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181.
Martin Amerbauer 《Studia Logica》1996,57(2-3):359-372
We give sound and complete tableau and sequent calculi for the prepositional normal modal logics S4.04, K4B and G
0(these logics are the smallest normal modal logics containing K and the schemata A A, A A and A ( A); A A and AA; A A and ((A A) A) A resp.) with the following properties: the calculi for S4.04 and G
0are cut-free and have the interpolation property, the calculus for K4B contains a restricted version of the cut-rule, the so-called analytical cut-rule.In addition we show that G
0is not compact (and therefore not canonical), and we proof with the tableau-method that G
0is characterised by the class of all finite, (transitive) trees of degenerate or simple clusters of worlds; therefore G
0is decidable and also characterised by the class of all frames for G
0.Research supported by Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung, project number P8495-PHY.Presented by W. Rautenberg 相似文献
182.
A reduction rule is introduced as a transformation of proof figures in implicational classical logic. Proof figures are represented as typed terms in a -calculus with a new constant P
(()). It is shown that all terms with the same type are equivalent with respect to -reduction augmented by this P-reduction rule. Hence all the proofs of the same implicational formula are equivalent. It is also shown that strong normalization fails for P-reduction. Weak normalization is shown for P-reduction with another reduction rule which simplifies of (( ) ) into an atomic type.This work was partially supported by a Grant-in-Aid for General Scientific Research No. 05680276 of the Ministry of Education, Science and Culture, Japan and by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.
Hiroakira Ono 相似文献
183.
Dieter Wandschneider 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》1996,27(2):347-352
The criticism formulated by L. B. Puntel concerning the theory of dialectic proposed by the author is rejected. Puntel's attempt at explicating predication by means of (second order) predicate logic fails: It misjudges predication being already presupposed for the possibility of predicate logic, thus belonging to the transcendental conditions of formal predicate logic, so that predication itself cannot be further explicated by means of such logic. What is in fact criticized by Puntel is something like an artefact of formalization. The unreflected application of formal logic here generates problems instead of solving them. 相似文献
184.
185.
186.
Reasoning about update logic 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Logical frameworks for analysing the dynamics of information processing abound [4, 5, 8, 10, 12, 14, 20, 22]. Some of these frameworks focus on the dynamics of the interpretation process, some on the dynamics of the process of drawing inferences, and some do both of these. Formalisms galore, so it is felt that some conceptual streamlining would pay off.This paper is part of a larger scale enterprise to pursue the obvious parallel between information processing and imperative programming. We demonstrate that logical tools from theoretical computer science are relevant for the logic of information flow. More specifically, we show that the perspective of Hoare logic [13, 18] can fruitfully be applied to the conceptual simplification of information flow logics. 相似文献
187.
William Keith 《Argumentation》1995,9(1):163-179
The move to Postmodernism in argumentation is often predicated on the rejection of the formal basis of argument in logic. While this rejection may be justified, and is widely discussed in the literature, the loss of logic creates problems that a Postmodern theory of argument must address without recourse to logic and its attendant modernist assumptions. This essay argues that conceiving of argument in terms ofpractices will address the key problematics of Postmodernism without abandoning those features of argumentation that make it an important social, cultural and political practice. Implications for both theory and pedagogy are discussed.The author would like to acknowledge the invaluable commentary of, and discussions with, John Lyne, Charles Willard, Steven Fuller, and Ed Schiappa. 相似文献
188.
189.
TIM HEYSSE 《Argumentation》1997,11(2):211-224
Philosophically, the study of argumentation is important because it holds out the prospect of an interpretation of rationality. For this we need to identify a transcendent perspective on the argumentative interaction. We need a normative theory of argumentation that provides an answer to the question: should the hearer accept the argument of the speaker. In this article I argue that formal logic implies a notion of transcendence that is not suitable for the study of argumentation, because, from a logical point of view, argumentation disappears from sight. We should therefore not expect formal logic to provide an interesting interpretation of the rationality intrinsic in argument and discussion. 相似文献
190.
JAN SMEDSLUND 《Scandinavian journal of psychology》1990,31(2):110-120
Tversky and Kahneman explain cognitive errors in terms of either misunderstanding or fallacy , but have failed to define these concepts. Therefore, they are unable to derive strict diagnostic criteria for distinguishing between them. The lack of conceptual clarification also has prevented them from recognizing the circular relationship between understanding and logicality. Diagnosis of understanding presupposes logicality, and diagnosis of logicality presupposes understanding. This circularity follows when understanding is defined as grasping what is and is not logically implied by a given expression as intended, and when fallacy is defined as logical error. Alternative definitions are discussed and rejected. Tversky and Kahneman fail to realize that one cannot explain and understand what is genuinely illogical, and that, therefore, errors must always be regarded as failure to understand, that is, as logical inference from erroneous premises. 相似文献