Probability judgment accuracy for general knowledge. Cross-national differences and assessment methods

In this study we compare the probability judgment accuracy of subjects from the United States and Turkey. Three different response modes were employed — numerical probabilities, pie diagrams, and odds. The questions employed in the study were restricted to two-alternative, general-knowledge items. The observed pattern of differences in the components of probability judgment accuracy paralleled those of studies that have compared Western and Asian subjects. In particular, Turkish subjects exhibited better discrimination but worse calibration than their US counterparts. This result persisted across all three response modes. These findings lend support to previous assertions that observed cross-national differences arise from socioeconomic rather than Asian versus Western cultural differences. However, the consistency of the observed differences across response modes refutes a previous assertion that observed cultural differences are merely the result of response bias.     

Measuring coherence

This paper aims to contribute to our understanding of the notion of coherence by explicating in probabilistic terms, step by step, what seem to be our most basic intuitions about that notion, to wit, that coherence is a matter of hanging or fitting together, and that coherence is a matter of degree. A qualitative theory of coherence will serve as a stepping stone to formulate a set of quantitative measures of coherence, each of which seems to capture well the aforementioned intuitions. Subsequently it will be argued that one of those measures does better than the others in light of some more specific intuitions about coherence. This measure will be defended against two seemingly obvious objections.     

Weak Bayesian coherentism

Recent results in probability theory have cast doubt on coherentism, purportedly showing (a) that coherence among a set of beliefs cannot raise their probability unless individual beliefs have some independent credibility, and (b) that no possible measure of coherence makes coherence generally probability-enhancing. I argue that coherentists can reject assumptions on which these theorems depend, and I derive a general condition under which the concurrence of two information sources lacking individual credibility can raise the probability of what they report.     

Waiting for the bus: when base-rates refuse to be neglected

The paper reports the results from 16 versions of a simple probability estimation task, where probability estimates derived from base-rate information have to be modified by case knowledge. In the bus problem [adapted from Falk, R., Lipson, A., & Konold, C. (1994). The ups and downs of the hope function in a fruitless search. In G. Wright & P. Ayton (Eds.), Subjective probability (pp. 353-377). Chichester, UK: Wiley], a passenger waits for a bus that departs before schedule in 10% of the cases, and is more than 10 min delayed in another 10%. What are Fred's chances of catching the bus on a day when he arrives on time and waits for 10 min? Most respondents think his probability is 10%, or 90%, instead of 50%, which is the correct answer. The experiments demonstrate the difficulties people have in replacing the original three-category 1/8/1 partitioning with a normalized, binary partitioning, where the middle category is discarded. In contrast with typical studies of "base-rate neglect", or under-weighing of base-rates, this task demonstrates a reversed base-rate fallacy, where frequentistic information is overextended and case information ignored. Possible explanations for this robust phenomenon are briefly discussed.     

Probability as a psychological distance: Construal and preferences

We argue that probability, like space and time, instantiates psychological distance. Unlikely outcomes may seem more remote than likely outcomes and may therefore be construed at a relatively high level. Specifically, when the probability of an outcome is low, ends-related primary features should be more salient than means-related secondary features, but as the probability of the outcome increases, means-related features may become no less and even more salient than ends-related features. Thus, increases in probability should increase the weight of means-related features relative to the weight of ends-related features in decisions, thereby decreasing (or even reversing) the preference for a more desirable/less feasible outcome over a less desirable/more feasible outcome. We observed this pattern in two experiments. Analyses of judgments, monetary decisions, and self-reported reasons for decisions showed that the weight of means-related features was more sensitive to changes in probability than the weight of ends-related features in decisions.     

Decision-making processes: sensitivity to sequentially experienced outcome probabilities

A computerized sequential event sampling decision-making task was administered to 187 5- to 10-year-olds and adults Participants made a series of choices between alternatives that differed in win probability (Study 1) or win and loss probability (Study 2). Intuitive and more explicit measures were used. Study 1 revealed that, across ages, participants demonstrated intuitive sensitivity to probability; however, adult participants evidenced greater sensitivity than did children, and younger children failed to demonstrate more explicit understanding of probability. Study 2 also revealed that children were intuitively sensitive to probability; however, the inclusion of loss had limited impact on decision processes. These findings and their relevance to cognitive developmental theory are discussed.     

Molar functional relations and clinical behavior analysis: implications for assessment and treatment

The experimental analysis of behavior has identified several molar functional relations that are highly relevant to clinical behavior analysis. These include matching, discounting, momentum, and variability. Matching provides a broader analysis of how multiple sources of reinforcement influence how individuals choose to allocate their time and offers an empirical rationale for reducing problem behavior by increasing adaptive behavior. Discounting highlights the functional relations that affect self-control. Momentum specifies the variables responsible for persistence in challenging situations. Variability characterizes a functional dimension of behavior that is essential for learning and problem solving. These concepts have important implications for clinical practice and research. A selective review of these concepts is presented, and their implications for assessment and treatment are discussed with two goals: to inform basic scientists about the relevance of their work and to invite clinical behavior analysts to broaden the conceptual basis for their work.     

Worry in Adults and Children: Developmental Differences in the Importance of Probability and Cost Judgments

This study investigated developmental differences in the relationship of probability and cost estimates to worrying. Adults, younger children (M age = 8.67 years) and older children (M age = 11.06 years) rated the extent to which they worry about a list of negative social and physical outcomes and provided subjective probability and cost estimates for the same outcomes. Adults reported worrying more about social outcomes and rated them as less ‘bad’ (or costly) but more likely to occur than physical outcomes. Unlike adults, children in both age groups reported worrying more about physical outcomes. However, similar to adults, they also rated social outcomes as less ‘bad’ but more likely to occur than physical outcomes. Regression analyses showed that probability ratings were the best predictors of worry in adults, both probability and cost ratings equally predicted worry in older children, but only cost ratings predicted worry in younger children.

决策过程中的建议采纳

建议采纳是指决策者参考他人建议并形成最终决策的过程。在过去的20年中,建议采纳研究集中探讨了三方面问题：（1）评判者多大程度上采纳了他人建议;（2）他人建议对决策质量的提升作用;（3）建议者和评判者在决策中的信心。本文首先介绍了建议采纳研究的实验范式,并从测量方法和研究成果两方面对上述三个问题进行回顾。未来的研究应注意丰富“建议”的外延、关注“建议者”角色、拓展决策任务、并探讨情绪在建议采纳过程中的作用。     

What determines biological fitness? The problem of the reference environment

Organisms’ environments are thought to play a fundamental role in determining their fitness and hence in natural selection. Existing intuitive conceptions of environment are sufficient for biological practice. I argue, however, that attempts to produce a general characterization of fitness and natural selection are incomplete without the help of general conceptions of what conditions are included in the environment. Thus there is a “problem of the reference environment”—more particularly, problems of specifying principles which pick out those environmental conditions which determine fitness. I distinguish various reference environment problems and propose solutions to some of them. While there has been a limited amount of work on problems concerning what I call “subenvironments”, there appears to be no earlier work on problems of what I call the “whole environment”. The first solution I propose for a whole environment problem specifies the overall environment for natural selection on a set of biological types present in a population over a specified period of time. The second specifies an environment relevant to extinction of types in a population; this kind of environment is especially relevant to certain kinds of long-term evolution.