Missing

Wartime experience in Britain during World War Two left thousands of empty spaces where once buildings and streets had been. It simultaneously left gaps in families, often with far-reaching consequences. In this paper, I reflect on one such case in my own family. I examine how the devastating loss of a particular family member as a consequence of an unlucky combination of time and place played into a silent history of earlier losses connected to physical migration, experiences which had traumatic impact decades later. The interweaving of physical place, space, and gaps, with their emotional and unconscious counterparts is explored in a narrative which also traces their ripple effect through time. As part of this meditation on my family's history, I draw on research on the impact later in life of early childhood experience of maternal depression, and on studies concerning the emotional impact of migration.     

Would a neuroscience of violence aid in understanding legal culpability?

Defense attorneys in criminal cases are beginning to argue that their clients were biologically predisposed to committing their crimes and therefore were less responsible for their behavior. Indeed, if our brains cause our behavior, and our brains are the way they are because of genetic composition, insults, disease, and life experiences, it becomes difficult to argue that any punishment as justified retribution for behavior is cogent. In this essay, I address the question of whether understanding the neuroscience behind human behavior should alter our legal notion of responsibility. We will examine this query in greater detail, using violence as a case study, asking whether understanding the neuroscience underlying violent behavior impacts our notion of personal or legal culpability. I shall argue that it does not. I proceed by first briefly sketching what we know about human violence and the biology behind it. Then I turn to a quick discussion of psychopaths, their connections to violence, and what we think we know about the biology of their brains. Finally, I come to the question of whether we should consider violent people with specific brain abnormalities as mad or bad, which will feed into the question of whether such people are responsible for their criminal behavior. I conclude with some very general and very brief speculations on what this discussion has to tell us about nature of being human.