A cross-cultural study of hindsight bias and conditional probabilistic reasoning

Hindsight bias is a mistaken belief that one could have predicted a given outcome once the outcome is known. Choi and Nisbett (2000 Choi, I. and Nisbett, R. E. 2000. Cultural psychology of surprise: Holistic theories and recognition of contradiction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79: 890–905. [Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) reported that Koreans showed stronger hindsight bias than Americans, and explained the results using the distinction between analytic cognition (Westerners) and holistic cognition (Easterners). The purpose of the present study was to see whether hindsight bias is stronger among Easterners than among Westerners using a probability judgement task, and to test an “explicit–implicit” hypothesis and a “rule-dialectics” hypothesis. We predicted that the implicit process is more active among Easterners to generate hindsight bias, and that Easterners are more dialectical thinkers, whereas Westerners are more rule-based thinkers. French, British, Japanese, and Korean participants were asked to make probabilistic judgements in a Good Samaritan scenario (Experiment 1) and in a scenario including conditional probabilistic judgement (Experiment 2). In both Experiments, we presume that the implicit revision of causal models is made just by being given unexpected outcome information, and that explicit revision is made by being asked to point out possible factors for an unexpected outcome. In the results Easterners showed greater hindsight bias generally and it was greater in the Good Samaritan scenario. We conclude that the reason why hindsight bias was lower among Westerners is primarily that they tried to follow a rule to suppress the bias.     

Keep or trade? Effects of pay-off range on decisions with the two-envelops problem

The “two-envelops” problem has stimulated much discussion on probabilistic reasoning, but relatively little experimentation. The problem specifies two identical envelopes, one of which contains twice as much money as the other. You are given one of the envelopes and the option of keeping it or trading for the other envelope. Variables of interest include the possible amounts of money involved, what is known about the process by which the amounts of money were assigned to the envelopes, and whether you are allowed to know how much money is in the envelope in hand before deciding whether to keep or trade. In an earlier study, Butler and Nickerson found that when participants were allowed to know how much was in the envelope in hand, they generally elected to trade if that amount was small relative to the range of possibilities and to keep otherwise. The present experiments showed that this propensity was independent of the amount of money in the envelopes. Participants made decisions with a strong bias for avoiding the risk of losing by trading, particularly when the amount in hand was known and large relative to the range of possible amounts, regardless of the absolute value of the gamble. The results illustrate the dependence of thinking on the context in which it occurs, and demonstrate a tendency to treat quantities that are large or small relative to a particular context in which they are encountered as though they were large or small in a more general sense.     

Keep or trade? An experimental study of the exchange paradox

The “exchange paradox”—also referred to in the literature by a variety of other names, notably the “two-envelopes problem”—is notoriously difficult, and experts are not all agreed as to its resolution. Some of the various expressions of the problem are open to more than one interpretation; some are stated in such a way that assumptions are required in order to fill in missing information that is essential to any resolution. In three experiments several versions of the problem were used, in each of which the information given was sufficient to determine an optimal choice strategy when it exists or to justify indifference regarding keeping or trading when such a strategy does not exist. College students who were presented with the various versions of the problem tended to base their choices on simple heuristics and to give little evidence of understanding the probabilistic implications of the differences in the problem statements.     

A Reinforcer Pathology perspective on relapse

The Reinforcer Pathology theory proposes conditions under which drugs emerge as excessively preferred reinforcers compared to other available reinforcers among drug users. The theory highlights 2 key variables as important determinants of drug preference: (a) excessive preference for immediate rewards (high discounting of future rewards); and (b) excessive valuation for addictive reinforcers (e.g., drugs). Two iterations of the Reinforcer Pathology theory exist with the latest iteration (i.e., Reinforcer Pathology 2.0) specifying that the temporal window of reinforcer integration (measured by delay discounting) is a determinant of reinforcer value. The 2 iterations of the Reinforcer Pathology theory are described. A novel insight and understanding of abstinence and relapse from a Reinforcer Pathology perspective, limitations, and future directions are discussed. The Reinforcer Pathology theory continues the long-standing efforts to scientifically understand and better define novel concepts and methods to further translational research and improve treatment outcomes. Exploring the complementary relation between the Reinforcer Pathology perspective and other current approaches could have a valuable effect.     

The absence of numbers to express the amount may affect delay discounting with humans

Human delay discounting is usually studied with experimental protocols that use symbols to express delay and amount. In order to further understand discounting, we evaluated whether the absence of numbers to represent reward amounts affects discount rate in general, and whether the magnitude effect is generalized to nonsymbolic situations in particular. In Experiment 1, human participants were exposed to a delay‐discounting task in which rewards were presented using dots to represent monetary rewards (nonsymbolic); under this condition the magnitude effect did not occur. Nevertheless, the magnitude effect was observed when equivalent reward amounts were presented using numbers (symbolic). Moreover, in estimation tasks, magnitude increments produced underestimation of large amounts. In Experiment 2, participants were exposed only to the nonsymbolic discounting task and were required to estimate reward amounts in each trial. Consistent with Experiment 1, the absence of numbers representing reward amounts produced similar discount rates of small and large rewards. These results suggest that value of nonsymbolic rewards is a nonlinear function of amount and that value attribution depends on perceived difference between the immediate and the delayed nonsymbolic rewards.     

负折扣现象:跨期决策中的自我-他人决策差异

负折扣现象作为一种违背时间折扣假定的现象越来越多地引起研究者关注。本文通过两种指标考察了为自己决策和为他人决策在负折扣现象上的差异。实验1运用二择一选择范式考察人们在为自己决策和为他人决策时对于何时发生负性事件的时间偏好。结果发现,相比较于为他人决策,为自己决策时被试更倾向于选择早些发生负性事件,即更容易产生负折扣现象。实验2运用测量时间折扣率的经典范式考察了人们在为自己决策和为他人决策时的时间折扣率。结果发现,为自己决策时比为他人决策时的时间折扣率更小,更容易出现负折扣率。总体结果表明,为自己决策比为他人决策更容易出现负折扣现象。从情绪卷入的角度看,我们推测,为自己决策时由于更多的预期负性情绪卷入,从而导致更容易产生负折扣现象。     

Tests of an indifference rule in variable‐delay and double‐reward choice procedures with humans

Four hundred and fifty participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk across 3 experiments to test the predictions of a hyperbolic discounting equation in accounting for human choices involving variable delays or multiple rewards (Mazur, 1984, 1986). In Experiment 1, participants made hypothetical choices between 2 monetary alternatives, 1 consisting of a fixed delay and another consisting of 2 delays of equal probability (i.e., a variable‐delay procedure). In Experiment 2, participants made hypothetical monetary choices between a single, immediate reward and 2 rewards, 1 immediate and 1 delayed (i.e., a double‐reward procedure). Experiment 3 also used a double‐reward procedure, but with 2 delayed rewards. Participants in all 3 experiments also completed a standard delay‐discounting task. Finally, 3 reward amounts were tested in each type of task ($100, $1000, and $5000). In the double‐reward conditions (Experiments 2 and 3), the results were in good qualitative and quantitative agreement with Mazur's model (1984, 1986). In contrast, when participants made choices involving variable delays (Experiment 1), there was relatively poor qualitative and quantitative agreement with this model. These results, along with our previous findings, suggest the structure of questions in hypothetical tasks with humans can be a strong determinant of the choice pattern.     

Neural correlates of intertemporal choice in aggressive behavior

People often have to make decisions between immediate rewards and more long-term goals. Such intertemporal judgments are often investigated in the context of monetary choice or drug use, yet not in regard to aggressive behavior. We combined a novel intertemporal aggression paradigm with functional neuroimaging to examine the role of temporal delay in aggressive behavior and the neural correlates thereof. Sixty-one participants (aged 18–22 years; 37 females) exhibited substantial variability in the extent to which they selected immediate acts of lesser aggression versus delayed acts of greater aggression against a same-sex opponent. Choosing delayed-yet-more-severe aggression was increased by provocation and associated with greater self-control. Preferences for delayed aggression were associated with greater activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) during such choices, and reduced functional connectivity between the VMPFC and brain regions implicated in motor impulsivity. Preferences for immediate aggression were associated with reduced functional connectivity between the VMPFC and the frontoparietal control network. Dispositionally aggressive participants exhibited reduced VMPFC activity, which partially explained and suppressed their preferences for delayed aggression. Blunted VMPFC activity may thus be a neural mechanism that promotes reactive aggression towards provocateurs among dispositionally aggressive individuals. These findings demonstrate the utility of an intertemporal framework for investigating aggression and provide further evidence for the similar underlying neurobiology between aggression and other rewarding behaviors.