Don’t Ever Do That! Long-term Duties in <Emphasis Type="Italic">PD</Emphasis><Subscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">e</Emphasis></Subscript><Emphasis Type="Italic">L</Emphasis>

This paper studies long-term norms concerning actions. In Meyer’s Propositional Deontic Logic (PD _e L), only immediate duties can be expressed, however, often one has duties of longer durations such as: “Never do that”, or “Do this someday”. In this paper, we will investigate how to amend PD _e L so that such long-term duties can be expressed. This leads to the interesting and suprising consequence that the long-term prohibition and obligation are not interdefinable in our semantics, while there is a duality between these two notions. As a consequence, we have provided a new analysis of the long-term obligation by introducing a new atomic proposition I (indebtedness) to represent the condition that an agent has some unfulfilled obligation. Presented by Jacek Malinowski     

Methodological naturalism and epistemic internalism

Epistemic naturalism holds that the results or methodologies from the cognitive sciences are relevant to epistemology, and some have maintained that scientific methods are more compatible with externalist theories of justification than with internalist theories. But practically all discussions about naturalized epistemology are framed exclusively in terms of cognitive psychology, which is only one of the cognitive sciences. The question addressed in this essay is whether a commitment to naturalism really does favor externalism over internalism, and we offer reasons for thinking that naturalism in epistemology is compatible with both internalist and externalist conceptions of justification. We also argue that there are some distinctively internalist aims that are currently being studied scientifically and these notions, and others, should be studied by scientific methods. This essay is dedicated to Deborah Mayo, who has long advocated using error statistical techniques to analyze and resolve epistemological puzzles in the philosophy of science. This essay follows the same spirit by advocating that computational concepts and techniques be applied within the heart of traditional, analytic epistemology.     

An Infinitary Extension of Jankov’s Theorem

It is known that for any subdirectly irreducible finite Heyting algebra A and any Heyting algebra B, A is embeddable into a quotient algebra of B, if and only if Jankov’s formula χ _A for A is refuted in B. In this paper, we present an infinitary extension of the above theorem given by Jankov. More precisely, for any cardinal number κ, we present Jankov’s theorem for homomorphisms preserving infinite meets and joins, a class of subdirectly irreducible complete κ-Heyting algebras and κ-infinitary logic, where a κ-Heyting algebra is a Heyting algebra A with # ≥  κ and κ-infinitary logic is the infinitary logic such that for any set Θ of formulas with # Θ ≥  κ, ∨Θ and ∧Θ are well defined formulas.     

证候存在的逻辑回答

认为存在的就是客观的,包含了自然客观、思维客观和理性客观;把疾病现象和疾病本质划等号,在症状层面规范证候标准,抛弃中医辨证思维,就等于否定中医。物质不能等于客观,不能取代存在。证候属于理性客观,发生于中医学,是中医“阴阳神气”观念临床实在化(还原)的必然。     

Kant on Complete Determination and Infinite Judgement

In the Transcendental Ideal Kant discusses the principle of complete determination: for every object and every predicate A, the object is either determinately A or not-A. He claims this principle is synthetic, but it appears to follow from the principle of excluded middle, which is analytic. He also makes a puzzling claim in support of its syntheticity: that it represents individual objects as deriving their possibility from the whole of possibility. This raises a puzzle about why Kant regarded it as synthetic, and what his explanatory claim means. I argue that the principle of complete determination does not follow from the principle of excluded middle because the externally negated or ‘negative’ judgement ‘Not (S is P)’ does not entail the internally negated or ‘infinite’ judgement ‘S is not-P.’ Kant's puzzling explanatory claim means that empirical objects are determined by the content of the totality of experience. This entails that empirical objects are completely determinate if and only if the totality of experience has a completely determinate content. I argue that it is not a priori whether experience has such a completely determinate content and thus not analytic that objects obey the principle of complete determination.     

文化心理学的跨学科运用——以跨文化传播研究为例

文化心理学是最近二三十年来心理学中发展最快的领域之一,作为一门典型的交叉学科,它有人类学、心理学、传播学等多种学科取向,是一门有胸怀、有气度、能包容的学科。文化心理学与跨文化传播研究诞生在相同的社会历史文化背景中,拥有共同的学科渊源,这种天然的关系决定了跨文化传播研究中运用文化心理学的正当性、必然性。文化心理学的全球化研究视角为跨文化传播研究提供了参照; 文化的观念、文化适应理论、文化敏感性和文化冲突理论等文化心理学的概念和理论为跨文化传播研究提供了理论支撑; 文化心理学还为跨文化传播现象和问题的具体研究提供了分析工具。反之,跨文化传播研究不仅为文化心理学提供了鲜活的案例,还为其理论建构提供了重要资源。     

基本医疗卫生改革的政治伦理、市场逻辑与未来走向

基本医疗卫生改革是当前实现“2030健康中国”和新时代下践行人民健康优先战略的一项制度创新。然而,现实中改革仍面临医疗资源配置不均和医疗服务供给效率不高的双重困境。本质上,医疗服务具有公利性与私利性二元属性,进而延伸出立足于公利性属性,基本医疗卫生改革应当坚守“人人公平享有”的政治伦理,鉴于私利性属性改革需要维护医疗市场主体合法逐利的正当权利,政府公利性创造与市场私利驱动是辩证性的哲学思考。我国医改未来应以公民健康与福祉共享为价值依归,始终坚持政府严守底线、市场有序竞争、社会和谐稳定的发展主线。

     

De Re Language,De Re Eliminability,and the Essential Limits of Both

De re modality is eliminable if there is an effective translation of all wffs into non-de re equivalents. We cannot have logical equivalence unless logic has odd theses, but we can have material equivalence by banning all essences, something the non-de re facts let us do, or by giving everything such humdrum essences as self-identity and banning the more interesting ones. Eliminability cannot be got from weaker assumptions, nor independent ones of even modest generality. The net philosophical import is that, quite apart from the merits of essentialism, de re language has scant utility.     

The Relation between Formal and Informal Logic

The issue of the relationship between formal and informal logic depends strongly on how one understands these two designations. While there is very little disagreement about the nature of formal logic, the same is not true regarding informal logic, which is understood in various (often incompatible) ways by various thinkers. After reviewing some of the more prominent conceptions of informal logic, I will present my own, defend it and then show how informal logic, so understood, is complementary to formal logic.     

Quantized Linear Logic,Involutive Quantales and Strong Negation

A new logic, quantized intuitionistic linear logic (QILL), is introduced, and is closely related to the logic which corresponds to Mulvey and Pelletier's (commutative) involutive quantales. Some cut-free sequent calculi with a new property quantization principle and some complete semantics such as an involutive quantale model and a quantale model are obtained for QILL. The relationship between QILL and Wansing's extended intuitionistic linear logic with strong negation is also observed using such syntactical and semantical frameworks.