Prospective emotion enables episodic prospection to shift time preference

The episodic effect suggests that episodic prospection (imagining future events) can effectively reduce time discounting, the propensity to discount the value of delayed rewards relative to immediate ones. However, less clear is how episodic prospection modulates time preference. As engagement in episodic prospection usually evokes prospective emotions, it was proposed that episodic prospection might work by inducing prospective emotions. Although one previous study has attempted to provide evidence to the emotional account of the episodic effect, shortcomings in its experimental design make its conclusion questionable. In this study, we replicated previous experimental design with improvements to further test the effects of prospective emotion on time preference. By manipulating the emotional valency associated with episodic prospection in a delay discounting task, we found that positive episodic prospection attenuated time discounting; negative episodic prospection exacerbated time discounting; and episodic prospection did not shift time preference when prospective emotion is removed. These results were essentially identical to the result of the previous study. Together, these studies suggested that the effects of episodic prospection depended on prospective emotion. Thus, one cannot ignore prospective emotion if counting on episodic prospection to combat humans’ impulsive behaviours.     

Effects of immediacy of feedback on estimations and performance

We investigated the role of anticipation of feedback in performance and estimation about own performance. We submitted 155 participants to a test of verbal aptitude, and we requested them to give estimations of their own performance and the performance of other participants. There were two treatments: immediate feedback and delayed feedback. Participants in the immediate‐feedback group were informed that they would receive feedback on their performance immediately after finishing the test, whereas participants in the delayed‐feedback group were informed that they would receive feedback a week after taking the test. The immediate‐feedback group performed better than the delayed‐feedback group. Furthermore, the former underestimated their own performance. On the other hand, participants on the delayed‐feedback group made unbiased estimations. We present a mathematical model based on construal‐level theory, decision affect theory, temporal discounting, and Moore and Healy's model of overestimation. The model suggests that the source of differences in performance and in estimations of own performance is a construal of the feedback situation that modifies the expected utility of the task.     

Which one made it go? The emergence of diagnostic reasoning in preschoolers

We evaluate the hypothesis that children's diagnostic causal reasoning becomes more sophisticated as their understanding of uncertainty advances. When the causal status of candidate causes was known, 3- and 4-year-olds were capable of diagnostic inference (Experiment 1) and could revise their beliefs when told their initial diagnosis was incorrect (Experiment 2). In Experiments 3 and 4, only 4-year-olds made successful inferences when the causal status of candidate causes was uncertain. The results suggest that by age 3, children appreciate that an effect can have multiple candidate causes, but it is not until age 4 that they begin to reason correctly when the causal status of candidate causes is unknown.     

Social Discounting and Cigarette Smoking During Pregnancy

In this study, we examined the association between social discounting and smoking status in a cohort of pregnant cigarette smokers (n = 91), quitters (n = 27), or never‐smokers (n = 30). The smokers and quitters were participants in clinical trials on smoking cessation and relapse prevention, whereas the never‐smokers were controls in a study on nicotine withdrawal during pregnancy. Social discounting was assessed using a paper‐and‐pencil task that assesses the amount of hypothetical money a person is willing to forgo in order to share with individuals in their social network ranging from the person who is emotionally closest to them to a mere acquaintance. The amount that women were willing to forgo in order to share decreased hyperbolically as a function of social distance, with smokers exhibiting steeper discounting functions (i.e., less generosity) than quitters or never‐smokers; discounting functions of quitters and never‐smokers did not differ significantly. In multivariate analyses controlling for potential sociodemographic and other confounds, social discounting remained a significant predictor of smoking status among smokers versus quitters. Overall, these results suggest that individual differences in social discounting may be a factor influencing the choices that women make about quitting smoking upon learning of a pregnancy. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of mindful eating training on delay and probability discounting for food and money in obese and healthy-weight individuals

Obese individuals tend to behave more impulsively than healthy weight individuals across a variety of measures, but it is unclear whether this pattern can be altered. The present study examined the effects of a mindful eating behavioral strategy on impulsive and risky choice patterns for hypothetical food and money. In Experiment 1, 304 participants completed computerized delay and probability discounting tasks for food-related and monetary outcomes. High percent body fat (PBF) predicted more impulsive choice for food, but not small-value money, replicating previous work. In Experiment 2, 102 randomly selected participants from Experiment 1 were assigned to participate in a 50-min workshop on mindful eating or to watch an educational video. They then completed the discounting tasks again. Participants who completed the mindful eating session showed more self-controlled and less risk-averse discounting patterns for food compared to baseline; those in the control condition discounted similarly to baseline rates. There were no changes in discounting for money for either group, suggesting stimulus specificity for food for the mindful eating condition.     

The Effect of Order and Rate of Presentation of Stimuli Upon the Establishment of a Conditioned Discrimination

The modified interfering cue theory put forward by Fletcher et al. (2) to explain performance in the ambiguous cue problem (ACP) was examined. Eight-year-old children were first trained to acquire response tendencies to the individual cues of this problem. When presented subsequently with the problem, the children showed marked differences in the number and type of errors made. The results were interpreted as supporting the theory of Fletcher et al. It was also suggested that the cues with clear positive or negative values were employed by the subjects to limit or neutralize the interference caused by the ambiguous cue.     

From Bayesian epistemology to inductive logic

Inductive logic admits a variety of semantics (Haenni et al. (2011) [7, Part 1]). This paper develops semantics based on the norms of Bayesian epistemology (Williamson, 2010 [16, Chapter 7]). Section 1 introduces the semantics and then, in Section 2, the paper explores methods for drawing inferences in the resulting logic and compares the methods of this paper with the methods of Barnett and Paris (2008) [2]. Section 3 then evaluates this Bayesian inductive logic in the light of four traditional critiques of inductive logic, arguing (i) that it is language independent in a key sense, (ii) that it admits connections with the Principle of Indifference but these connections do not lead to paradox, (iii) that it can capture the phenomenon of learning from experience, and (iv) that while the logic advocates scepticism with regard to some universal hypotheses, such scepticism is not problematic from the point of view of scientific theorising.     

Confirmation as partial entailment: A representation theorem in inductive logic

The most prominent research program in inductive logic – here just labeled The Program, for simplicity – relies on probability theory as its main building block and aims at a proper generalization of deductive-logical relations by a theory of partial entailment. We prove a representation theorem by which a class of ordinally equivalent measures of inductive support or confirmation is singled out as providing a uniquely coherent way to work out these two major sources of inspiration of The Program.     

Discounting by Probabilistic Waiting

In everyday life, many probabilistic situations may be characterized as probabilistic waiting. A gambler, for example, bets repeatedly at the racetrack, the casino, or the card table. The gambler may not win on the first try, but if a gamble is repeated enough times, a win is almost certain to occur eventually. If repeated gambles are structured as strings of losses ending in a win (probabilistic waiting) and the amount won is discounted by the delay caused by the series of losses, then strings with many losses will be discounted more than those with fewer losses, thereby causing subjective value of the series of gambles as a whole to increase. The current study used the opposite effect that amount has on the degree of delay and probability discounting as a marker to determine whether people evaluate situations involving probabilistic waiting as they evaluate situations involving delayed outcomes or as situations involving probabilistic outcomes. We find that the more likely a probabilistic waiting situation is to end in reward (e.g., a gamble is repeated indefinitely until reward is obtained), the more that situation conforms to delay discounting; the less likely a probabilistic waiting situation is to end in reward (e.g., a fixed, small number of gambles), the more that situation conforms to probability discounting. We argue that the former situation is applicable to pathological gambling, and that people with steep delay discount functions would therefore be more likely to have gambling problems. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.