Prolegomena to Concise Theories of Action

A new methodology for developing theories of action has recently emerged which provides means for formally evaluating the correctness of such theories. Yet, for a theory of action to qualify as a solution to the frame problem, not only does it need to produce correct inferences, but moreover, it needs to derive these inferences from a concise representation of the domain at hand. The new methodology however offers no means for assessing conciseness. Such a formal account of conciseness is developed in this paper. Combined with the existing criterion for correctness, our account of conciseness offers a framework where proposed solutions to the frame problem can be formally evaluated.     

The One-to-One Constraint in Analogical Mapping and Inference

Theories of analogical reasoning have assumed that a 1-to-1 constraint discourages reasoners from mapping a single element in 1 analog to multiple elements in another. Empirical evidence suggests that reasoners sometimes appear to violate the one-to-one constraint when asked to generate mappings, yet virtually never violate it when asked to generate analogical inferences. However, few studies have examined analogical inferences based on nonisomorphic analogs, and their conclusions are suspect due to methodological problems. We sought to elicit mixed inferences that could result from combining information from 2 possible mappings. Participants generated 2-to-1 correspondences when asked for explicit mappings, but did not produce mixed inferences. Multiple correspondences appear to arise from multiple isomorphic mappings, rather than from a single homomorphic mapping.     

Associative learning of discrimination with masked stimuli

Great controversy exists on whether associative learning occurs without awareness. In Experiment 1, 31 participants received discrimination training by repeated presentations of two stimulus sequences (S1_A → S2_A, and S1_B → S2_B), S1 being a masked stimulus. S2 were imperative stimuli for a reaction time (RT) task. After the acquisition phase, all participants were tested with 20 presentations of congruent (S1_A → S2_A and S1_B → S2_B) and incongruent (S1_A → S2_B and S1_B → S2_A) stimulus sequences. The RT in the testing phase was faster in congruent than in incongruent stimulus sequences. These results are considered strong evidence of associative learning without awareness of the contingency between the stimuli. A second experiment was designed with SOA varied between three groups (23, 58, and 117 ms). The results showed that the participants responded more quickly to congruent stimulus sequences and that the SOA did not affect RT. The SOA did not modify the effect of congruence either, although the interaction was near significance.     

Insight problem solving in individuals with high versus low schizotypy

Insight problem solving requires restructuring of a problem space by stepping out of the framework provided by the commonly activated cognitive schemas and acquiring a new perspective on the problem. Schizotypy has been linked with loosened associative and overinclusive thinking that may be advantageous for this process. The present study tested this hypothesis and found that individuals with a high degree of schizotypy show better performance on a set of insight problems relative to individuals with low schizotypy, but not on a set of incremental problems that required focused goal-related thinking. Results support the notion that schizotypy is associated not only with enhanced abilities in creative processes involved in divergent thinking but also in creative operations during analytical problem solving.     

The integration problem for naive realism

This paper makes explicit the basic problem perfect hallucinations pose for perceptual naive realists, more fundamental than the well-trodden Screening-off Problem. The deeper problem offers the basis for an overarching classification of the available naive- realist-friendly approaches to perfect hallucinations. In the course of laying out the challenges to the different types of response, the paper makes a case for the superiority of a particular approach to perfect hallucinations, on which they would be understood as a special kind of perceptual anomaly—arising from a secondary mode of perceptual processing.     

Fodor on global cognition and scientific inference

This paper addresses the extent to which quotidian cognition is like scientific inference by focusing on Jerry Fodor's famous analogy. I specifically consider and rebut a recent attempt made by Tim Fuller and Richard Samuels to deny the usefulness of Fodor's analogy. In so doing, I reveal some subtleties of Fodor's arguments overlooked by Fuller and Samuels and others. Recognizing these subtleties provides a richer appreciation of the analogy, allowing us to gain better traction on the issue concerning the extent to which everyday cognition is like scientific inference. In the end, I propose that quotidian cognition is indeed like scientific inference, but not precisely in the way Fodor claims it is.     

Auditory awareness negativity is an electrophysiological correlate of awareness in an auditory threshold task

One theory of visual awareness proposes that electrophysiological activity related to awareness occurs in primary visual areas approximately 200 ms after stimulus onset (visual awareness negativity: VAN) and in fronto-parietal areas about 300 ms after stimulus onset (late positivity: LP). Although similar processes might be involved in auditory awareness, only sparse evidence exists for this idea. In the present study, we recorded electrophysiological activity while subjects listened to tones that were presented at their own awareness threshold. The difference in electrophysiological activity elicited by tones that subjects reported being aware of versus unaware of showed an early negativity about 200 ms and a late positivity about 300 ms after stimulus onset. These results closely match those found in vision and provide convincing evidence for an early negativity (auditory awareness negativity: AAN), as well as an LP. These findings suggest that theories of visual awareness are also applicable to auditory awareness.     

Comparing Multiple Paths to Mastery: What is Learned?

Contemporary theories of learning postulate one or at most a small number of different learning mechanisms. However, people are capable of mastering a given task through qualitatively different learning paths such as learning by instruction and learning by doing. We hypothesize that the knowledge acquired through such alternative paths differs with respect to the level of abstraction and the balance between declarative and procedural knowledge. In a laboratory experiment we investigated what was learned about patterned letter sequences via either direct instruction in the relevant patterns or practice in solving letter-sequence extrapolation problems. Results showed that both types of learning led to mastery of the target task as measured by accuracy performance. However, behavioral differences emerged in how participants applied their knowledge. Participants given instruction showed more variability in the types of strategies they used to articulate their knowledge as well as longer solution times for generating the action implications of that knowledge as compared to the participants given practice. Results are discussed regarding the implications for transfer, generalization, and procedural application. Learning theories that claim generality should be tested against cross-scenario phenomena, not just parametric variations of a single learning scenario.     

Acquiring an understanding of design: evidence from children's insight problem solving

The human ability to make tools and use them to solve problems may not be zoologically unique, but it is certainly extraordinary. Yet little is known about the conceptual machinery that makes humans so competent at making and using tools. Do adults and children have concepts specialized for understanding human-made artifacts? If so, are these concepts deployed in attempts to solve novel problems? Here we present new data, derived from problem-solving experiments, which support the following. (i) The structure of the child's concept of artifact function changes profoundly between ages 5 and 7. At age 5, the child's conceptual machinery defines the function of an artifact as any goal a user might have; by age 7, its function is defined by the artifact's typical or intended use. (ii) This conceptual shift has a striking effect on problem-solving performance, i.e. the child's concept of artifact function appears to be deployed in problem solving. (iii) This effect on problem solving is not caused by differences in the amount of knowledge that children have about the typical use of a particular tool; it is mediated by the structure of the child's artifact concept (which organizes and deploys the child's knowledge). In two studies, children between 5 and 7 years of age were matched for their knowledge of what a particular artifact "is for", and then given a problem that can only be solved if that tool is used for an atypical purpose. All children performed well in a baseline condition. But when they were primed by a demonstration of the artifact's typical function, 5-year-old children solved the problem much faster than 6-7-year-old children. Because all children knew what the tools were for, differences in knowledge alone cannot explain the results. We argue that the older children were slower to solve the problem when the typical function was primed because (i) their artifact concept plays a role in problem solving, and (ii) intended purpose is central to their concept of artifact function, but not to that of the younger children.