Neural substrates of cognitive skill learning in Parkinson's disease

While cognitive skill learning is normally acquired implicitly through frontostriatal circuitry in healthy individuals, neuroimaging studies suggest that patients with Parkinson's disease (PD) do so by activating alternate, intact brain areas associated with explicit memory processing. To further test this hypothesis, 10 patients with PD and 12 healthy controls were tested on a modified, learning version of the Tower of London task while undergoing positron emission tomography at four different time points over the course of learning. Despite having less accurate problem solving abilities than controls, PD patients were able to acquire the skill learning task. However, as compared to controls, they maintained higher levels of cerebral blood flow activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and hippocampus and showed an increase in activity in the frontopolar cortex and posterior cingulate over the course of learning. These findings reflect a shift to the explicit memory system in PD patients, enabling them to learn this cognitive skill, which is normally acquired by control subjects using implicit learning strategies and frontostriatal circuitry.     

Substantive and procedural norms in normative multiagent systems

Procedural norms are instrumental norms addressed to agents playing a role in the normative system, for example to motivate these role playing agents to recognize violations or to apply sanctions. Procedural norms have first been discussed in law, where they address legal practitioners such as legislators, lawyers and policemen, but they are discussed now too in normative multiagent systems to motivate software agents. Procedural norms aim to achieve the social order specified using regulative norms like obligations and permissions, and constitutive norms like counts-as obligations. In this paper we formalize procedural, regulative and constitutive norms using input/output logic enriched with an agent ontology and an abstraction hierarchy. We show how our formalization explains Castelfranchi's notion of mutual empowerment, stating that not only the agents playing a role in a normative system are empowered by the normative system, but the normative system itself is also empowered by the agents playing a role in it. In our terminology, the agents are not only institutionally empowered, but they are also delegated normative goals from the system. Together, institutional empowerment and normative goal delegation constitute a mechanism which we call delegation of power, where agents acting on behalf of the normative system become in charge of recognizing which institutional facts follow from brute facts.     

Beyond Therapy and Enhancement: The Alteration of Human Nature

With the rapid progress and considerable promise of nanobiotechnology/neurosciences there is the potential of transforming the very nature of human beings and of how humans can conceive of themselves as rational animals through technological innovations. The interface between humans and machines (neuro-digital interface), can potentially alter what it means to be human, i.e., the very idea of human nature and of normal functioning will be changed. In this paper, I argue that we are potentially on the verge of a paradigm shift in terms of the ends and goals of techno-science and its applications in the biomedical sciences. In particular, the development of brain-computer interfaces could reconceptualize the very notion of what it means to be human. Hence, we should not limit our reflections of applications in terms of therapy and enhancement but also include an examination of applications aiming at the alteration of human nature. To this end I will first delineate the potential paradigm shift and then map out four distinct clusters of concerns in relation to the brain-computer interface. Finally, I argue that our moral and philosophical reflections should follow a procedural model based on managed consensus due to our pluralistic context.

Authorities’ knowledge of shared group membership and its effects on the respect-informing properties of procedural fairness

We observe that the voice-leads-to-respect process underlying relational models of procedural fairness is assumed to follow primarily if not solely from interaction with an in-group authority. Moreover, if the voice recipients believe that the authority is unaware of this shared group membership, then the provision of voice actually says nothing (to the voice recipients) about their standing as group members; the respect-providing information as valued in-group members is absent because the recipients know that the authority does not know of their shared group membership. We tested these assumptions in a three-way design manipulating the group membership of the authority (in-group vs. out-group), the nature of voice (provided vs. denied) and the nature of group membership knowledge (the authority knows or does not know the voice recipient’s group membership). A significant three-way interaction was found, as predicted, on respect and fairness ratings. These data provide clear experimental support for an unstated, and yet untested, assumption of relational models of procedural fairness.     

When does high procedural fairness reduce self-evaluations following unfavorable outcomes?: The moderating effect of prevention focus

The present studies were designed to delineate when procedural fairness would be more versus less likely to be inversely related to people’s self-evaluations in response to unfavorable outcomes. Prior theory and research have shown that: (1) the more that people assign psychological significance to unfavorable outcomes, the more likely are their self-evaluations to be adversely affected by such outcomes, and (2) people who are more prevention focused in their self-regulatory orientation assign greater psychological significance to unfavorable outcomes. Consequently, we predicted that in the face of unfavorable outcomes, the inverse relationship between procedural fairness and self-evaluations would be more likely to emerge among those who are more prevention focused. Using different conceptions or operationalizations of all of the independent and dependent variables, we found support for this prediction in three studies, spanning different cultures, contexts, and methodologies.     

The egocentric nature of procedural justice: Social value orientation as moderator of reactions to decision-making procedures

In four studies, the authors investigated the individual-oriented versus social-oriented nature of procedural justice effects by comparing fairness-based responses to decision-making procedures among proself versus prosocial oriented individuals. In Studies 1 through 3, we measured participants’ social value orientation and manipulated whether or not they were granted or denied voice in a decision-making process. Results consistently revealed that the effects of voice versus no-voice on fairness-based perceptions, emotions, and behavioral intentions were significantly more pronounced for individuals with proself orientations than for individuals with prosocial orientations. These findings were extended in Study 4, a field study in which perceived procedural justice was a stronger predictor of satisfaction and organizational citizenship behaviors among proselfs than among prosocials. These findings suggest that procedural justice effects can be accounted for by self-oriented motives or needs, rather than prosocial motives that are often conceptualized as being associated with justice.     

Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom

There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be. Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons, though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing the core truths of both camps.

Why Levelling Down could be Worse for Prioritarianism than for Egalitarianism

Derek Parfit has argued that, in contrast to prioritarianism, egalitarianism is exposed to the levelling down objection, i.e., the objection that it is absurd that a change which consists merely in the betteroff losing some of their well-being should be in one way for the better. In reply, this paper contends that (1) there is a plausible form of egalitarianism which is equivalent to another form of prioritarianism than the Parfitian one, a relational rather than an absolute form of prioritarianism, and that (2), although this relational or egalitarian form of prioritarianism is hit by the levelling down objection, the Parfitian form is also hit by it, or worse objections, if it is fully worked out.

The role of a mentoring group for family therapy trainees and therapists of color

This article discusses the development, process, and impact of a mentoring group for family therapists of color. A within-group process for trainees of color in a predominantly White institution can provide a valuable resource for support, validation, empowerment, and collective action. The article examines how such mentoring promotes the effectiveness of therapists of color, as well as the practices and goals of social justice and diversity within training institutions and the field in general. Reflections and recommendations for implementing such a group are offered, as well as a personal narrative of a group member's experience of finding her voice in the group.     

What determines people’s fairness judgments? Identification and outcomes influence procedural justice evaluations under uncertainty

When the procedures people experience are uncertain, factors unrelated to principles of procedural justice may nevertheless shape procedural justice judgments. This paper investigates two of these factors: an individual’s level of social identification with the group enacting the procedures and the outcomes associated with the procedure. It was predicted and found that high (vs. low) levels of identification promote relatively positive perceptions of procedural justice. It was also predicted and found that desirable (vs. undesirable) outcomes promote relatively positive perceptions of procedural justice. These effects only emerged in the absence of direct information indicating whether procedures were (un)fair. By showing an influence of identification and outcomes on procedural justice judgments under conditions of informational uncertainty, these studies provide important experimental evidence that integrates and extends previous research on justice, identity, and uncertainty to understand subjective evaluations of process fairness.