牟宗三先生名字义蕴辨正

本文不同意蔡仁厚把"三"释为三才、三光、三教等,认为"三"有明确性,且传达着尚中和的儒家意识;反对将"离中"解成"中宜离以显其用",认为"离中"即附丽中道.进而提出"三"为<离>卦之数,"离中"则源于<离>六二爻,牟宗三的名字寄予着对德业双修的期望--如丽(离)中天的事业,中正美好的德行.     

A pragmatic defense of Millianism

A new kind of defense of the Millian theory of names is given, which explains intuitive counter-examples as depending on pragmatic effects of the relevant sentences, by direct application of Grice’s and Sperber and Wilson’s Relevance Theory and uncontroversial assumptions. I begin by arguing that synonyms are always intersubstitutable, despite Mates’ considerations, and then apply the method to names. Then, a fairly large sample of cases concerning names are dealt with in related ways. It is argued that the method, as applied to the various cases, satisfies the criterion of success: that for every sentence in context, it is a counter-example to Millianism to the extent that it has pragmatic effects (matching speakers’ intuitions).     

El,Baal, and Allah

This article compares the appropriations of the divine names El and Baal into the Yahwistic faith in ancient Israel with the Christian use of the word “Allah” in contemporary Indonesia. This study finds that, like El and Baal, “Allah” can function as both an appellative and personal name in contemporary Indonesia. However, the term “Allah” in Indonesia is at a crossroads to develop either to be more generic, like El, or to be more personal, like Baal. Learning from the peaceful appropriation of El as a generic name and the polemical appropriation of Baal as a personal name in ancient Israel, Indonesian Christians need to advocate the use of the name Allah as an appellative because it may prevent unnecessary conflicts in the Christian–Muslim relationship in Indonesia. Furthermore, the use of the common word “Allah” in Indonesia to refer to the supreme being is crucial for promoting interreligious dialogue between Islam and Christianity.     

Learning of letter names follows similar principles across languages: Evidence from Hebrew

Letter names play an important role in early literacy. Previous studies of letter name learning have examined the Latin alphabet. The current study tested learners of Hebrew, comparing their patterns of performance and types of errors with those of English learners. We analyzed letter-naming data from 645 Israeli children who had not begun formal reading instruction: a younger group (mean age 5 years 2 months) and an older group (mean age 6 years 2 months). Children's errors often involved letters with similar shapes or letters adjacent to one another in the alphabet. Most Hebrew letter names are not very similar to one another phonologically, and there were fewer phonologically based confusions than in English. We found both general frequency effects and frequency effects that reflected the letters in individual children's names. On average, girls knew more letter names than did boys. The results suggest that letter name learning follows similar principles across languages.     

Visual Imagery Processing and Knowledge of Famous Names in Alzheimer's Disease and MCI

ABSTRACT

The study of memory for famous people and visual imagery retrieval was investigated in patients in the early stages of Alzheimer's disease (AD) and in the prodromal stage of AD, so-called Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI). Fifteen patients with AD (MMSE ≥23), 15 patients with amnestic MCI (a-MCI) and 15 normal controls (NC) performed a famous names test designed to evaluate the semantic and distinctive physical features knowledge of famous persons. Results indicated that patients with AD and a-MCI generated significantly less physical features and semantic biographical knowledge about famous persons than did normal control participants. Additionally, significant differences were observed between a-MCI and AD patients in all tasks. The present findings confirm recent studies reporting semantic memory impairment in MCI. Moreover, the current findings show that mental imagery is lowered in a-MCI and AD and is likely related to the early semantic impairment.     

When seeing is not believing: A critique of priest's argument from perception

In this paper I critically examine an argument proposed by Graham Priest in support of the claim that the observable world is consistent. According to this argument we have good reason to think that the observable world is consistent, specifically we perceive it to be consistent. I critique this argument on two fronts. First, Priest appears to reason from the claim ‘we know what it is to have a contradictory perception’ to the claim ‘we know what it is to perceive a contradiction’. I argue that this inference fails to be valid. Secondly, I give reasons for thinking that if an observable state of affairs were to be contradictory, we would perceive it to be consistent. As such that the world we observe appears consistent does not constitute evidence that it is in fact consistent. That we see a consistent world is no reason to believe that the world is consistent. I conclude the paper with some reflections on the implications of this analysis for the plausibility of trivialism.     

On the Double-Reference Character of ＂Hexagram＂ Names in the Yijing： Engaging Fregean＆Kripkean Approaches to the Issue of How Reference Is Possible

This paper aims to examine the general issue of how reference is possible in philosophy of language through a case analysis of the ＂double reference＂ semantic-syntactic structure of ideographic hexagram （guaxiang 卦象） names in the Yijing text. I regard the case of the ＂hexagram＂ names as being quite representative of the ＂double-reference＂ semantic-syntactic structure of referring names. I thus explore how the general morals drawn from this account of ＂hexagram＂ names can engage two representative approaches, the Fregean and Kripkean ones, and contribute to our understanding and treatment of the issue of reference.     

荀子“正名”伦理思想的元语言学分析

荀子的"正名"理论蕴涵着深刻的语言学和伦理学思想,二者密不可分。从元语言学入手分析,会发现荀子的对象域建立于认识论和人性论的形上基础,而元语言和对象语言依据着形下的方法论原则。但归根结底,是形上的依据影响了形下的依据。异于西方分析伦理学家,荀子对形上依据存而不论,并不试图用形下的语言理论去解释形上问题。根据这两条泾渭分明的依据,荀子建立起了以元语言分析为基础的伦理体系。     

Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names

Russellians can have a no proposition view of empty names. I will defend this theory against the problem of meaningfulness, and show that the theory is in general well motivated. My solution to the problem of meaningfulness is that speakers’ judgements about meaningfulness are tracking grammaticality, and not propositional content.