To do or not to do? A cognitive consistency model for drawing conclusions from conditional instructions and advice

This paper investigates a cognitive consistency model of the directionality of conditional instructions and advice that use probability expressions to express uncertainty about the antecedent p. The proposed model combines world knowledge (conveyed by causal direction) with linguistic information (conveyed by polarity and negation), and predicts whether the complex sentence antecedent has a positive or negative directionality, which in turn predicts whether a positive or negative conclusion q will be drawn. The first experiment uses Do q if p conditionals to show that given a consequent q participants complete antecedents p with a probability expression in line with expected sentence directionality. The second experiment uses If p then do q conditionals to show similar effects in a reverse direction. A third experiment uses If p then do q conditionals to show that participants draw conclusions predicted by the cognitive consistency model but not by a decision-theoretic approach to reasoning.     

Explaining the gambler's fallacy: Testing a gestalt explanation versus the “law of small numbers”

The present study tests a gestalt (closure) explanation for the gambler's fallacy which posits that runs in random events will be expected to reverse only when the run is open or ongoing. This is contrasted with the law of small numbers explanation suggesting that people expect random outcomes to balance out generally. Sixty-one university students placed hypothetical guesses and bets on a series of coin tosses. Either heads or tails were dominant (8 versus 4). In a closed run condition the run ended prior to the critical trial (e.g., HHHT), and in an open run condition the run remained open (e.g., THHH). As hypothesised, participants showed the gambler's fallacy in the open run condition, but not in the closed run condition. This difference is not due to differential memory for the outcomes. Men, and people with more previous experience gambling, were also found to be more prone to the gambler's fallacy. It is argued that the gestalt explanation best explains the results.     

When functions and causes compete

The discounting principle states that ‘the role of a given cause in producing a given effect is discounted if other plausible causes are present’ (Kelley, 1972 Kelley, H. H. 1972. “Attribution theory in social psychology”. In Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behaviour, Edited by: Jones, E., Kanouse, D., Kelley, H., Nisbett, R., Valins, S. and Weiner, B. 1–26. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press.  [Google Scholar], p. 8). The principle has only been tested with cases where the two explanations are of the same kind (i.e., causal explanations). However, explanations of properties of objects, people, or events often involve functions. Zebras have stripes in order to be better camouflaged. Humans have eyebrows to keep sweat from running into their eyes. Adrenaline is secreted in order to modulate fight and flight responses. Thus, what happens when we are faced with two different kinds of explanation for the same property: one functional and one causal? People evaluated explanations of properties for natural kinds and artefacts. Functional explanations were discounted in favour of causal explanations, however this was only true for properties of artefacts. The presence of an alternative explanation for properties of natural kinds did not affect the plausibility of either kind of explanation.     

An Analysis of Certain Effects of Bilateral Temporal Lobectomy in the Rhesus Monkey,with Special Reference to “Psychic Blindness”

Southern, black, poverty-level, female subjects were classified as Actives, Dropouts, or Never-Beens in regard to attendance at a family-planning clinic. The subjects took a story-telling test designed for lower social class subjects and rated a variety of persons and activities along semantic differential dimensions. Women who had dropped out were significantly lower than the other groups in their needs for achievement and for controlling life events. Actives perceived more difficulty in controlling events. Several significant differences were also found in the semantic differential ratings. The results can be interpreted to yield a consistent set of hypotheses about motivations related to birth control decisions.     

Conditioned Reflex and Perception: The Concept of Syncretism

Delay discounting occurs when the subjective value of an outcome decreases because its delivery is delayed. Past research has shown that how steeply participants discount an outcome varies inversely with the value of previously discounted outcomes. In the present study, participants discounted the same hypothetical monetary outcome ($1,000) after their hypothetical annual income was halved (Experiment 1) or doubled (Experiment 2). Rates of discounting decreased and increased, respectively, after these manipulations (although a similar change in discounting was observed for the control and treatment groups in Experiment 2). These results suggest that altering the context in which the discounting task is framed alters the subjective value of the outcome itself, in this case money. This result has implications for understanding contrast effects that are observed in rates of discounting, as well as for researchers and practitioners who are interested in determining methods for altering how individuals discount delayed outcomes.     

Good things come to those who wait: Time discounting differences between adult offenders and nonoffenders

Criminal behavior has been explained by the idea that offenders have a lack of self-control. Yet, Wilson and Daly reported that juvenile offenders exhibit time-discounting tendencies similar to those of nonoffending juveniles. As no previous study has compared time-discounting behavior of adult offenders with nonoffenders, we raise the question, do adult offenders exhibit shorter time horizons or the tendency to discount future rewards? To answer this question, 89 offenders (ex-prisoners and prisoners) and 106 nonoffenders completed a time-discounting measure containing 27 different monetary choices. Our results show that, counter to findings with juvenile offenders, adult offenders (ex-prisoners) exhibit significantly shorter time horizons and discount more than nonoffenders as delayed payoffs increase to medium and large rewards. Furthermore, both offenders and nonoffenders are less likely to discount as the reward of future gains increases to medium and large.