跨期选择的认知机制与神经基础

跨期选择是指个体对发生在不同时间的成本与收益进行权衡的决策过程。跨期选择的计算模型从经济学的角度用数学模型来建构时间折扣函数,而认知成分模型则从心理学的角度来研究跨期选择中的心理效应与认知成分。跨期选择的神经基础有三种不同的研究取向：双机制加工取向、单机制加工取向、自我控制取向。未来研究应该在跨期选择的认知机制、神经通路及运行机制、跨期选择的应用,以及从进化的角度对人与动物的跨期选择行为进行更深入的研究。     

Deductive and inductive conditional inferences: Two modes of reasoning

A number of single- and dual-process theories provide competing explanations as to how reasoners evaluate conditional arguments. Some of these theories are typically linked to different instructions—namely deductive and inductive instructions. To assess whether responses under both instructions can be explained by a single process, or if they reflect two modes of conditional reasoning, we re-analysed four experiments that used both deductive and inductive instructions for conditional inference tasks. Our re-analysis provided evidence consistent with a single process. In two new experiments we established a double dissociation of deductive and inductive instructions when validity and plausibility of conditional problems were pitted against each other. This indicates that at least two processes contribute to conditional reasoning. We conclude that single-process theories of conditional reasoning cannot explain the observed results. Theories that postulate at least two processes are needed to account for our findings.     

Effects of mindful eating training on delay and probability discounting for food and money in obese and healthy-weight individuals

Obese individuals tend to behave more impulsively than healthy weight individuals across a variety of measures, but it is unclear whether this pattern can be altered. The present study examined the effects of a mindful eating behavioral strategy on impulsive and risky choice patterns for hypothetical food and money. In Experiment 1, 304 participants completed computerized delay and probability discounting tasks for food-related and monetary outcomes. High percent body fat (PBF) predicted more impulsive choice for food, but not small-value money, replicating previous work. In Experiment 2, 102 randomly selected participants from Experiment 1 were assigned to participate in a 50-min workshop on mindful eating or to watch an educational video. They then completed the discounting tasks again. Participants who completed the mindful eating session showed more self-controlled and less risk-averse discounting patterns for food compared to baseline; those in the control condition discounted similarly to baseline rates. There were no changes in discounting for money for either group, suggesting stimulus specificity for food for the mindful eating condition.     

Probabilistic choice (models) as a result of balancing multiple goals

We conceptualize probabilistic choice as the result of the simultaneous pursuit of multiple goals in a vector optimization representation, which is reduced to a scalar optimization that implies goal balancing. The majority of prior theoretical and empirical work on such probabilistic choice is based on random utility models, the most basic of which assume that each choice option has a valuation that has a deterministic (systematic) component plus a random component determined by some specified distribution. An alternate approach to probabilistic choice has considered maximization of one quantity (e.g., utility), subject to constraints on one or more other quantities (e.g., cost). The multiple goal perspective integrates the results regarding the well-studied multinomial logit model of probabilistic choice that has been derived from each of the above approaches; extends the results to other models in the generalized extreme value (GEV) class; and relates them to recent axiomatic work on the utility of gambling.     

The Effect of Order and Rate of Presentation of Stimuli Upon the Establishment of a Conditioned Discrimination

The modified interfering cue theory put forward by Fletcher et al. (2) to explain performance in the ambiguous cue problem (ACP) was examined. Eight-year-old children were first trained to acquire response tendencies to the individual cues of this problem. When presented subsequently with the problem, the children showed marked differences in the number and type of errors made. The results were interpreted as supporting the theory of Fletcher et al. It was also suggested that the cues with clear positive or negative values were employed by the subjects to limit or neutralize the interference caused by the ambiguous cue.     

From Bayesian epistemology to inductive logic

Inductive logic admits a variety of semantics (Haenni et al. (2011) [7, Part 1]). This paper develops semantics based on the norms of Bayesian epistemology (Williamson, 2010 [16, Chapter 7]). Section 1 introduces the semantics and then, in Section 2, the paper explores methods for drawing inferences in the resulting logic and compares the methods of this paper with the methods of Barnett and Paris (2008) [2]. Section 3 then evaluates this Bayesian inductive logic in the light of four traditional critiques of inductive logic, arguing (i) that it is language independent in a key sense, (ii) that it admits connections with the Principle of Indifference but these connections do not lead to paradox, (iii) that it can capture the phenomenon of learning from experience, and (iv) that while the logic advocates scepticism with regard to some universal hypotheses, such scepticism is not problematic from the point of view of scientific theorising.     

Discounting by Probabilistic Waiting

In everyday life, many probabilistic situations may be characterized as probabilistic waiting. A gambler, for example, bets repeatedly at the racetrack, the casino, or the card table. The gambler may not win on the first try, but if a gamble is repeated enough times, a win is almost certain to occur eventually. If repeated gambles are structured as strings of losses ending in a win (probabilistic waiting) and the amount won is discounted by the delay caused by the series of losses, then strings with many losses will be discounted more than those with fewer losses, thereby causing subjective value of the series of gambles as a whole to increase. The current study used the opposite effect that amount has on the degree of delay and probability discounting as a marker to determine whether people evaluate situations involving probabilistic waiting as they evaluate situations involving delayed outcomes or as situations involving probabilistic outcomes. We find that the more likely a probabilistic waiting situation is to end in reward (e.g., a gamble is repeated indefinitely until reward is obtained), the more that situation conforms to delay discounting; the less likely a probabilistic waiting situation is to end in reward (e.g., a fixed, small number of gambles), the more that situation conforms to probability discounting. We argue that the former situation is applicable to pathological gambling, and that people with steep delay discount functions would therefore be more likely to have gambling problems. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Associations Between Delay Discounting and Risk‐Related Behaviors,Traits, Attitudes,and Outcomes

Delay discounting—preference for immediate, smaller rewards over distal, larger rewards—has been argued to be part of the “generality of deviance”, which describes the co‐occurrence of various forms of impulsive and risky behaviors among individuals. Some studies have linked laboratory‐measured delay discounting to behaviors, traits, attitudes, and outcomes associated with risk, but these associations have been inconsistent. Furthermore, many of these studies have been conducted with exclusively undergraduate samples, or in samples offering low statistical power. In a large community sample (n = 328) diverse in age and socioeconomic status, we examined associations between two measures of behavioral delay discounting (single‐shot and canonical k‐parameter estimation) and behavioral risk‐taking, personality traits associated with risk, domain‐specific risk attitudes, gambling and problem gambling, antisocial behavior, and criminal outcomes. In addition, we explored whether a novel response time latency measure of delay discounting explained variance in these risk‐related outcomes. Results indicated that behavioral delay discounting was consistently associated with all variables related to impulse control: high trait impulsivity, low trait self‐control, risk‐averse attitudes toward financial investment, risk‐prone attitudes toward gambling and health/safety risks, gambling and problem gambling, antisocial conduct, and criminal outcomes. Latency‐measured delay discounting was inconsistently associated with behavioral delay discounting and risk‐related measures. Together, results suggest that delay discounting is associated with poor impulse control consistent with a generality of deviance account. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Individual Differences in Delay Discounting: Differences are Quantitative with Gains,but Qualitative with Losses

Research on delay discounting and inter‐temporal choice has yielded significant insights into decision making. Although research has focused on delayed gains, the discounting of losses is potentially important in precisely those areas where the discounting of gains has proved informative (e.g., substance use and abuse). Participants in the current study completed both a questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed gains and an analogous questionnaire consisting of choices between immediate and delayed losses. For almost all participants, the likelihood of choosing the delayed gain decreased with increases in the wait until it would be received. In contrast, when losses (i.e., payments) were involved, different participants showed quite different patterns of choices. More specifically, although the majority of the participants became increasingly likely to choose to pay later as the delay was increased, some participants appeared to be debt averse, in that they were more likely to choose the immediate payment option when the delay was long than when it was brief. These debt‐averse participants also were more likely to choose to wait for a larger delayed gain than other participants and scored lower on Impulsiveness than those who showed the typical pattern of discounting delayed losses. Taken together, these results suggest that in the case of delayed gains, people differ only quantitatively (i.e., in how steeply they discount), whereas in the case of delayed losses, people differ qualitatively as well as quantitatively, contrary to the common assumption that a single impulsivity trait underlies choices between immediate and delayed outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.