QUANTUM ASPECTS OF LIFE: RELATING EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY WITH THEOLOGY VIA MODERN PHYSICS

Abstract In the present paper, I shall argue that quantum theory can contribute to reconciling evolutionary biology with the creation hypothesis. After giving a careful definition of the theological problem, I will, in a first step, formulate necessary conditions for the compatibility of evolutionary theory and the creation hypothesis. In a second step, I will show how quantum theory can contribute to fulfilling these conditions. More precisely, I claim that (1) quantum probabilities are best understood in terms of ontological indeterminism, but (2) reflect nevertheless causal openness rather than divine indifference or arbitrariness, and (3) such a genuinely creative universe can be considered as the work of a loving Creator. I ask subsequently whether these necessary conditions are also sufficient for the compatibility of evolutionary theory and the creation hypothesis. Finally, I will show that relating evolutionary biology with theology via quantum theory could also shed some light on the nature of life.     

God is great – but not necessary? On Ara Norenzayan,Big Gods (2013)

Norenzayan provides ample evidence to support the claim that beliefs about moralizing Big Gods correlate with prosocial behavior. Atheists, for their part, are the most mistrusted minority wherever there is a widespread belief in moralizing gods. Projecting these patterns of thought and behavior on to our ancestors 10 000 years back is risky, though. It is a plausible hypothesis that prosociality in societies where people meet anonymous others on a regular basis may have coevolved with beliefs about Big Gods, but it remains historically speculative and the direction of causality is impossible to establish.     

EXPERIENTIAL NARRATIVES OF RAPE AND TORTURE

Many Guatemalan women suffered extreme sexual violence during the latter half of the twentieth century. Learning of this violence can evoke hatred in persons who love and respect women—hatred for the men who perpetrated the violence and also for other men around the world who victimize women in this way. Hatred is a common response to a perceived evil, and it might in some cases be a fitting response, but it is important to subject one's emotions to critical moral reflection. A key task of ethics is to encourage persons to cultivate good habits of being moved. This essay analyzes the way in which two different texts manage, through the skillful presentation of experiential narratives, to help readers acknowledge the hatred they might feel, but also to think twice about the hatred to which they consent.     

Evil acts not evil people: their characteristics and contexts

Abstract: The problem of evil has vexed philosophers and theologians for centuries and anthropologists, sociologists, psychoanalysts and analytical psychologists in more recent times. Numerous theories have been proposed but there is still little agreement on such basic questions as the nature of evil, what constitutes and motivates an evil act, and how we resolve conflicts between individuals and groups in which evil acts are being committed. I am proposing that evil should be used as an adjective, and not as a noun. As such it should be employed to qualify acts of persons rather than their character. This change would enable us to eschew foundational explanations of evil and, therefore, to examine evil acts in their contexts and so better discern their nature and motivation. I will contend that evil acts begin when an individual makes, or members of a group make, assertions about the ‘naturalness’ of their own acts and, correspondingly, the ‘unnaturalness’ of the acts of others. I will suggest that this results from the anxiety that ensues when they cannot adequately signify their experience of these acts. When this occurs, those so treated are dispossessed of their ‘personhood’, allowing members of the ‘natural’ group to violate their ‘boundaries' with impunity. These violations can range from the relatively innocuous such as being ignored to the extreme such as genocide. I am asserting that all these acts should be termed evil as they derive from the same semiotic process of ‘naturalizaton’. I will discuss ways of preventing individuals or groups from embarking on the process of ‘naturalization’ and describe the types of contexts that might reduce or eliminate the commission of evil acts by those already engaged in their perpetration. To demonstrate these ideas I will use examples from my personal experience, from analytic theory and from the ‘troubles' in Northern Ireland.     

Theodicy: The Solution to the Problem of Evil,or Part of the Problem?

Theodicy, the enterprise of searching for greater goods that might plausibly justify God’s permission of evil, is often criticized on the grounds that the project has systematically failed to unearth any such goods. But theodicists also face a deeper challenge, one that places under question the very attempt to look for any morally sufficient reasons God might have for creating a world littered with evil. This ‘anti-theodical’ view argues that theists (and non-theists) ought to reject, primarily for moral reasons, the project of ‘justifying the ways of God to men’. Unfortunately, this view has not received the serious attention it deserves, particularly in analytic philosophy of religion. Taking my cues from such anti-theodicists as Kenneth Surin, D.Z. Phillips and Dostoyevsky’s Ivan Karamazov, I defend several reasons for holding that the way of thinking about God and evil enshrined in theodical discourse can only add to the world’s evils, not remove or illuminate them.

Why Theists Cannot Accept Skeptical Theism

In recent years skeptical theism has gained currency amongst theists as a way to escape the problem of evil by invoking putatively reasonable skepticism concerning our ability to know that instances of apparently gratuitous evil are unredeemed by morally sufficient reasons known to God alone. After explicating skeptical theism through the work of Stephen Wykstra and William Alston, I present a cumulative-case argument designed to show that skeptical theism cannot be accepted by theists insofar as it crucially undermines epistemic license to the very theism it is invoked to defend. I also argue that attempts to defend a theism-friendly moderate version of skeptical theism either fail to halt the spread of damaging skepticism, or lack philosophical validity.

中国佛教伦理的社会意义

中国佛教伦理的社会意义值得探究 ,我们拟从三个方面来分析。首先以孝道为例来论述中国佛教是怎样与中国重家庭、重孝道的礼法制度相协调 ,使中国人认同佛教也是讲孝的 ;其次是着重通过对佛教道德规范内涵的分析 ,揭示其所包含的丰富的社会意义 ;再次是阐述中国佛教伦理对现代人类社会的三大矛盾 ,即人与自我、人与他人、人与自然的矛盾的缓解、转化作用 ,从而肯定其内在具有的现代社会意义。     

恶“德”——一种特殊的道德现象

人类竭尽所能 ,在最大的限度上去减少各种罪恶 ,其中 ,包括恶“德”的手段在内。为了更好地运用恶“德”这种手段 ,加强对它的研究和运用是十分必要的。     

Religion in the Context of Culture, Theology, and Global Ethics

The theme of this symposium is distinctive and challenging, because it incorporates the dimensions of interreligious reflection, theology, science, and ethics. This article presents a palette of issues that are both challenge and resource for approaching the theme. Three sets of issues are considered: (1) the role of religion in culture, (2) theological interpretation of nature, disease, and evil, and (3) the fashioning of a global ethic.     

‘In human shape to become the very beast!’ – Henry More on animals

ABSTRACT

Animals – both tame and wild, as metaphors and as real presences – populate many of More’s works. In this essay, I show that, from the early Psychodia Platonica to the Divine Dialogues, animals are at the core of key metaphysical issues that reverberate on the levels of psychology and ethics. In particular I discuss three main aspects: (1) the role of animals in More’s critique of atheism, both as safeguard for the body–soul interaction and as proofs of divine providence in nature; (2) the problem of evil in the universe, and how to justify the existence of ‘evil’ animals in particular; (3) the differentiation between animals and humans, especially on the basis of their respective possibility of attaining happiness. In all three cases, I argue that More attempts to ‘tame’ the nature of animals, and yet that he is aware that ‘animality’ remains partly untamed.