Delay Discounting as a Function of Intrinsic/Extrinsic Religiousness,Religious Fundamentalism,and Regular Church Attendance

Delay discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome decreases because its delivery is delayed. Previous research has suggested that the rate at which some, but not all, outcomes are discounted varies as a function of regular church attendance. In the present study, 509 participants completed measures of intrinsic religiousness, extrinsic religiousness, religious fundamentalism, and whether they regularly attended church services. They then completed a delay-discounting task involving five outcomes. Although religiousness was not a significant predictor of discounting for all outcomes, participants scoring high in intrinsic religiousness tended to display less delay discounting than participants scoring low. Likewise, participants scoring high in religious fundamentalism tended to display more delay discounting than participants scoring low. These results partially replicate previous ones in showing that the process of discounting may vary as a function of religiousness. The results also provide some direction for those interested in altering how individuals discount.     

Sex differences in the effects of disinhibition,perceived peer drinking,and delay discounting on drinking among Japanese college students

Disinhibition, perceived peer drinking, and delay discounting are considered significant predictors of drinking in young adults. This study examined whether perceived peer drinking and delay discounting mediate the association between disinhibition and drinking for young men and women. In this study, 258 Japanese college students (109 men and 149 women, mean age 19.17 (SD = 1.20) years old) completed a self-administered questionnaire that included four measures—the disinhibition subscale of the Sensation Seeking Scale for Japanese Adolescents, the proportion of friends who drink as an index of perceived peer drinking behaviors, the Monetary Choice Questionnaire, and participants’ own drinking behavior. In the multiple mediator models analyzed using structural equation modeling, for both sexes, perceived peer drinking had the largest direct effect on participants’ drinking, followed by disinhibition and delay discounting. However, the results of mediation analyses indicated that perceived peer drinking mediated the association between disinhibition and drinking for only women. The results of this study imply that it is important to consider sex differences in the association between personality traits and peer influence to develop programs aiming to reduce drinking among young adults in Japan.     

Good or Bad,We Want it Now: Fixed‐cost Present Bias for Gains and Losses Explains Magnitude Asymmetries in Intertemporal Choice

Intertemporal tradeoffs are ubiquitous in decision making, yet preferences for current versus future losses are rarely explored in empirical research. Whereas rational‐economic theory posits that neither outcome sign (gains vs. losses) nor outcome magnitude (small vs. large) should affect delay discount rates, both do, and moreover, they interact: in three studies, we show that whereas large gains are discounted less than small gains, large losses are discounted more than small losses. This interaction can be understood through a reconceptualization of fixed‐cost present bias, which has traditionally described a psychological preference for immediate rewards. First, our results establish present bias for losses—a psychological preference to have losses over with now. Present bias thus predicts increased discounting of future gains but decreased (or even negative) discounting of future losses. Second, because present bias preferences do not scale with the magnitude of possible gains or losses, they play a larger role, relative to other motivations for discounting, for small magnitude intertemporal decisions than for large magnitude intertemporal decisions. Present bias thus predicts less discounting of large gains than small gains but more discounting of large losses than small losses. The present research is the first to demonstrate that the effect of outcome magnitude on discount rates may be opposite for gains and losses and also the first to offer a theory (an extension of present bias) and process data to explain this interaction. The results suggest that policy efforts to encourage future‐oriented choices should frame outcomes as large gains or small losses. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of temporal context and expectancy in resource allocation to and perception of rapid serial events

The perception of target events presented in a rapid stream of non-targets is impaired for early target positions, but then gradually improves, a phenomenon known as attentional awakening. This phenomenon has been associated with better resource allocation. It is unclear though whether improved resource allocation and attentional awakening are a consequence of the temporal context, that is, the position of the target event in the stimulus stream, or are due to a simple expectancy or foreperiod effect. Expectancy is an alternative explanation of attentional awakening because it depends on the a posteriori probabilities, which will increase with target position when all target positions are equally likely. To differentiate between the expectancy and the temporal context account the a priori (objective) probability of target position was defined such that the a posteriori probability would be high for early and late, and low for intermediate target positions. EEG was collected and the P3 ERP evoked by target events was derived as an indicator of resource allocation. A robust attentional awakening effect was observed. The relationships between measures of performance and P3 amplitude, and respectively target position, a priori, and a posteriori probability were analyzed. Results showed that in contrast to target position, a posteriori probability had little impact on performance and did not moderate the association between P3 amplitude and performance. Results also indicated that in spite of the evident role of target position on resource allocation and the perception of target events in rapid stimulus streams, target position is likely not the only variable these are affected by. Nevertheless, the findings of the present study suggest that whereas the temporal context of a rapid serial event is a key player for resource allocation to and perception of the event, expectancy seems of very little consequence.     

Decision Making with Uncertain Reinforcement in Children with Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)

Reward-related processes are impaired in children with ADHD. Whether these deficits can be ascribed to an aversion to delay or to an altered responsiveness to magnitude, frequency, valence, or the probability of rewards still needs to be explored. In the present study, children with ADHD and normal controls aged 7 to 10 years performed a simple probabilistic discounting task. They had to choose between alternatives where the magnitude of rewards was inversely related to the probability of outcomes. As a result, children with ADHD opted more frequently for less likely but larger rewards than normal controls. Shifts of the response category after positive or negative feedback, however, occurred as often in children with ADHD as in control children. In children with ADHD, the frequency of risky choices was correlated with neuropsychological measures of response time variability but unrelated to measures of inhibitory control. It is concluded that the tendency to select less likely but larger rewards possibly represents a separate facet of dysfunctional reward processing, independent of delay aversion or altered responsiveness to feedback.     

Reconsidering the aims of analysis in a probabilistic universe: Containment and coniunctio

Abstract

This paper explores the relationship between our attempts to define the aims of analysis and the acceptance of probability in New Physics. It draws attention to the influence of physicists on both Jung and Bion, which is well documented. It presents an argument for process-based aims rather than the recognition of innate knowledge as an aim. Two processes from different traditions (Jungian and Kleinian) are suggested as central to the aims of analysis: containment and coniunctio. The coniunctio/disiunctio axis in Jung's writing is paralleled with the axis PS<->D of the post-Kleinians. Clinical material is presented supporting the necessity of differential aims and illustrating development/stasis along this axis. A case is made for analysis to embrace the reality of uncertainty and to work with the psychic obstacles in patients, and in analysts, that result from coming to terms with probability.     

Probabilities on Sentences in an Expressive Logic

Automated reasoning about uncertain knowledge has many applications. One difficulty when developing such systems is the lack of a completely satisfactory integration of logic and probability. We address this problem directly. Expressive languages like higher-order logic are ideally suited for representing and reasoning about structured knowledge. Uncertain knowledge can be modeled by using graded probabilities rather than binary truth values. The main technical problem studied in this paper is the following: Given a set of sentences, each having some probability of being true, what probability should be ascribed to other (query) sentences? A natural wish-list, among others, is that the probability distribution (i) is consistent with the knowledge base, (ii) allows for a consistent inference procedure and in particular (iii) reduces to deductive logic in the limit of probabilities being 0 and 1, (iv) allows (Bayesian) inductive reasoning and (v) learning in the limit and in particular (vi) allows confirmation of universally quantified hypotheses/sentences. We translate this wish-list into technical requirements for a prior probability and show that probabilities satisfying all our criteria exist. We also give explicit constructions and several general characterizations of probabilities that satisfy some or all of the criteria and various (counter)examples. We also derive necessary and sufficient conditions for extending beliefs about finitely many sentences to suitable probabilities over all sentences, and in particular least dogmatic or least biased ones. We conclude with a brief outlook on how the developed theory might be used and approximated in autonomous reasoning agents. Our theory is a step towards a globally consistent and empirically satisfactory unification of probability and logic.     

On the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities

We argue that in spite of their apparent dissimilarity, the methodologies employed in the a priori and a posteriori assessment of probabilities can both be justified by appeal to a single principle of inductive reasoning, viz., the principle of symmetry. The difference between these two methodologies consists in the way in which information about the single-trial probabilities in a repeatable chance process is extracted from the constraints imposed by this principle. In the case of a posteriori reasoning, these constraints inform the analysis by fixing an a posteriori determinant of the probabilities, whereas, in the case of a priori reasoning, they imply certain claims which then serve as the basis for subsequent probabilistic deductions. In a given context of inquiry, the particular form which a priori or a posteriori reason may take depends, in large part, on the strength of the underlying symmetry assumed: the stronger the symmetry, the more information can be acquired a priori and the less information about the long-run behavior of the process is needed for an a posteriori assessment of the probabilities. In the context of this framework, frequency-based reasoning emerges as a limiting case of a posteriori reasoning, and reasoning about simple games of chance, as a limiting case of a priori reasoning. Between these two extremes, both a priori and a posteriori reasoning can take a variety of intermediate forms.     

A randomised Monty Hall experiment: The positive effect of conditional frequency feedback

The Monty Hall dilemma (MHD) is a notorious probability problem with a counterintuitive solution. There is a strong tendency to stay with the initial choice, despite the fact that switching doubles the probability of winning. The current randomised experiment investigates whether feedback in a series of trials improves behavioural performance on the MHD and increases the level of understanding of the problem. Feedback was either conditional or non-conditional, and was given either in frequency format or in percentage format. Results show that people learn to switch most when receiving conditional feedback in frequency format. However, problem understanding does not improve as a consequence of receiving feedback. Our study confirms the dissociation between behavioural performance on the MHD, on one hand, and actual understanding of the MHD, on the other. We discuss how this dissociation can be understood.     

Are there degrees of belief?

John Maynard Keynes claimed that not all probabilities were comparable. Frank Ramsey argued that they were, and that Keynes's views to the contrary rested on a confusion of degree of entailment and degree of belief. We will argue that Keynes and Ramsey largely talked past each other, and yet that there are issues of great significance underlying their dispute. In particular, the simple principle of maximizing expected utility may be seen in a new light as one step of a rich and complex process.