Word Senses as Clusters of Meaning Modulations: A Computational Model of Polysemy

Most words in natural languages are polysemous; that is, they have related but different meanings in different contexts. This one-to-many mapping of form to meaning presents a challenge to understanding how word meanings are learned, represented, and processed. Previous work has focused on solutions in which multiple static semantic representations are linked to a single word form, which fails to capture important generalizations about how polysemous words are used; in particular, the graded nature of polysemous senses, and the flexibility and regularity of polysemy use. We provide a novel view of how polysemous words are represented and processed, focusing on how meaning is modulated by context. Our theory is implemented within a recurrent neural network that learns distributional information through exposure to a large and representative corpus of English. Clusters of meaning emerge from how the model processes individual word forms. In keeping with distributional theories of semantics, we suggest word meanings are generalized from contexts of different word tokens, with polysemy emerging as multiple clusters of contextually modulated meanings. We validate our results against a human-annotated corpus of polysemy focusing on the gradedness, flexibility, and regularity of polysemous sense individuation, as well as behavioral findings of offline sense relatedness ratings and online sentence processing. The results provide novel insights into how polysemy emerges from contextual processing of word meaning from both a theoretical and computational point of view.     

The illocutionary force of laws

This article provides a speech act analysis of ‘crime-enacting’ provisions in criminal statutes, focusing on the illocutionary force of these provisions. These provisions commonly set out not only particular crimes and their characteristics but also their associated penalties. Enactment of a statute brings into force new social facts, typically norms, through the official utterance of linguistic material. These norms are supposed to guide behaviour: they tell us what we must, may, or must not do. Our main claim is that the illocutionary force of such provisions is primarily ‘world-creating’, i.e. effective, or declarational, rather than directive (behaviour-guiding). We assume that directive illocutionary force is either direct or indirect, showing that provisions need not contain the linguistic items that make for direct directives and that according to standard tests no indirect directive is present. A potential counter-argument is that any utterance serving to direct behaviour is necessarily a directive. We show that this behaviour-directing property is shared by some clear non-directives.     

What matters is the underlying experience: Similar motor responses during processing observed hand actions and hand-related verbs

It is well-accepted that processing observed actions involves at some extent the same neural mechanisms responsible for action execution. More recently, it has been forwarded that also the processing of verbs expressing a specific motor content is subserved by the neural mechanisms allowing individuals to perform the content expressed by that linguistic material. This view is also known as embodiment and contrasts with a more classical approach to language processing that considers it as amodal. In the present study, we used a go/no-go paradigm, in which participants were requested to respond to real words and pictures and refrain from responding when presented stimuli were pseudowords and scrambled images. Real stimuli included pictures depicting hand- and foot-related actions and verbs expressing hand- and foot-related actions. We, therefore, directly compared the modulation of hand motor responses during the observation of actions and the presentation of verbs, expressing actions in the same category. The results have shown that participants gave slower hand motor responses during the observation of hand actions and the processing of hand-related verbs as than observed foot actions and related verbs. These findings support embodiment showing that whatever the modality of presentation (observed action or verb), the modulation of hand motor responses was similar, thus suggesting that processing seen actions and related verbs shares common mechanisms most likely involving the motor system and the underlying motor experience.     

文化视域下文化神经科学学科主张与检讨

文化神经科学是在宏大的文化背景下来全面深入考察个体的"心理、行为与脑认知机制"之间规律的一门学科。文化神经科学所倡导的神经-文化交互作用模型表明该学科以融合视野引领心理学研究范式的变革成为可能。同时,从文化学视野来审视,亦折射出其在文化学层面的短板,即人文精神与文化意蕴在"文化"名义下日渐式微。     

Attention and semantic processing during speech: an fMRI study

This fMRI study was conducted to investigate whether language semantics is processed even when attention is not explicitly directed to word meanings. In the “unattended” condition, the subjects performed a visual detection task while hearing semantically related and unrelated word pairs. In the “phoneme” condition, the subjects made phoneme judgements between prime and target words, and in the “word” condition, they indicated whether the words in each word pair were semantically related or unrelated. In the word condition, stronger activity was obtained for unrelated than related words in the superior temporal gyrus/sulcus (STG/STS), lingual/fusiform gyri and cuneus, whereas in the phoneme condition no such effect was observed. However, during the unattended condition, stronger activity was found in the right STG. Our results suggest that both semantic judgement of word pairs and their passive hearing activate the same neural networks but this activation is more restricted in the passive hearing.     

Triggering Individual Emergence: Inspiration of Banathy,the Visionary

This paper examines how metaphors can play a key role in triggering individual emergence. Metaphor is referenced in two main ways: the enthalpy metaphor is used to provide understanding of, and guide, the process of effective conversation. Metaphor is also interpreted very broadly to define those images, analogies, concepts, models, and theories that define our understanding of the world and our perception. It is our perception that must change if we are to improve the future. The paper examines how sharing of appropriate metaphor through conversation can lead to collective emergence; and similarly, how integral conversation-with-self triggered by metaphors in (1) conversation with others, (2) other external stimuli, and (3) internal thought processes, can trigger individual emergence. The paper examines which of the three sources of trigger may be singly/jointly or sequentially the most powerful in their effect of triggering individual emergence, and under what context. The model presented is evaluated for the process of emergence of the paper. The reader is invited to participate in furthering the evaluation process. The author's own individual emergence is recognized as stemming from ongoing association with, and inspiration of, Bela Banathy, to whom the work is dedicated.     

Book Reviews

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to identify what I take to be the main conceptual problem in Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals when the Limit Assumption (LA) is not satisfied, what I call the Discrimination Problem (DP), and to present and discuss a modification of Lewis’ semantics that aims at solving DP. First, I outline Lewis’ semantics, highlighting the aspects that will be relevant for our discussion. Second, I present DP and discuss it with a heuristic example. Third, I present the new proposal and comment some formal consequences and the objections they give rise to. Fourth, I present an allegedly equivalent version of the proposal and discuss the difference between counterfactuals and strict conditionals. Finally, I defend that the two proposals are different and argue for the first one as the best way of capturing two intuitions that seem in conflict when the LA is not satisfied. I conclude with a dilemma: either the proposal here defended works or LA is inescapable. Thus, if the proposal doesn’t work, the paper must then be considered as an indirect defense of the Limit Assumption.     

‘Ought’ and Control

Ethical theorists often assume that the verb ‘ought’ means roughly ‘has an obligation’; however, this assumption is belied by the diversity of ‘flavours’ of ought-sentences in English. A natural response is that ‘ought’ is ambiguous. However, this response is incompatible with the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists, who classify ‘ought’ as a member of the family of modal verbs, which are treated uniformly as operators. To many ethical theorists, however, this popular treatment in linguistics seems to elide an important distinction between agential and non-agential ought-statements. The thought is that ‘ought’ must have at least two senses, one implicating agency and connected to obligations, and another covering other uses. In this paper, I pursue some resolution of this tension between semantic theory and ethical theory with respect to the meaning of ‘ought’. To this end, I consider what I believe to be the most linguistically sophisticated argument for the view that the word ‘ought’ is ambiguous between agential and non-agential senses. This argument, due to Mark Schroeder, is instructive but based on a false claim about the syntax of agential ought-sentences—or so I attempt to show by first situating Schroeder's argument in its proper linguistic background and then discussing some syntactic evidence that he fails to appreciate. Then, I use the failure of this argument to motivate some more general reflections on how the standard treatment of ‘ought’ by theoretical semanticists might be refined in the light of the distinction important to ethical theory between agential and non-agential ought-statements, but also on how ethical theory might benefit from more careful study of the dominant treatment of modals as operators in theoretical semantics.     

Are Computational Transitions Sensitive to Semantics?

The formal conception of computation (FCC) holds that computational processes are not sensitive to semantic properties. FCC is popular, but it faces well-known difficulties. Accordingly, authors such as Block and Peacocke pursue a ‘semantically-laden’ alternative, according to which computation can be sensitive to semantics. I argue that computation is insensitive to semantics within a wide range of computational systems, including any system with ‘derived’ rather than ‘original’ intentionality. FCC yields the correct verdict for these systems. I conclude that there is only one promising strategy for semantically-laden theorists: identify special computational systems that help generate their own semantic properties, and then show that computation within those systems is semantically-laden. Unfortunately, the few existing discussions that pursue this strategy are problematic.     

Basic Response Time Tools for Studying General Processing Capacity in Attention,Perception, and Cognition

One of the more important constructs in the study of attention, perception, and cognition is that of capacity. The authors reviewed some of the common meanings of this construct and proposed a more precise treatment. They showed how the distribution of response times can be used to derive measures of process capacity and to further illustrate how these measures can be used to address important hypotheses in cognition.