Demons are everywhere: The effects of belief in pure evil,demonization, and retribution on punishing criminal perpetrators

Do preconceived beliefs about evil influence perceptions and punishments of those who harm others? We examined the effects of belief in pure evil (BPE), demonization, and belief in retribution on punishment of a stereotypically (vs. non-stereotypically) evil criminal. Participants punished the stereotypically evil perpetrator more (i.e., greater recommended jail time, opposition to parole, and support for his execution) because of increases in demonization (i.e., greater perceptions of the criminal as wicked, evil, and threatening), but not increases in retributive feelings. However, regardless of the criminal’s exhibited stereotypically evil traits, greater BPE predicted harsher punishment of the perpetrator; both greater demonization and stronger retributive feelings mediated the relationship between BPE and severe punishments. Further, effect sizes indicated BPE (vs. the evilness manipulation) more strongly predicted demonization and punishment. Thus, some individuals naturally see perpetrators as demons, and retributively punish them, whether or not there is more explicit stereotypic evidence of their evil dispositions.     

Covert reading of letters in a case of global alexia

This study describes the case of a global alexic patient with a severe reading deficit affecting words, letters and Arabic numbers, following a left posterior lesion. The patient (VA) could not match spoken letters to their graphic form. A preserved ability to recognize shape and canonical orientation of letters indicates intact access to the representation of letters and numbers as visual objects. A relatively preserved ability to match lowercase to uppercase letters suggests partially spared access to abstract letter identities independently of their visual forms. The patient was also unable to match spoken letters and numbers to their visual form, indicating that she could not access the graphemic representations of letters from their phonological representations. This pattern of performance suggests that the link between graphemic and phonological representations is disrupted in this patient. We hypothesize that VA’ residual reading abilities are supported by the right hemisphere.     

Descartes,Scientia and Pure Enquiry

In Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Bernard Williams supplies an interpretation of Descartes's Meditations in which the meditator's clean sweep of initial beliefs is justified by a stance that abrogates all practical pressures: the stance of pure enquiry. Otherwise, Williams explains, it would not be reasonable to set many of the initial beliefs aside. Nowhere, however, does Descartes assert that his approach is in this sense ‘pure’. It would of course be preferable if the meditator's rejection of all the initial beliefs did not require an abrogation of the conditions that govern everyday belief-formation and assessment. I supply a reading that accomplishes this. The key to this reading is recognition that Descartes is a thinker of his time, a time when the pre-modern worldview was being systematically rejected. I show, in this regard, that when Descartes characterizes a belief as ‘uncertain’, this has the implication that the belief is false. And, certainly, the rational policy, without need for any special stance, is to reject falsehoods.     

Phonological alexia with vowel-consonant dissociation in non-word reading

We present a patient with alexia secondary to cerebral lesion whose errors in the reading of non-words affect vowels more than consonants. The interest of the case resides in: (1) the documentation of a vowel-consonant dissociation selectively affecting the reading of non-words; and (2) the localization of the alteration in a specific stage of the perilexical reading pathway, that is, the blending of phonetic chains. The case contributes to the discussion on the nature of representations and the processing of vowels and consonants.     

Variants of the basic calculus of constructions

In this paper, a number of different versions of the basic calculus of constructions that have appeared in the literature are compared and the exact relationships between them are determined. The biggest differences between versions are those between the original version of Coquand and the version in early papers on the subject by Seldin. None of these results is very deep, but it seems useful to collect them in one place.     

THE SUPERNATURAL AS LANGUAGE GAME

Abstract. For many in the Anglo‐American tradition of language analysis, Ludwig Wittgenstein, the great progenitor of twentieth‐century philosophy of language, showed conclusively that theological terms lack any referent in reality and therefore represent a discourse that can do no more than manifest the existential attitudes that speakers take toward reality as a whole. To think that such terms represent more is to be bewitched by the use of language. Is it possible, however, that theological language references a fundamental human drive? In this article I reexamine the dyad of nature and supernature from the perspective of Wittgenstein's philosophy. Perhaps surprisingly, Wittgenstein's thought on the subject offers much more than his famous, terse aphorism at the conclusion of his first masterwork, the Tractatus Logico‐Philosophicus ([1921] 1961, 74, §7): “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.” Furthermore, the basic Tractarian drive to determine the relationship between language and reality, which is redirected but not extinguished in Wittgenstein's second, divergent, opus, the Philosophical Investigations ([1953] 1967), may be the place for a renewed examination of what the supernatural means in human discourse. Does talk of God give expression to the fundamental transcendence of human knowledge? Is it a language game we can eschew?     

Word recognition and face recognition following posterior cerebral artery stroke: Overlapping networks and selective contributions

It has been suggested that word- and face recognition rely on a common cerebral network for perceptual processing. To further explore this hypothesis, face- and word recognition were assessed in seven patients with focal lesions after stroke of the posterior cerebral artery in either hemisphere. The aim was to investigate if problems in face- and word recognition would co-occur, if testing was sensitive and patients were not pre-selected based on behavioural symptoms. Patients and matched controls were given a reading test and a delayed matching paradigm with faces, objects, and words. Interestingly, all patients with word recognition difficulties had problems in face recognition, independently of the affected hemisphere, supporting the existence of a bilateral perceptual network for faces and words. However, two patients showed selective face recognition problems after unilateral damage to either hemisphere, suggesting that parts of this network may be more critical for face than for word recognition.     

Rapid word identification in pure alexia is lexical but not semantic

Following the notion that patients with pure alexia have access to two distinct reading strategies-letter-by-letter reading and semantic reading-a training program was devised to facilitate reading via semantics in a patient with pure alexia. Training utilized brief stimulus presentations and required category judgments rather than explicit word identification. The training was successful for trained words, but generalized poorly to untrained words. Additional studies involving oral reading of nouns and of functors also resulted in improved reading of trained words. Pseudowords could not be trained to criterion. The results suggest that improved reading can be achieved in pure alexia by pairing rapidly presented words with feedback. Focusing on semantic processing is not essential to this process. It is proposed that the training strengthens connections between the output of visual processing and preexisting orthographic representations.     

The impurity of “pure” indexicals

Within the class of indexicals, a distinction is often made between “pure” or “automatic” indexicals on one hand, and demonstratives or “discretionary” indexicals on the other. The idea is supposed to be that certain indexicals refer automatically and invariably to a particular feature of the utterance context: ‘I’ refers to the speaker, ‘now’ to the time of utterance, ‘here’ to the place of utterance, etc. Against this view, I present cases where reference shifts from the speaker, time, or place of utterance to some other object, time, or place. I consider and reject the claim that these counterexamples to the automatic indexical theory all involve non-literal uses of indexicals and argue that they cannot be explained away on the grounds that they involve conversational implicature or pretense.