Unique Best Deserver Theory and Arguments From Misclassification

It is a core commitment of Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism (E2D) that an utterance is 1-necessary iff it is a priori. But Jeff Speaks's Argument from Misclassification proves that, on a natural interpretation, E2D assigns necessary 1-intensions to many utterances that speakers deem a posteriori. Given that 1-intensions are meant to formalize a speaker's own understanding of the words she utters, this proof raises serious difficulties for E2D. In response, Elliott, McQueen, and Weber point out that the Argument from Misclassification presupposes a controversial theory of reference-fixation for proper names and argue that E2Dists ought to reject this theory. They discuss three alternatives to the theory that render E2D immune to the Argument from Misclassification. I demonstrate here that each of these alternatives either (i) replicates the faults of the original theory by assigning necessary 1-intensions to a posteriori utterances, or (ii) makes 1-intensions creatures of darkness. I argue that, although the Argument from Misclassification does indeed rely on a controversial theory of reference-fixation, Elliott, McQueen, and Weber have indicated no promising alternative to this theory.     

Are brand names special words? Letter visual-similarity affects the identification of brand names,but not common words

Brand names are often considered a special type of words of special relevance to examine the role of visual codes during reading: unlike common words, brand names are typically presented with the same letter-case configuration (e.g., IKEA, adidas). Recently, Pathak et al. (European Journal of Marketing, 2019, 53 , 2109) found an effect of visual similarity for misspelled brand names when the participants had to decide whether the brand name was spelled correctly or not (e.g., tacebook [baseword: facebook] was responded more slowly and less accurately than xacebook). This finding is at odds with both orthographically based visual-word recognition models and prior experiments using misspelled common words (e.g., viotin [baseword: violin ] is identified as fast as viocin ). To solve this puzzle, we designed two experiments in which the participants had to decide whether the presented item was written correctly. In Experiment 1, following a procedure similar to Pathak et al. (European Journal of Marketing, 2019, 53 , 2109), we examined the effect of visual similarity on misspelled brand names with/without graphical information (e.g., anazon vs. atazon [baseword: amazon ]). Experiment 2 was parallel to Experiment 1, but we focused on misspelled common words (e.g., anarillo vs. atarillo ; baseword: amarillo [yellow in Spanish]). Results showed a sizeable effect of visual similarity on misspelled brand names – regardless of their graphical information, but not on misspelled common words. These findings suggest that visual codes play a greater role when identifying brand names than common words. We examined how models of visual-word recognition can account for this dissociation.     

Evidence from masked‐priming that initial identification of brand names is via abstract letter identities

Although visual‐word recognition is often assumed to proceed on the basis of case‐invariant letter representations, previous research has shown a role for letter‐case in recognizing brand names. One recent study reported early effects of letter‐case in a brand‐decision task using masked primes (Perea et al., 2015, British Journal of Psychology, 106, 162). The present study attempts to replicate this finding using brand names typically presented in all lowercase (e.g., adidas), all uppercase (e.g., IKEA), or titlecase (e.g., Ford). Across three masked‐priming experiments, we found no advantage for case‐matched identity primes over case‐mismatched identity primes. This finding suggests that brand‐specific letter‐case information does not play a role in the early processing of brand names. However, we observed evidence that case may be used as a cue for making brand decisions, which may explain the effect reported by Perea et al. (2015, British Journal of Psychology, 106, 162).     

Fictional coreference as a problem for the pretense theory

There seems to be a perfectly ordinary sense in which different speakers can use an empty name to talk about the same thing. Call this fictional coreference. It is a constraint on an adequate theory of empty names that it provide a satisfactory account of fictional coreference. The main claim of this paper is that the pretense theory of empty names does not respect this constraint.

Moral judgment purposivism: saving internalism from amoralism

Consider orthodox motivational judgment internalism: necessarily, A’s sincere moral judgment that he or she ought to φ motivates A to φ. Such principles fail because they cannot accommodate the amoralist, or one who renders moral judgments without any corresponding motivation. The orthodox alternative, externalism, posits only contingent relations between moral judgment and motivation. In response I first revive conceptual internalism by offering some modifications on the amoralist case to show that certain community-wide motivational failures are not conceptually possible. Second, I introduce a theory of moral motivation that supplements the intuitive responses to different amoralist cases. According to moral judgment purposivism (MJP), in rough approximation, a purpose of moral judgments is to motivate corresponding behaviors such that a mental state without this purpose is not a moral judgment. MJP is consistent with conceptual desiderata, provides an illuminating analysis of amoralist cases, and offers a step forward in the internalist-externalist debates.

GENERALIZATION OF NAMING RESPONSES TO OBJECTS IN THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT AS A FUNCTION OF TRAINING STIMULUS MODALITY WITH RETARDED CHILDREN

Picture-cards, photographs, and real objects were compared as training stimuli in order to determine which best facilitated the generalization of naming responses learned in a special training room to real objects in the natural environments of four retarded children. The amount of transfer of naming behavior between the three stimulus modes and the average amount of training time required per stimulus mode were also assessed. Three of the four children displayed considerably more generalization to the real objects in the natural environment when they were trained with real objects. The fourth child displayed substantial generalization regardless of the training stimulus mode. No particular training stimulus mode clearly facilitated the transfer of naming responses to other modes or greatly reduced training time. The results of two supplementary procedures conducted with one child showed that: (1) training in several environments facilitated generalization to real objects in the natural environment when real objects were used as training stimuli but not when picture-cards were used, and (2) transfer from picture-cards to real objects was facilitated by training other picture-cards and the real objects portrayed by them at the same time.     

Vowels, syllables, and letter names: differences between young children's spelling in English and Portuguese

Young Portuguese-speaking children have been reported to produce more vowel- and syllable-oriented spellings than have English speakers. To investigate the extent and source of such differences, we analyzed children's vocabulary and found that Portuguese words have more vowel letter names and a higher vowel-consonant ratio than do English words. In a spelling experiment, we found that Portuguese speakers used more vowels, but did not produce more syllabic spellings, than did English speakers. The differences that we observed are attributable to quantitative differences in the languages and their writing and letter name systems. They do not support the widespread idea that speakers of Romance languages pass through an additional, syllabic, stage of development.     

How Could Chinese Thinking Modes Integrate into Contemporary Western Epistemology? —A Hybrid Perspective of Both AI and the Confucian Theory of the Rectification of Names

Post-Gettier contemporary epistemology is different from traditional epistemology in the sense that the former is concerned more with the normative dimension of knowledge, while the latter is concerned more with how knowledge is actually formed. Due to the cultural differences concerning how to understand key epistemological terms like “knowledge,” “belief,” and “justification,” the Chinese-speaking philosophical world, analytic thinkers precluded, has long been unable to appreciate the fruits of the post-Gettier epistemology. Two intermediate moves are proposed to take for filling the gap between post-Gettier epistemology and the Chinesespeaking intellectual community: Firstly, the fusion of AI and epistemology is encouraged, hence, such a move would provide a chance to double-check the putative universal applicability of specific conclusions of the post-Gettier epistemology from an engineering perspective; secondly, an algorithmoriented reconstruction of the Confucian theory of the rectification of names is also encouraged to bring new life to some traditional Chinese-based thoughts on the process of epistemic justification.     

Looking for Whitehead

Saul Kripke in his revolutionary and influential series of lectures from the early 1970s (later published as the book Naming and Necessity) famously resurrected John Stuart Mill's theory of proper names. Kripke at the same time rejected Mill's theory of general terms. According to Kripke, many natural kind terms do not fit Mill's account of general terms and are closer to proper names. Unfortunately, Kripke and his followers ignored key passages in Mill's A System of Logic in which Mill enunciates a sophisticated and detailed theory of natural kind terms that anticipates and is in some ways superior to Kripke's.     

Searching for interference effects in learning new face–name associations

In three experiments we attempted to increase interference using experimental manipulations in a face–name learning paradigm. All experiments included young and older adult participants because ageing is associated with increases in both susceptibility to interference and difficulty in learning face–name associations. None of the experiments produced interference for either age group: The inclusion of confusable (i.e., ambiguous) names and occupations, having to learn an additional piece of information in association with each face, and requiring participants to guess when uncertain all failed to negatively impact name learning. Interference does not appear to be the critical mechanism underlying the difficulty of learning proper names, and it cannot account for older adults' disproportionate decline in name-learning ability.