To do or not to do? A cognitive consistency model for drawing conclusions from conditional instructions and advice

This paper investigates a cognitive consistency model of the directionality of conditional instructions and advice that use probability expressions to express uncertainty about the antecedent p. The proposed model combines world knowledge (conveyed by causal direction) with linguistic information (conveyed by polarity and negation), and predicts whether the complex sentence antecedent has a positive or negative directionality, which in turn predicts whether a positive or negative conclusion q will be drawn. The first experiment uses Do q if p conditionals to show that given a consequent q participants complete antecedents p with a probability expression in line with expected sentence directionality. The second experiment uses If p then do q conditionals to show similar effects in a reverse direction. A third experiment uses If p then do q conditionals to show that participants draw conclusions predicted by the cognitive consistency model but not by a decision-theoretic approach to reasoning.     

Explaining the gambler's fallacy: Testing a gestalt explanation versus the “law of small numbers”

The present study tests a gestalt (closure) explanation for the gambler's fallacy which posits that runs in random events will be expected to reverse only when the run is open or ongoing. This is contrasted with the law of small numbers explanation suggesting that people expect random outcomes to balance out generally. Sixty-one university students placed hypothetical guesses and bets on a series of coin tosses. Either heads or tails were dominant (8 versus 4). In a closed run condition the run ended prior to the critical trial (e.g., HHHT), and in an open run condition the run remained open (e.g., THHH). As hypothesised, participants showed the gambler's fallacy in the open run condition, but not in the closed run condition. This difference is not due to differential memory for the outcomes. Men, and people with more previous experience gambling, were also found to be more prone to the gambler's fallacy. It is argued that the gestalt explanation best explains the results.     

Overconfidence in interval estimates: What does expertise buy you?

People’s 90% subjective confidence intervals typically contain the true value about 50% of the time, indicating extreme overconfidence. Previous results have been mixed regarding whether experts are as overconfident as novices. Experiment 1 examined interval estimates from information technology (IT) professionals and UC San Diego (UCSD) students about both the IT industry and UCSD. This within-subjects experiment showed that experts and novices were about equally overconfident. Experts reported intervals that had midpoints closer to the true value—which increased hit rate—and that were narrower (i.e., more informative)—which decreased hit rate. The net effect was no change in hit rate and overconfidence. Experiment 2 showed that both experts and novices mistakenly expected experts to be much less overconfident than novices, but they correctly predicted that experts would provide narrower intervals with midpoints closer to the truth. Decisions about whether to consult experts should be based on which aspects of performance are desired.     

Action Phases and Goal Setting: Being Optimistic After Decision Making Without Getting into Trouble

According to Gollwitzer's mindset theory, people in postdecisional action phases, who are about to implement a chosen action or goal, are supposed to be more optimistic than people in predecisional action phases, who are deliberating on different actions or goals (P. M. Gollwitzer, 1990). The present experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that postdecisional people are optimistic in a way that does not set them up for failure and disappointment. In three experiments it is shown that people who are in an implemental mindset neither set more demanding goals than do deliberative people nor do they inflate their performance predictions. Instead, they are more confident in reaching their goals and more cautious when predicting future performance. This behavior is interpreted in terms of a strategy that allows people to hold optimistic beliefs without facing the danger of exaggerated goal setting or a disconfirmation of their beliefs.     

A policy maker’s dilemma: Preventing terrorism or preventing blame

Although anti-terrorism policy should be based on a normative treatment of risk that incorporates likelihoods of attack, policy makers’ anti-terror decisions may be influenced by the blame they expect from failing to prevent attacks. We show that people’s anti-terror budget priorities before a perceived attack and blame judgments after a perceived attack are associated with the attack’s severity and how upsetting it is but largely independent of its likelihood. We also show that anti-terror budget priorities are influenced by directly highlighting the likelihood of the attack, but because of outcome biases, highlighting the attack’s prior likelihood has no influence on judgments of blame, severity, or emotion after an attack is perceived to have occurred. Thus, because of accountability effects, we propose policy makers face a dilemma: prevent terrorism using normative methods that incorporate the likelihood of attack or prevent blame by preventing terrorist attacks the public find most blameworthy.     

Public attitudes toward stuttering in Turkey: probability versus convenience sampling

Purpose: A Turkish translation of the Public Opinion Survey of Human Attributes-Stuttering (POSHA-S) was used to compare probability versus convenience sampling to measure public attitudes toward stuttering. Method: A convenience sample of adults in Eski?ehir, Turkey was compared with two replicates of a school-based, probability cluster sampling scheme. Results: The two replicates of the probability sampling scheme yielded similar demographic samples, both of which were different from the convenience sample. Components of subscores on the POSHA-S were significantly different in more than half of the comparisons between convenience and probability samples, indicating important differences in public attitudes. Conclusions. If POSHA-S users intend to generalize to specific geographic areas, results of this study indicate that probability sampling is a better research strategy than convenience sampling.Educational objectives: The reader will be able to: (1) discuss the difference between convenience sampling and probability sampling; (2) describe a school-based probability sampling scheme; and (3) describe differences in POSHA-S results from convenience sampling versus probability sampling.     

Differences between probability and frequency judgments: The role of individual differences in working memory capacity

Most theories of probability judgment assume that judgments are made by comparing the strength of a focal hypothesis relative to the strength of alternative hypotheses. In contrast, research suggests that frequency judgments are assessed using a non-comparative process; the strength of the focal hypothesis is assessed without comparing it to the strength of alternative hypotheses. We tested this distinction between probability and frequency judgments using the alternative outcomes paradigm (Windschitl, Young, & Jenson, 2002). Assuming that judgments of probability (but not judgments of frequency) entail comparing the focal hypothesis with alternative hypotheses, we hypothesized that probability judgments would be sensitive to the distribution of the alternative hypotheses and would be negatively correlated with individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity. In contrast, frequency judgments should be unrelated to the distribution of the alternatives and uncorrelated with WM-capacity. Results supported the hypotheses.     

Not as gloomy as we thought: reassessing how the public understands probability of precipitation forecasts

Prior research on probability of precipitation (PoP) forecasts showed that many people wrongfully believe that PoP forecasts are derived from a percentage of time, a percentage of a region or the strength of agreement among forecasters. We posit that the wording of interpretation selection tasks matters, because different response options are associated with different metacognitive feelings. We hypothesised that the incorrect PoP interpretations are more often chosen by participants because they are more fluent than the correct PoP interpretation. We assessed the role of fluency in correctness perception (Study 1) and reassessed PoP interpretations with a more fluent correct interpretation (Study 2). Fluency perception was positively related with perception of correctness. Furthermore, participants selected the correct fluent interpretation more often than the correct disfluent one. We have drawn a more optimistic picture of people’s PoP forecasts understanding than that shown before and have discussed the methodological and applied implications.