Institutional Insights for Analysing Strategic Manoeuvring in the British Prime Minister’s Question Time

This paper aims at creating an adequate theoretical basis for a systematic integration of institutional insights into the pragma-dialectical analysis of argumentative exchanges that occur in institutionalised contexts. The argumentative practice of Prime Minister’s Question Time in the British House of Commons is examined, as a case in point, in order to illustrate how the knowledge of the characteristics of an institution, its rules and conventions can be integrated into the pragma-dialectical analysis. The paper highlights the role that theoretical concepts and tools such as strategic manoeuvring, argumentative activity types and dialectical profiles play in this integration.

The Basic Constructive Logic for a Weak Sense of Consistency defined with a Propositional Falsity Constant

The logic B_Kc1 is the basic constructive logic in the ternaryrelational semantics (without a set of designated points) adequateto consistency understood as the absence of the negation ofany theorem. Negation is introduced in B_Kc1 with a negationconnective. The aim of this paper is to define the logic B_Kc1F.In this logic negation is introduced via a propositional falsityconstant. We prove that B_Kc1 and B_Kc1F are definitionally equivalent.     

Empirical metaphysics: the role of intuitions about possible cases in philosophy

Frank Jackson has argued that only if we have a priori knowledge of the extension-fixers for many of our terms can we vindicate the methodological practice of relying on intuitions to decide between philosophical theories. While there has been much discussion of Jackson’s claim that we have such knowledge, there has been comparatively little discussion of this most powerful argument for that claim. Here I defend an alternative explanation of our intuitions about possible cases, one that does not rely on a priori extension-fixers. This alternative explanation provides a vindication of our reliance on intuitions, while blocking Jackson’s abductive argument for a priori semantic knowledge. In brief, I argue that we should regard our armchair intuitions as providing an important, a priori source of evidence for hypotheses about the contents of our implicit referential policies with regard to our terms. But all such hypotheses have a potential falsifier that is only discoverable empirically. In other words, gold-standard evidence for such hypotheses is always empirical.

Autonomous construction of ecologically and socially relevant semantics

This article presents a synthetic modeling approach to the problem of grounded construction of concepts. In many computational models of grounded language acquisition and evolution, meanings are created in the process of discrimination between a chosen object and other objects present on the scene of communication. We argue that categories constructed for the purpose of identification rather than discrimination are more suitable for the detached language use (talking about things not present here and now). We describe a semantics based on so-called identification criteria constructed by extracting cross-situational similarities among instances of a category, and present several computational models. In the model of individual category construction, the instances are grouped to categories by common motor programs (affordances), while in the model of social learning, focused on the influence of naming on category formation, entities are considered members of the same category, if they are labeled with the same word by an external teacher. By these two mechanisms, the learner can construct interactionally grounded representation of objects, properties, relations, changes, complex situations and events. We also report and analyze simulation results of an experiment focused on the dynamics of meanings in iterated intergenerational transmission.     

Talking About a Universalist World

The paper defends a combination of perdurantism with mereological universalism by developing semantics of temporary predications of the sort ’some P is/was/will be (a) Q’. We argue that, in addition to the usual application of causal and other restrictions on sortals, the grammatical form of such statements allows for rather different regimentations along three separate dimensions, according to: (a) whether ‘P’ and ‘Q’ are being used as phase or substance sortal terms, (b) whether ‘is’, ‘was’, and ‘will be’ are the ‘is’, ‘was’, ‘will be’ of identity or of constitution, and (c) whether ‘Q’ is being used as a subject or predicate term. We conclude that this latitude is beneficial, as it conforms with linguistic reality (i.e., the multiple uses actually in place) and also enables one to turn what is ordinarily perceived as a problem for universalist perdurantism viz., a commitment to all sorts of weird and gerrymandered temporally extended entities, into an advantage, for the richness in questions allows us to make sense of the many different readings of sentences of the same grammatical form.     

Non-Classical Negation in the Works of Helena Rasiowa and Their Impact on the Theory of Negation

The paper is devoted to the contributions of Helena Rasiowa to the theory of non-classical negation. The main results of Rasiowa in this area concerns–constructive logic with strong (Nelson) negation,–intuitionistic negation and some of its generalizations: minimal negation of Johansson and semi-negation.We discuss also the impact of Rasiowa works on the theory of non-classical negation.A lecture presented at the International Conference Trends in Logic III : A. Mostowski, H. Rasiowa and C. Rauszer in memoriam, Warsaw, Ruciane-Nida September 23-26, 2005.     

Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy

Our understanding of subjunctive conditionals has been greatly enhanced through the use of possible world semantics and, more precisely, by the idea that they involve variably strict quantification over possible worlds. I propose to extend this treatment to ceteris paribus conditionals – that is, conditionals that incorporate a ceteris paribus or ‘other things being equal’ clause. Although such conditionals are commonly invoked in scientific theorising, they traditionally arouse suspicion and apprehensiveness amongst philosophers. By treating ceteris paribus conditionals as a species of variably strict conditional I hope to shed new light upon their content and their logic.     

Inexact Knowledge with Introspection

Standard Kripke models are inadequate to model situations of inexact knowledge with introspection, since positive and negative introspection force the relation of epistemic indiscernibility to be transitive and euclidean. Correlatively, Williamson’s margin for error semantics for inexact knowledge invalidates axioms 4 and 5. We present a new semantics for modal logic which is shown to be complete for K45, without constraining the accessibility relation to be transitive or euclidean. The semantics corresponds to a system of modular knowledge, in which iterated modalities and simple modalities are not on a par. We show how the semantics helps to solve Williamson’s luminosity paradox, and argue that it corresponds to an integrated model of perceptual and introspective knowledge that is psychologically more plausible than the one defended by Williamson. We formulate a generalized version of the semantics, called token semantics, in which modalities are iteration-sensitive up to degree n and insensitive beyond n. The multi-agent version of the semantics yields a resource-sensitive logic with implications for the representation of common knowledge in situations of bounded rationality.