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131.
This research examines decisions from experience in restless bandit problems. Two experiments revealed four main effects. (1) Risk neutrality: the typical participant did not learn to become risk averse, a contradiction of the hot stove effect. (2) Sensitivity to the transition probabilities that govern the Markov process. (3) Positive recency: the probability of a risky choice being repeated was higher after a win than after a loss. (4) Inertia: the probability of a risky choice being repeated following a loss was higher than the probability of a risky choice after a safe choice. These results can be described with a simple contingent sampler model, which assumes that choices are made based on small samples of experiences contingent on the current state. 相似文献
132.
Louis Narens 《Journal of mathematical psychology》2009,53(5):399-407
A new foundation is presented for the theory of subjective judgments of probability known in the psychological literature as “Support Theory”. It is based on new complementation operations that, unlike those of classical probability theory (set-theoretic complementation) and classical logic (negation), need not satisfy the principles of the Law of The Excluded Middle and the Law of Double Complementation. Interrelationships between the new complementation operations and the Kahneman and Tversky judgmental heuristic of availability are described. 相似文献
133.
Gaissmaier and Schooler (2008) [Gaissmaier, W., & Schooler, L. J. (2008). The smart potential behind probability matching. Cognition, 109, 416-422] argue that probability matching, which has traditionally been viewed as a decision making error, may instead reflect an adaptive response to environments in which outcomes potentially follow predictable patterns. In choices involving monetary stakes, we find that probability matching persists even when it is not possible to identify or exploit outcome patterns and that many “probability matchers” rate an alternative strategy (maximizing) as superior when it is described to them. Probability matching appears to reflect a mistaken intuition that can be, but often is not, overridden by deliberate consideration of alternative choice strategies. 相似文献
134.
Stephen Finlay 《Philosophical Studies》2009,143(3):315-340
This paper advances a reductive semantics for ‘ought’ and a naturalistic theory of normativity. It gives a unified analysis
of predictive, instrumental, and categorical uses of ‘ought’: the predictive ‘ought’ is basic, and is interpreted in terms
of probability. Instrumental ‘oughts’ are analyzed as predictive ‘oughts’ occurring under an ‘in order that’ modifer (the
end-relational theory). The theory is then extended to categorical uses of ‘ought’: it is argued that they are special rhetorical
uses of the instrumental ‘ought’. Plausible conversational principles explain how this end-relational ‘ought’ can perform
the expressive functions of the moral ‘ought’. The notion of an ‘ought-simpliciter’ is also discussed.
相似文献
Stephen FinlayEmail: |
135.
Rachael Briggs 《Synthese》2009,167(1):81-92
David Lewis’s ‘Humean Supervenience’ (henceforth ‘HS’) combines realism about laws, chances, and dispositions with a sparse
ontology according to which everything supervenes on the overall spatiotemporal distribution of non-dispositional properties
(Lewis 1986a, Philosophical papers: Volume II, pp. ix–xvii, New York: Oxford Univesity Press, 1994, Mind 103:473–490). HS
faces a serious problem—a “big bad bug” (Lewis 1986a, p. xiv): it contradicts the Principal Principle, a seemingly obvious
norm of rational credence. Two authors have tried to rescue Lewis’s ontology from the ‘big bad bug’ (henceforth ‘the Bug’)
by rejecting realism about laws, chances, and dispositions (Halpin 1994, Aust J Phil 72:317–338, 1998, Phil Sci 65:349–360;
Ward 2005, Phil Sci 71:241–261). I will argue that this strategy cannot possibly work: it is the ontology, not the realist
thesis, that lies at the root of the problem. 相似文献
136.
Joshua Sack 《Synthese》2009,169(2):241-257
This paper aims to extend in two directions the probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic provided in Kooi’s paper (J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) and to relate these extensions to ones made in van Benthem et al. (Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool,
2006). Kooi’s probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic adds to probabilistic epistemic logic sentences that express consequences
of public announcements. The paper (van Benthem et al., Proceedings of LOFT’06. Liverpool, 2006) extends (Kooi, J Logic Lang
Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003) to using action models, but in both papers, the probabilities are discrete, and are defined on
trivial σ-algebras over finite sample spaces. The first extension offered in this paper is to add a previous-time operator to a probabilistic
dynamic epistemic logic similar to Kooi’s in (J Logic Lang Inform 12(4):381–408, 2003). The other is to involve non-trivial
σ-algebras and continuous probabilities in probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic. 相似文献
137.
The effect of constant outcome value on judgments and decision making given linguistic probabilities
Two experiments were performed to determine whether judgments of the relative chances of two independent events occurring are biased by constant outcome values contingent on the events when the uncertainties are specified by linguistic expressions (e.g. doubtful). In Experiment 1, subjects directly judged the relative chances of the two events, of which one was represented by a spinner and the other by a linguistic probability expression. In Experiment 2, only linguistic probability expressions were used to describe the two events and a betting procedure was used. A bias was evident in both studies, such that the relative judgments tended to favour the event with the positive rather than the negative contingent outcome. The bias was smaller for the low- than for the high-probability phrases. Individual differences were great, with the bias appearing strongly in only about one-third of the population. Theoretical implications of the present and related results are discussed. 相似文献
138.
Delay discounting is one of the most studied phenomena in Psychology in the last decades. Recently, it has been proposed as a transdiagnostic variable accounting for several psychopathological problems. A review of current practices and clinical application (Bailey et al., 2021) and a response article (Stein et al., 2022) have been recently published. Despite both of them being stimulating, the articles raise issues needing further discussion. The first part of the present article critically appraises both publications by highlighting their strengths/limitations and offers an alternate perspective that clarifies some theoretical issues and allows new lines in research. In the second part, one of these new lines of research is presented by describing a research proposal based on the analysed critiques and current developments in both psychopathology and addiction research. This article contributes to the discussion on delay discounting suggesting alternative interpretations and future studies to improve theoretical models. 相似文献
139.
140.
T Galtress A Garcia K Kirkpatrick 《Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior》2012,98(1):65-87
Individual differences in impulsive choice behavior have been linked to a variety of behavioral problems including substance abuse, smoking, gambling, and poor financial decision-making. Given the potential importance of individual differences in impulsive choice as a predictor of behavioral problems, the present study sought to measure the extent of individual differences in a normal sample of hooded Lister rats. Three experiments utilized variations of a delay discounting task to measure the degree of variation in impulsive choice behavior across individual rats. The individual differences accounted for 22-55% of the variance in choice behavior across the three experiments. In Experiments 2 and 3, the individual differences were still apparent when behavior was measured across multiple choice points. Large individual differences in the rate of responding, and modest individual differences in timing of responding were also observed during occasional peak trials. The individual differences in timing and rate, however, did not correlate consistently with individual differences in choice behavior. This suggests that a variety of factors may affect choice behavior, response rate, and response timing. 相似文献