From Walls to Windows: Using Barriers as Pathways to Insightful Solutions

The purpose of this study was to explore and develop a conceptual model for how individuals unlock insight. The concept of insight — the ‘out of the box’ or ‘aha!’ solution to a problem — offers a framework for exploring and understanding how best to enhance problem solving skills due to the cognitive shift insight requires. Creative problem solving (CPS) is inherent to a variety of performance realms including effective decision making, innovation, and organizational development; however, related processes of insight, innovation and creativity remain intangible. The model, based on a review of the problem solving literature, proposes that insight involves a five stage, cyclical process emerging as: primary appraisal of the problem, secondary appraisal based on prior knowledge, initial focus, problem representation, and solution generation when, if no solution is found, the cycle begins again. The research has implications for individual, team and organizational settings suggesting that performance on a wide variety of problems may be improved by utilizing an integrated focus rather than a barrier or goal focus alone.     

超越人生的困境——论苏东坡对佛学如是观的认识

苏东坡对佛学人生观的领悟概括地讲即是对佛学“如是观”的认识。所谓“如是观”,在佛学中的本义被认为是以一种非世俗的般若佛智来观照世法真实相状的正确看法。因此,苏东坡虽经历诸多人生痛苦,却能以超然的态度作“如是观”,这也可以说是般若空观在东坡生活道路上所起的积极作用。     

The Experience of Insight Follows Incubation in the Compound Remote Associates Task

The phenomenon of insight is frequently characterized by the experience of a sudden and certain solution. Anecdotal accounts suggest that insight frequently occurs after the problem solver has taken some time away from the problem (i.e., incubation). However, the mechanism by which incubation may facilitate insight problem‐solving remains unclear. Here, we used compound remote associates problems to explore the likely mechanisms by which incubation may facilitate problem‐solving. First, we manipulated problem fixation to explore whether forgetting can explain incubation effects. Second, leveraging previous work linking the experience of insight to unconscious semantic integration, we asked participants to report their experience of insight after each problem solution, including problems solved after a period of distracted incubation. We hypothesized that incubation was not principally important for forgetting but rather frequently causes a shift to a more unconscious semantic integration strategy. Consistent with this we found that initial problem fixation did not predict the improvement in problem‐solving after incubation and that participants were more likely to report insight on problems solved after incubation. Our findings suggest that incubation may facilitate insight problem‐solving leading to a mind‐set shift to a more unconscious problem‐solving strategy involving semantic integration.     

Overconfidently underthinking: narcissism negatively predicts cognitive reflection

Abstract

There exists a large body of work examining individual differences in the propensity to engage in reflective thinking processes. However, there is a distinct lack of empirical research examining the role of dispositional factors in these differences and understanding these associations could provide valuable insight into decision-making. Here, we examine whether individual differences in cognitive reflection are related to narcissism (excessive self-focused attention) and impulsiveness (trait-based lack of inhibitory control). Participants across three studies completed measures of narcissism, impulsiveness and cognitive reflection. Results indicate that grandiose and vulnerable narcissists differ in their performance on problem-solving tasks (i.e., Cognitive Reflection Test [CRT]) and preferences for intuitive thinking, as well as the degree to which they reflect on and understand their own thoughts and enjoy cognitively effortful activities. Additionally, though impulsiveness was significantly related to self-report measures of cognitive reflection (i.e., metacognitive reflection, metacognitive insight, and need for cognition), it showed no association with a behavioural measure of cognitive reflection (i.e., CRT scores). Our results suggest that certain individual differences in dispositional and personality characteristics may play important roles in the extent to which individuals engage in certain forms of reflective thinking.