符合率和反应标准。实验一结果表明,不同材料难度和识记遍数下的回忆成绩和FOK判断等级差异显著,但输出控制中的反应标准值没受这些因素的影响;实验二结果是严格和宽松奖惩条件下的反应标准值差异显著,严格条件下的反应标准显著高于宽松条件下的反应标准,表明奖惩条件对信息提取中的反应标准有显著影响     

Judging Yourself as You Judge Others: Moral Development and Exculpation

This study investigated two main issues: Whether people's judgments about real-life moral transgressions are affected by the role they play in them and whether self-serving biases in such judgments vary with level of moral development. One-hundred twenty university students took Colby and Kohlberg's (1987) test of moral judgment and made open-ended and rating-scale judgments about three real-life transgressions they considered moral in nature. As expected, participants made more exculpatory judgments about transgressions they committed than they did about transgressions others committed, but participants did not judge transgressions committed against them more harshly than they judged transgressions committed against others. The higher participants scored on Kohlberg's test the less they externalized and excused their moral transgressions. Contrary to expectation, this relation also applied to moral judgments about transgressions committed by others against others. These findings have important implications for models of moral development and social cognition.     

FOK产生机制的实验研究

通过以初中生和大学生为被试的两个实验探讨了FOK（Feeling-of-Knowing即“熟知感”）的产生机制,是线索熟悉性还是靶项目的可提取性（或记忆强度）决定FOK判断的等级。识记材料为90对中文词对.分前后两部分让被试识记,前后两部分词对之间安排三种关系：①完全相同;②仅线索词相同,③完全不同,这三种关系可选成不同的靶项目记忆强度和不同的线索熟悉性.两组实验结果一致表明,FOK的等级判断的高低取决于线索熟悉程度,而不随靶项目的记忆强度而变化.     

Getting real in analysis

The author uses a detailed clinical example to illustrate how reality testing can create rather than foreclose opportunities for analytic investigation. He proposes that authentic analysis of transference within the treatment relationship requires close and explicit attention to be paid to considerations of reality, but in a way that does not require the patient to defer to the analyst's view. The author reconsiders certain conceptions of a special psychoanalytic reality, of regression in clinical analysis, and of the nature of free association, suggesting that they tend to discourage the realism necessary to effective psychoanalytic work. In this context, he underlines the importance of ongoing reference to therapeutic outcome as an aspect of reality, and reflects upon the impact of the reality of the analytic treatment setting and the question of termination.     

Kant: The Audacity of Judgement

In the legal judgement reason demands that it extend itself beyond the mere subjective limits of the self in order that it might fashion a judgement that speaks for the other. This is the universal necessity of the judgement. No claim of truth or the moral law can guarantee that others will agree with this judgement: thus disputation is the risk which reason takes in order to judge at all. The author examines this audacity of judgement by reference to Kant's autonomy of reason, which risks itself in the thought that thinks. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Social cognition and the human brain

Humans are exceedingly social animals, but the neural underpinnings of social cognition and behavior are not well understood. Studies in humans and other primates have pointed to several structures that play a key role in guiding social behaviors: the amygdala, ventromedial frontal cortices, and right somatosensory-related cortex, among others. These structures appear to mediate between perceptual representations of socially relevant stimuli, such as the sight of conspecifics, and retrieval of knowledge (or elicitation of behaviors) that such stimuli can trigger. Current debates concern the extent to which social cognition draws upon processing specialized for social information, and the relative contributions made to social cognition by innate and acquired knowledge.     

部分线索效应中的记忆监控

通过三个实验,利用学习时间分配作为指标,考察了学习者对部分线索效应记忆监控的状况。实验1考察被试在单次学习条件下的学习时间分配情况,结果发现被试在两种条件下所使用的学习时间没有明显差异。这说明在一次学习后被试还不能对部分线索的消极作用进行有效控制。实验2中,经过多次学习后,被试在部分线索条件下使用了更多的学习时间。实验3在自控步调学习前加入回溯性任务难度判断任务,结果发现经过一次学习,部分线索组和自由回忆组的判断值虽无显著差异,但部分线索组的自控步调学习时间显著长于自由回忆组,并且其回忆成绩也显著提高,说明回溯性任务难度判断过程本身是学习时间分配的制约因素。研究说明,为了加速主体对部分线索的消极影响的控制,引导主体对学习任务进行难度判断是一种有效的手段。     

Learning style,judgements of learning,and learning of verbal and visual information

The concept of learning style is immensely popular despite the lack of evidence showing that learning style influences performance. This study tested the hypothesis that the popularity of learning style is maintained because it is associated with subjective aspects of learning, such as judgements of learning (JOLs). Preference for verbal and visual information was assessed using the revised Verbalizer‐Visualizer Questionnaire (VVQ). Then, participants studied a list of word pairs and a list of picture pairs, making JOLs (immediate, delayed, and global) while studying each list. Learning was tested by cued recall. The results showed that higher VVQ verbalizer scores were associated with higher immediate JOLs for words, and higher VVQ visualizer scores were associated with higher immediate JOLs for pictures. There was no association between VVQ scores and recall or JOL accuracy. As predicted, learning style was associated with subjective aspects of learning but not objective aspects of learning.     

Counterfactual and semi-factual thoughts in moral judgements about failed attempts to harm

People judge that an individual who attempts to harm someone but fails should be blamed and punished more when they imagine how things could have turned out worse, compared to when they imagine how things could have turned out the same, or when they think only about what happened. This moral counterfactual amplification effect occurs when people believe the protagonist had no reason for the attempt to harm, and not when the protagonist had a reason, as Experiment 1 shows. It occurs for intentional failed attempts to harm and also for accidental near-misses, as Experiment 2 shows, but not for failed attempts in which the harm occurs anyway by another cause, for both general judgments about the event and specific judgments about the individual's actions, as Experiments 3 and 4 show. The implications for understanding the role of counterfactual thoughts in moral judgement are discussed.     

THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE

Abstract: We often speak about religious experience, and sometimes we speak about metaphysical experience. Yet we seldom hear about philosophical experience. Is philosophy purely a matter of theories and theses, or does it have an experiential aspect? In this article, I argue for the following three claims. First, there is something we might call philosophical experience, and there is nothing mystical about it. Second, philosophical experiences are expressed in something quite similar to what Kant called “aesthetic judgements.” Third, philosophical experiences are expressed by using words in what Wittgenstein called “secondary sense.” Finally, I try to show the educational significance of pursing philosophical experiences. Through articulating them one might find one's ground, and through articulating them in a less private and more universal form one might raise oneself to universality. Thus, in expressing philosophical experiences one aspires to speak in a universal voice.