环境损益的社会折扣:利他人格的影响

他人与自我之间的社会距离越远,则他人的获益或损失带给自我的效用就越小,此现象被称为社会折扣。虽然有一些研究探讨了金钱结果的社会折扣现象,但作为公共品的环境结果的社会折扣规律及其影响因素并未得到应有的研究。本研究以优劣空气天数为例,采用选择滴定程序,在损益两种情境下探索环境结果的社会折扣现象,并考察利他人格对社会折扣的影响。结果发现:(1)相比双曲模型,指数模型在损益两种情境下皆能更佳地拟合环境结果的社会折扣函数;(2)损益情境与社会距离的交互作用影响环境结果的社会折扣程度,损失情境下的社会折扣程度随社会距离的增加而变大的幅度大于收益情境;(3)利他人格在社会距离对社会折扣的影响中起调节作用。相比高利他人格者,低利他人格者的社会折扣受社会距离的影响较大。本研究对理解环境结果社会折扣和环保决策行为具有重要意义。     

Do process simulations during episodic future thinking enhance the reduction of delay discounting for middle income participants and those living in poverty?

Two studies examined whether episodic future thinking (EFT; pre‐experiencing future events) reduces discounting of future rewards (DD). No studies have investigated whether process simulations (i.e., simulating the process of executing a future event) amplify EFT's reduction of DD. Study 1 examined the effect of incorporating process simulations into EFT (N = 42, M_age = 43.27; 91% female, family income = $75,976) using a 2 × 2 factorial design with type of episodic thinking (process, nonprocess/general) and temporal perspective (EFT, episodic recent thinking) as between‐subjects factors. Study 2 replicated Study 1 in a sample of adults living in poverty (N = 36; M_age = 38.44, 88% female; family income = $25,625). The results of both studies showed EFT reduced DD, but process‐oriented EFT did not amplify the effect of EFT. Our findings suggest the key ingredient in EFT's effect on DD is self‐projection into the future. This was also the first study to show EFT improves DD in a sample living in poverty.     

Waiting impulsivity: a distinctive feature of ADHD neuropsychology?

Impulsivity is a core feature of attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). It has been conceptualized in a number of different ways. In the current article, we examine how the new concept of “waiting impulsivity”, which refers to premature responding before a scheduled target appears, adds to our understanding of impulsivity in ADHD. Sixty children (8–12 years old; 30 ADHD; 30 typically developing controls) completed the 4-choice serial reaction time task, a measure of waiting impulsivity, alongside tasks measuring inhibitory control and temporal discounting and questionnaires measuring behavioral disorder symptoms, delay aversion, and various aspects of impulsivity. A multiple logistic regression model was used to explore the contribution of the primary task outcomes to predict group membership. Children with ADHD displayed more waiting impulsivity and less inhibitory control; they did not differ in temporal discounting. There was no correlation between waiting impulsivity and inhibitory control. Waiting impulsivity was correlated with parent-reported ratings of hyperactivity/impulsivity, inattention, oppositional defiant disorder (ODD), and conduct disorder (CD) and with self-reported delay aversion ratings. Only waiting impulsivity was a significant predictor of ADHD status. In conclusion, waiting impulsivity is distinct from inhibitory control deficits and predicts ADHD status independently of it. Future research needs to examine the relationship with delay aversion and ODD/CD more thoroughly.     

Delay discounting in the pigeon: In search of a magnitude effect

The magnitude effect, where larger outcomes are discounted proportionally less than smaller outcomes, is a well‐established phenomenon in delay discounting by human participants. To this point in the literature magnitude effects have not been reliably evidenced in nonhuman animals. , however, used a concurrent‐chains arrangement with pigeon and found evidence for a magnitude effect. Grace et al. suggested that in many delay discounting experimental arrangements with nonhuman animals (e.g., adjusting amount, adjusting delay) the organism is not given the opportunity to directly compare outcomes of different sizes. They suggest that because of the lack of direct comparison it is difficult for the organism to determine the relative size of each outcome, which in turn mutes the effect of the amount differences between outcomes. As a test of this “comparison hypothesis,” the present experiment was conducted to assess whether the magnitude effect would be evidenced in pigeon when using an adjusting amount procedure where outcomes of different amounts were presented proximally. In the present arrangement, pigeons were presented two choice panels in an operant chamber where each panel was associated with an independent adjusting amount delay discounting task, but with differing outcome amounts (i.e., a 32‐food pellet panel and an 8‐food pellet panel). In this arrangement the choice panels alternated in their availability within a session from trial block to trial block. The present findings indicate no reliable effect of amount, even when the outcomes were proximal and thus readily comparable. This result suggests that the lack of magnitude effect is not driven by the organism's ability to compare the difference in amount between choice alternatives.     

适应性时间管理：死亡意识对时间知觉和跨期决策的影响

死亡意识是个体对自身死亡必然性的认识; 基于进化适应性的考量, 作者认为具有前瞻性的死亡意识作为人类特有的认知能力和个体生命史的终极坐标, 不仅可能引起恐惧感和防御反应, 更重要的是可以帮助人们做出适应性的时间管理。据此推论, 死亡意识的启动会加强人们对时间有限性的关注, 体验出更强的时间流逝感, 影响人们对时间的评估, 以及人们对不同时间点的成本与收益进行权衡而做出的跨期决策。本研究采用死亡凸显范式启动死亡意识, 通过两个实验探讨了死亡意识、时间知觉和跨期决策三者之间的关系。结果发现, 死亡意识启动使被试低估时间距离, 并表现出较低的跨期决策延迟折扣率, 从而在较小的即时获益与更大的延迟的获益之间更为偏好未来导向的选项。进一步的分析显示, 时间知觉在死亡意识和跨期决策延迟折扣率之间起到部分中介变量的作用。以上的研究结果初步揭示了死亡意识在时间管理上的适应性价值。     

Social discounting and delay discounting

Social discounting was measured as the amount of money a participant was willing to forgo to give a fixed amount (usually $75) to another person. In the first experiment, amount forgone was a hyperbolic function of the social distance between the giver and receiver. In the second experiment, degree of social discounting was an increasing function of reward magnitude whereas degree of delay discounting was a decreasing function of reward magnitude. In the third experiment, the shape of the function relating delayed rewards to equally valued immediate rewards for another person was predicted from individual delay and social discount functions. All in all, the studies show that the social discount function, like delay and probability discount functions, is hyperbolic in form. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Synchronic Bayesian updating and the Sleeping Beauty problem: reply to Pust

I maintain, in defending “thirdism,” that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the “preliminary probability” 1/4 to the statement S: “Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads.” (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero, because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such an epistemic situation is irrelevant, because relative to I, statement S nonetheless has degree of evidential support 1/4.     

From the Terrible Loneliness to the Wonderful Agreement of Human Beings

What would be the “terrible loneliness” and what would be the “wonderful agreement” in the present paper? The “terrible loneliness” is the only reality that a person perceives and/or thinks during the now going on. For the person, an enormous quantity of occurrences is in the present moment absent. A very small quantity of occurrences is present. The person is the only being in having this. And, this is only during a little moment. The person never thinks about his loneliness in this moment. On the contrary, he thinks he is plenty of people and full of occurrences. But, if he were thinking about reality, he would live in a terrible loneliness. How does he escape himself from this loneliness? He thinks that the probable occurrences are real occurrences. He may be right in a plenty of times. Going through what I call opening hypotheses—basic hypotheses and non-basic but important hypotheses—and going through what I call simply hypotheses he is able to sanction a wonderful agreement of human beings about the known parts of the Universe. However, they are hypotheses, not absolute realities.     

On emotional innumeracy: Predicted and actual affective responses to grand-scale tragedies

The present research demonstrates that people overestimate the intensity of their emotional responses to grand-scale tragedies. Participants predicted that they would feel significantly worse if thousands of people were killed in a disaster than if only a few people were killed, and yet they exhibited an “emotional flatline,” feeling equally sad regardless of the number of people killed. This unforeseeable emotional flatline was demonstrated in response to deaths stemming from human violence and natural disasters, both close to home and far away (including hurricanes in the United States, a forest fire in Spain, and the Iraq War). Participants’ actual emotional responses were calibrated with fatalities only when abstract death tolls were translated into concrete images. We argue that affective forecasts and emotional experiences may arise from separate systems, leading to reliable forecasting errors, as well as influencing subsequent judgments.     

跨期选择中的反常现象及其心理机制

时间折现是跨期选择研究的核心问题。指数折现效用模型（DU模型）是描述时间折现现象的基本模型。跨期选择的实验研究中发现的大量违背DU模型的反常现象表明,DU模型并不能很好地解释人们在跨期选择中的真实行为。文章从时间知觉、建构水平、参照点和价值函数、情绪激活、情绪麻木、期待效用等角度探讨了造成各种反常现象的心理机制,并提出了值得进一步研究的方向和问题。