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11.
Alastair Taylor 《World Futures: Journal of General Evolution》2013,69(4):293-309
The Life Era: Cosmic Selection and Conscious Evolution Eric Chaisson New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1987. 259 pages. 相似文献
12.
Daniel Heussen 《Thinking & reasoning》2013,19(3):233-250
The discounting principle states that ‘the role of a given cause in producing a given effect is discounted if other plausible causes are present’ (Kelley, 1972, p. 8). The principle has only been tested with cases where the two explanations are of the same kind (i.e., causal explanations). However, explanations of properties of objects, people, or events often involve functions. Zebras have stripes in order to be better camouflaged. Humans have eyebrows to keep sweat from running into their eyes. Adrenaline is secreted in order to modulate fight and flight responses. Thus, what happens when we are faced with two different kinds of explanation for the same property: one functional and one causal? People evaluated explanations of properties for natural kinds and artefacts. Functional explanations were discounted in favour of causal explanations, however this was only true for properties of artefacts. The presence of an alternative explanation for properties of natural kinds did not affect the plausibility of either kind of explanation. 相似文献
13.
Itay Shani 《New Ideas in Psychology》2010,28(3):324-337
One of the most significant characteristics of intentional states is the fact that they represent their intentional objects under selective aspects (or modes of presentation); that is, that they manifest an aspectual shape (Searle, 1992). Surprisingly however, although this remarkable feature is widely recognized little has been done to explain what makes representation aspect-relative in the first-place. In this article I attempt to outline an answer to this question. I begin with a critique of Searle's explanation of aspectual shape as anchored in conscious experience. I argue next that, since to represent an object under an aspect is to represent it relative to a selective set of properties, the task - from the perspective of a theory of mental representation - is to explain what makes intentional states property-relative. It is then argued that while this task cannot be handled properly by standard (in particular computational-representational) theories of mental representation, a shift towards an action-based framework for theories of perception and representation promises to provide the key with which to unlock the puzzle. 相似文献
14.
Jan Plate 《Inquiry (Oslo, Norway)》2018,61(8):783-853
This paper provides an analysis of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, as applied both to properties and to relations. In contrast to other accounts, the approach taken here locates the source of a property’s intrinsicality or extrinsicality in the manner in which that property is ‘logically constituted’, and thus – plausibly – in its nature or essence, rather than in e.g. its modal profile. Another respect in which the present proposal differs from many extant analyses lies in the fact that it does not seek to analyse the ‘global’ distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties on the basis of the ‘local’ distinction between having a property intrinsically and having it extrinsically. Instead, the latter distinction is explicated on the basis of the former. 相似文献
15.
Anjan Chakravartty 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):149-158
Two of the most potent challenges faced by scientific realism are the underdetermination of theories by data, and the pessimistic
induction based on theories previously held to be true, but subsequently acknowledged as false. Recently, Stanford (2006,
Exceeding our grasp: Science, history, and the problem of unconceived alternatives. Oxford: Oxford University Press) has formulated what he calls the problem of unconceived alternatives: a version of the
underdetermination thesis combined with a historical argument of the same form as the pessimistic induction. In this paper,
I contend that while Stanford does present a novel antirealist argument, a successful response to the pessimistic induction
would likewise defuse the problem of unconceived alternatives, and that a more selective and sophisticated realism than that
which he allows is arguably immune to both concerns.
相似文献
Anjan ChakravarttyEmail: |
16.
Ásta Sveinsdóttir 《Philosophical Studies》2008,140(1):135-148
In this article I introduce a certain kind of anti-realist account of what makes a property essential to an object and defend
it against likely objections. This account, which I call a ‘conferralist’ account, shares some of the attractive features
of other anti-realist accounts, such as conventionalism and expressivism, but I believe, not their respective drawbacks.
相似文献
ásta SveinsdóttirEmail: |
17.
Luca Moretti 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(1):97-114
Minimal entities are, roughly, those that fall under notions defined by only deflationary principles. In this paper I provide
an accurate characterization of two types of minimal entities: minimal properties and minimal facts. This characterization
is inspired by both Schiffer’s notion of a pleonastic entity and Horwich’s notion of minimal truth. I argue that we are committed
to the existence of minimal properties and minimal facts according to a deflationary notion of existence, and that the appeal
to the inferential role reading of the quantifiers does not dismiss this commitment. I also argue that deflationary existence
is language-dependent existence—this clarifies why minimalists about properties and facts are not realists about these entities
though their language may appear indistinguishable from the language of realists.
相似文献
Luca MorettiEmail: |