全文获取类型
收费全文 | 619篇 |
免费 | 90篇 |
国内免费 | 80篇 |
出版年
2024年 | 1篇 |
2023年 | 1篇 |
2022年 | 8篇 |
2021年 | 19篇 |
2020年 | 23篇 |
2019年 | 37篇 |
2018年 | 38篇 |
2017年 | 41篇 |
2016年 | 27篇 |
2015年 | 27篇 |
2014年 | 42篇 |
2013年 | 78篇 |
2012年 | 39篇 |
2011年 | 38篇 |
2010年 | 22篇 |
2009年 | 57篇 |
2008年 | 51篇 |
2007年 | 54篇 |
2006年 | 20篇 |
2005年 | 23篇 |
2004年 | 30篇 |
2003年 | 23篇 |
2002年 | 23篇 |
2001年 | 8篇 |
2000年 | 9篇 |
1999年 | 4篇 |
1998年 | 8篇 |
1997年 | 5篇 |
1996年 | 6篇 |
1995年 | 7篇 |
1994年 | 4篇 |
1993年 | 2篇 |
1992年 | 5篇 |
1991年 | 2篇 |
1989年 | 1篇 |
1988年 | 4篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1982年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有789条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
191.
192.
With the “typical” attribute framing manipulation, assimilation effects have often been obtained; people often judge the attributes of a judgmental target more positively when the attributes are framed positively (e.g., 99% pure) than negatively (e.g., 1% impure). Research has not, however, explored or demonstrated the effects of correcting or overcorrecting for the frame's influence. Overcorrection framing occurs when a more positive response is produced by the negative frame. Across three experiments, overcorrection as well as typical framing effects were obtained. In Experiments 1 and 2, overcorrection effects were obtained when participants were prompted to consider complementary information and, in Experiment 3, when the frame's source was described as untrustworthy. In contrast, typical framing effects were obtained when prompts were not supplied and when the frame's source was not described as being untrustworthy. These results supported the unification model that uses a priming analysis to account for assimilation (typical framing) and contrast (overcorrection framing) effects. We discussed how overcorrection is expected with other framing manipulations, such as risky-choice framing. We provided reasons for asymmetrical correction effects and discussed implications of our analysis for holistic/analytical as well as System 1/System 2 processing styles, the influence of different amounts of cognitive resource allocations, and the possibility of a correction process involving averaging. 相似文献
193.
In a first study 10 adults, aged 24-44 years, solved all 105 subtraction problems in the form M - N = , where 0 < or = M < or = 13, 0 < or = N < or = 13 and N < or = M. Each participant solved every problem 10 times and in total there were 10 500 answers. Answers, response latencies and errors were registered. Retrospective verbal reports were also given, indicating how a solution was reached: (1) via a (conscious) reconstructive cognitive process or (2) via an (unconscious) reproductive (retrieval) process. The participants made 291 errors (2.8%) when solving the subtractions in study 1. The rate of self-correction was very high, 92%. In a second study 27 undergraduate students estimated overall error rates, including self-corrected errors for the 105 subtraction problems used in the first study. Judged and actual error rates were compared. The participants systematically underestimated error rates for error prone problems and overestimated error rates for error free problems. The participants were fairly accurate when they predicted problems that were most error prone, with a hit rate of 0.67 for the (18) problems predicted as the most error prone ones. In contrast, predictions of which problems were error free were very poor with a hit rate of only 0.20 of the problems predicted as error free really having no errors in study 1. The correlation between judged error rates and frequencies for actually made errors was 0.69 for answers belonging to reconstructive solutions. In contrast, there was no significant correlation between judged and actual error rates at all for retrieved solutions, possibly reflecting the inaccessibility to consciousness of quick retrieval processes. 相似文献
194.
Legal decisions such as the decision to bail upon adjourning a case have major consequences for both defendants and society. In the English system, magistrates, most of whom are lay people, are afforded considerable discretion and must work under constraints such as time pressure. Judgment analysis of the bail decision making policies of 81 magistrates from 44 courts throughout England and Wales revealed intra‐ and inter‐magistrate inconsistency in bail decisions, discrepancies between stated and elicited cue use, and high levels of post‐decisional confidence. Furthermore, magistrates' policies were better described and predicted by a fast and frugal model characterized by noncompensatory cue use, than by either of two compensatory integration models. The fast and frugal model portrays a picture of bail decision making that conflicts with the ideal practice as defined by the due process model of justice. We discuss the implications of these findings for judgment and decision making research and criminal justice policy. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
195.
Nick Bostrom 《Synthese》2007,157(1):59-78
The Sleeping Beauty problem is test stone for theories about self- locating belief, i.e. theories about how we should reason
when data or theories contain indexical information. Opinion on this problem is split between two camps, those who defend
the “1/2 view” and those who advocate the “1/3 view”. I argue that both these positions are mistaken. Instead, I propose a
new “hybrid” model, which avoids the faults of the standard views while retaining their attractive properties. This model
appears to violate Bayesian conditionalization, but I argue that this is not the case. By paying close attention to the details of
conditionalization in contexts where indexical information is relevant, we discover that the hybrid model is in fact consistent
with Bayesian kinematics. If the proposed model is correct, there are important lessons for the study of self-location, observation
selection theory, and anthropic reasoning. 相似文献
196.
This paper contrasts two approaches to agentive self-awareness: a high-level, narrative-based account, and a low-level comparator-based
account. We argue that an agent’s narrative self-conception has a role to play in explaining their agentive judgments, but
that agentive experiences are explained by low-level comparator mechanisms that are grounded in the very machinery responsible
for action-production. 相似文献
197.
M. Albert 《Synthese》2007,156(3):587-603
Probability theory is important because of its relevance for decision making, which also means: its relevance for the single
case. The propensity theory of objective probability, which addresses the single case, is subject to two problems: Humphreys’
problem of inverse probabilities and the problem of the reference class. The paper solves both problems by restating the propensity
theory using (an objectivist version of) Pearl’s approach to causality and probability, and by applying a decision-theoretic
perspective. Contrary to a widely held view, decision making on the basis of given propensities can proceed without a subjective-probability
supplement to propensities. 相似文献
198.
Melanie Killen 《Current directions in psychological science》2007,16(1):32-36
ABSTRACT— Developmental research on social and moral reasoning about exclusion has utilized a social-domain theory, in contrast to a global stage theory, to investigate children's evaluations of gender- and race-based peer exclusion. The social-domain model postulates that moral, social-conventional, and personal reasoning coexist in children's evaluations of inclusion and exclusion, and that the priority given to these forms of judgments varies by the age of the child, the context, and the target of exclusion. Findings from developmental intergroup research studies disconfirm a general-stage-model approach to morality in the child, and provide empirical data on the developmental origins and emergence of intergroup attitudes regarding prejudice, bias, and exclusion. 相似文献
199.
200.
Davis JK 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2007,28(1):1-30
Moral decision procedures such as principlism or casuistry require intuition at certain junctures, as when a principle seems
indeterminate, or principles conflict, or we wonder which paradigm case is most relevantly similar to the instant case. However,
intuitions are widely thought to lack epistemic justification, and many ethicists urge that such decision procedures dispense
with intuition in favor of forms of reasoning that provide discursive justification. I argue that discursive justification does not eliminate or minimize the need for intuition, or constrain our intuitions.
However, this is not a problem, for intuitions can be justified in easy or obvious cases, and decision procedures should be
understood as heuristic devices for reaching judgments about harder cases that approximate the justified intuitions we would
have about cases under ideal conditions, where hard cases become easy. Similarly, the forms of reasoning which provide discursive
justification help decision procedures perform this heuristic function not by avoiding intuition, but by making such heuristics
more accurate. Nonetheless, it is possible to demand too much justification; many clinical ethicists lack the time and philosophical
training to reach the more elaborate levels of discursive justification. We should keep moral decision procedures simple and
user-friendly so that they will provide what justification can be achieved under clinical conditions, rather than trying to maximize our epistemic justification out of an overstated concern
about intuition. 相似文献