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171.
In a world of limited resources, scarcity and rivalry are central challenges for decision makers—animals foraging for food, corporations seeking maximal profits, and athletes training to win, all strive against others competing for the same goals. In this article, we establish the role of competitive pressures for the facilitation of optimal decision making in simple sequential binary choice tasks. In two experiments, competition was introduced with a computerized opponent whose choice behavior reinforced one of two strategies: If the opponent probabilistically imitated participant choices, probability matching was optimal; if the opponent was indifferent, probability maximizing was optimal. We observed accurate asymptotic strategy use in both conditions irrespective of the provision of outcome probabilities, suggesting that participants were sensitive to the differences in opponent behavior. An analysis of reinforcement learning models established that computational conceptualizations of opponent behavior are critical to account for the observed divergence in strategy adoption. Our results provide a novel appraisal of probability matching and show how this individually ‘irrational’ choice phenomenon can be socially adaptive under competition. 相似文献
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Amber Sprenger Michael R. Dougherty 《Organizational behavior and human decision processes》2006,99(2):202-211
Most theories of probability judgment assume that judgments are made by comparing the strength of a focal hypothesis relative to the strength of alternative hypotheses. In contrast, research suggests that frequency judgments are assessed using a non-comparative process; the strength of the focal hypothesis is assessed without comparing it to the strength of alternative hypotheses. We tested this distinction between probability and frequency judgments using the alternative outcomes paradigm (Windschitl, Young, & Jenson, 2002). Assuming that judgments of probability (but not judgments of frequency) entail comparing the focal hypothesis with alternative hypotheses, we hypothesized that probability judgments would be sensitive to the distribution of the alternative hypotheses and would be negatively correlated with individual differences in working memory (WM) capacity. In contrast, frequency judgments should be unrelated to the distribution of the alternatives and uncorrelated with WM-capacity. Results supported the hypotheses. 相似文献
175.
Myerson J Green L Warusawitharana M 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2001,76(2):235-243
We describe a novel approach to the measurement of discounting based on calculating the area under the empirical discounting function. This approach avoids some of the problems associated with measures based on estimates of the parameters of theoretical discounting functions. The area measure may be easily calculated for both individual and group data collected using any of a variety of current delay and probability discounting procedures. The present approach is not intended as a substitute for theoretical discounting models. It is useful, however, to have a simple, univariate measure of discounting that is not tied to any specific theoretical framework. 相似文献
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Alvin Plantinga 《Theology & Science》2013,11(4):369-401
I begin by noting that several theologians and others object to special divine action (divine intervention and action beyond conservation and creation) on the grounds that it is incompatible with science. These theologians are thinking of classical Newtonian science; I argue that in fact classical science is in no way incompatible with special divine action, including miracle. What is incompatible with special divine action is the Laplacean picture, which involves the causal closure of the universe. I then note that contemporary, quantum mechanical science doesn't even initially appear to be incompatible with special divine action. Nevertheless, many who are well aware of the quantum mechanical revolution (including some members of the Special Divine Action Project) still find a problem with special divine action, hoping to find an understanding of it that doesn't involve divine intervention. I argue that their objections to intervention are not sound. Furthermore, it isn't even possible to say what intervention is, given the quantum mechanical framework. I conclude by offering an account of special divine action that isn't open to their objections to intervention. 相似文献
178.
Tadeusz Szuba 《World Futures: Journal of General Evolution》2013,69(1):61-80
Collective Intelligence (CI) can be formalized as a specific1 computational process through the use of a molecular model of computations and mathematical logic, in terms of interacting information_molecules, which are chaotically or quasi-chaotically displacing and running natural-based inference processes in their own environment. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence as a property of a social structure of beings of any nature is surprisingly short and abstract (which is astonishing) from definitions of Life. The formal definition of Collective Intelligence proposed by the author in the last few years seems to be valid for the whole spectrum of beings, in human social structures to ants in colonies, and even for bacterial colonies. It has recently been found that the CI definition also has an engineering value. The theory of CI can also be used to better understand Evolution because it allows us to locate and relate Life and Intelligence in Evolution. Moreover, this approach presents Evolution as something more complex than can be concluded from Darwinism. Probably the most surprising fact is that a simple extrapolation of the definition of Collective Intelligence brings us to the conclusion that most probably the first elementary Collective Intelligence emerged on Earth in the "chemical soup of primeval molecules," much before Life emerged. Collective Intelligence can be defined with fewer and weaker conditions than Life requires. Perhaps the emergence of that early elementary Collective Intelligence provided the basic momentum to build Life as we now know it. Thus Evolution caused Intelligence to create Life. Our hypothesis is consistent with biochemistry theories that "primeval biochemical molecules" started to interact, "firing" the Collective Intelligence of their "elementary chemical social structure" for survival. This successful action boosted further growth of complexity in that "elementary social structure," which finally resulted in the emergence of "well-defined Life." Furthermore, it provided a self-propagating cycle of growth of individual and collective Intelligence and individual and collective Life. The Collective Intelligence of ants, wolves, humans, and so forth today is only a higher level of Collective Intelligence development. Thus the present Evolution is a computational process of unidentified complexity where Life, Intelligence, and perhaps other as yet undiscovered components play temporary roles. In this paper we provide formalization and a proposed partial proof for this hypothesis. 相似文献
179.
Karl L. Wuensch 《The Journal of general psychology》2013,140(3):273-276
Hungry adult female deer mice were presented with freshly asphyxiated conspecifics and house mice. The deer mice showed a reliable preference for the conspecific flesh during the first 2 hr of testing, but this preference was attenuated during the following 20 hr of testing. Previous research has shown that male deer mice prefer contraspecific flesh. The preference of female deer mice for conspecific flesh is attributed to their tendency to be more aggressive toward living conspecifics than are male deer mice and their tendency to avoid living contraspecifics more than do male deer mice. 相似文献
180.
A Bayesian network (BN) is a graphical model of uncertainty that is especially well suited to legal arguments. It enables us to visualize and model dependencies between different hypotheses and pieces of evidence and to calculate the revised probability beliefs about all uncertain factors when any piece of new evidence is presented. Although BNs have been widely discussed and recently used in the context of legal arguments, there is no systematic, repeatable method for modeling legal arguments as BNs. Hence, where BNs have been used in the legal context, they are presented as completed pieces of work, with no insights into the reasoning and working that must have gone into their construction. This means the process of building BNs for legal arguments is ad hoc, with little possibility for learning and process improvement. This article directly addresses this problem by describing a method for building useful legal arguments in a consistent and repeatable way. The method complements and extends recent work by Hepler, Dawid, and Leucari (2007) on object‐oriented BNs for complex legal arguments and is based on the recognition that such arguments can be built up from a small number of basic causal structures (referred to as idioms). We present a number of examples that demonstrate the practicality and usefulness of the method. 相似文献