Can probability neglect bias promote social distancing during the COVID-19 pandemic?

The effectiveness of a stay-at-home order depends on the speed of behavioral changes that are triggered by risk perception. Probability neglect bias, one of the cognitive biases, may lead people to engage in social distancing. However, there is no empirical evidence of the relationship between probability neglect bias and social distancing. This study aims to examine the relationship between individual differences in susceptibility to probability neglect bias and the level of social distancing practice during the early stages of the COVID-19 outbreak in Japan. The level of engagement in social distancing was defined as the narrowing of life-space mobility. We conducted a web-based questionnaire survey among 1000 adults living in central Tokyo, Japan, at the beginning of the pandemic outbreak. Our results show that people had a strong fear of infection in the early pandemic stages. Approximately 60% of our subjects were influenced by probability neglect bias. People susceptible to probability neglect bias engaged in social distancing more intensely than those who were not susceptible after the state of emergency was lifted.     

How fast can you (possibly) do it,or how long will it (certainly) take? Communicating uncertain estimates of performance time

Recent research on verbal probability statements has revealed that some expressions (e.g., possible) are especially appropriate for describing outcomes in the high end of a distribution, whereas other expressions (e.g., certain) are more appropriate for describing low-end values. However, some dimensions appear to be reversible, with higher achievements sometimes associated with high and sometimes with low values, depending on frame. We report three experiments where this “reframing effect” is studied in communications of estimated performance time, both from a speaker's and from a listener's perspective. We hypothesize that statements describing tasks as “taking time” suggest a duration frame, and find accordingly that statements about how many hours that possibly will be spent on a task, or the time a task possibly takes, lead to high time estimates. Statements focusing on the actor's role suggest, in contrast, a speed frame, thus statements about what the actor can possibly do lead to low time estimates. Estimates of the time a task certainly takes or when it is certainly done follow the opposite pattern. The results are in line with approaches that see production and comprehension of language as a dynamical and context-driven process.     

What is “Intervention”?

I begin by noting that several theologians and others object to special divine action (divine intervention and action beyond conservation and creation) on the grounds that it is incompatible with science. These theologians are thinking of classical Newtonian science; I argue that in fact classical science is in no way incompatible with special divine action, including miracle. What is incompatible with special divine action is the Laplacean picture, which involves the causal closure of the universe. I then note that contemporary, quantum mechanical science doesn't even initially appear to be incompatible with special divine action. Nevertheless, many who are well aware of the quantum mechanical revolution (including some members of the Special Divine Action Project) still find a problem with special divine action, hoping to find an understanding of it that doesn't involve divine intervention. I argue that their objections to intervention are not sound. Furthermore, it isn't even possible to say what intervention is, given the quantum mechanical framework. I conclude by offering an account of special divine action that isn't open to their objections to intervention.     

Verbal probabilities: An alternative approach

Previous studies of verbal probabilities have tried to place expressions like a chance, possible, and certain on 0–1 numerical probability scales. We ask instead, out of a range of outcomes, which outcome a verbal probability suggests. When, for instance, a sample of laptop batteries lasts from 1.5 to 3.5 hours, what is a certain and what is a possible duration? Experiment 1 showed that speakers associate certain with low values and possible with (unlikely) high or maximal values. In Experiment 2, this methodology was applied to several positive and negative verbal probability phrases, showing a preference for high rather than low or middle values in a distribution. Experiment 3 showed that such maxima are not universally described by large numbers. For instance, maximum speed is often described in terms of a small number of time units. What can (possibly) happen is accordingly sometimes described with very low and sometimes with very high values, depending upon focus of interest. Finally, participants in Experiment 4 were given the role of hearers rather than speakers and were asked to infer outcome ranges from verbal probabilities. Hearers appeared to be partly aware of speakers' tendencies to describe outcomes at the top of the range.     

Knowledge and man

Collective Intelligence (CI) can be formalized as a specific1 computational process through the use of a molecular model of computations and mathematical logic, in terms of interacting information_molecules, which are chaotically or quasi-chaotically displacing and running natural-based inference processes in their own environment. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence as a property of a social structure of beings of any nature is surprisingly short and abstract (which is astonishing) from definitions of Life. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence proposed by the author in the last few years seems to be valid for the whole spectrum of beings, in human social structures to ants in colonies, and even for bacterial colonies. It has recently been found that the CI definition also has an engineering value. The theory of CI can also be used to better understand Evolution because it allows us to locate and relate Life and Intelligence in Evolution. Moreover, this approach presents Evolution as something more complex than can be concluded from Darwinism. Probably the most surprising fact is that a simple extrapolation of the definition of Collective Intelligence brings us to the conclusion that most probably the first elementary Collective Intelligence emerged on Earth in the "chemical soup of primeval molecules," much before Life emerged. Collective Intelligence can be defined with fewer and weaker conditions than Life requires. Perhaps the emergence of that early elementary Collective Intelligence provided the basic momentum to build Life as we now know it. Thus Evolution caused Intelligence to create Life. Our hypothesis is consistent with biochemistry theories that "primeval biochemical molecules" started to interact, "firing" the Collective Intelligence of their "elementary chemical social structure" for survival. This successful action boosted further growth of complexity in that "elementary social structure," which finally resulted in the emergence of "well-defined Life." Furthermore, it provided a self-propagating cycle of growth of individual and collective Intelligence and individual and collective Life. The Collective Intelligence of ants, wolves, humans, and so forth today is only a higher level of Collective Intelligence development. Thus the present Evolution is a computational process of unidentified complexity where Life, Intelligence, and perhaps other as yet undiscovered components play temporary roles. In this paper we provide formalization and a proposed partial proof for this hypothesis.     

Additivity neglect in probability estimates: Effects of numeracy and response format

When people are asked to estimate the probabilities for an exhaustive set of more than two events, they often produce probabilities that add up to more than 100%. Potential determinants for such additivity neglect are explored in four experiments. Additive responses vary between experimental conditions, mainly as a result of response format, with a scale format leading to fewer additive responses than a list format with self-generated, written probabilities. Participants with high numeracy scores produced more additive responses, especially after being primed with a numeracy scale. Additivity neglect for 100% sums appears to be unrelated to other subadditive judgments, like non-additive disjunctions. We conclude that additivity neglect is caused by a case-based approach, which comes natural in real-life situations where the full set of outcomes is not available.     

How accurate are women's estimates of date of onset of next menses?

Abstract

Because of individual differences in Occurrence of ovulation and patterns of hormonal secretions, one would usually prefer to measure locus in the menstrual cycle using physiological assessment procedures. But such methods are time consuming and costly. When exploring a new domain for possible relations to the menstrual cycle, it would be cost effective to use the simpler procedure of having each women verbally estimate date of onset of next menses. The accuracy of such estimates was studied in two college age samples. Estimated number of days until next onset correlated highly with actual number of days, as verified by follow-up (r = 0.90). As a group, women neither under- nor overestimated number of days. The precision with which these judgments were made was reasonably high. In sum, when a group of women are followed for one cycle, the average accuracy is very high, certainly high enough to support use of such verbal reports for certain scientific purposes.     

The Probability of Iterated Conditionals

Iterated conditionals of the form If p, then if q, r are an important topic in philosophical logic. In recent years, psychologists have gained much knowledge about how people understand simple conditionals, but there are virtually no published psychological studies of iterated conditionals. This paper presents experimental evidence from a study comparing the iterated form, If p, then if q, r with the “imported,” noniterated form, If p and q, then r, using a probability evaluation task and a truth‐table task, and taking into account qualitative individual differences. This allows us to critically contrast philosophical and psychological approaches that make diverging predictions regarding the interpretation of these forms. The results strongly support the probabilistic Adams conditional and the “new paradigm” that takes this conditional as a starting point.     

The effects of music tempo on simulated driving performance and vehicular control

The automobile is currently the most popular and frequently reported location for listening to music. Yet, not much is known about the effects of music on driving performance, and only a handful of studies report that music-evoked arousal generated by loudness decreases automotive performance. Nevertheless, music tempo increases driving risks by competing for attentional space; the greater number of temporal events which must be processed, and the frequency of temporal changes which require larger memory storage, distract operations and optimal driving capacities. The current study explored the effects of music tempo on PC-controlled simulated driving. It was hypothesized that simulated driving while listening to fast-paced music would increase heart rate (HR), decrease simulated lap time, and increase virtual traffic violations. The study found that music tempo consistently affected both simulated driving speed and perceived speed estimates: as the tempo of background music increased, so too did simulated driving speed and speed estimate. Further, the tempo of background music consistently affected the frequency of virtual traffic violations: disregarded red traffic-lights (RLs), lane crossings (LNs), and collisions (ACs) were most frequent with fast-paced music. The number of music-related automobile accidents and fatalities is not a known statistic. Police investigators, drivers, and traffic researchers themselves are not mindful of the risks associated with listening to music while driving. Implications of the study point to a need for drivers' education courses to raise public awareness about the effects of music during driving.     

Adding possibilities can reduce the Gambler's Fallacy: A naïve-probability paradox

This paper reports a novel paradox of intuitive probabilistic reasoning detected in naïve reasoners’ responses in two separate experiments where we manipulated the number of sets (or possibilities) of the problem keeping constant the probability of the critical set. Experiment 1 showed that the incidence of the Gambler's Fallacy (GF) was reduced when the number of sets was increased. In Experiment 2, a reduction of the GF also occurred but, more importantly, the percentage of correct responses of the participants increased when three sets of possibilities instead of two were used. Therefore, both Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that an increase in the extensional complexity of a problem can, under certain circumstances, lead to facilitation. These results support the importance of the extensional features in solving chance problems and are consistent with the model theory of reasoning.