When good evidence goes bad: the weak evidence effect in judgment and decision-making

An indispensable principle of rational thought is that positive evidence should increase belief. In this paper, we demonstrate that people routinely violate this principle when predicting an outcome from a weak cause. In Experiment 1 participants given weak positive evidence judged outcomes of public policy initiatives to be less likely than participants given no evidence, even though the evidence was separately judged to be supportive. Experiment 2 ruled out a pragmatic explanation of the result, that the weak evidence implies the absence of stronger evidence. In Experiment 3, weak positive evidence made people less likely to gamble on the outcome of the 2010 United States mid-term Congressional election. Experiments 4 and 5 replicated these findings with everyday causal scenarios. We argue that this “weak evidence effect” arises because people focus disproportionately on the mentioned weak cause and fail to think about alternative causes.     

TEACHING SELF‐CONTROL WITH QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT REINFORCERS

This study examined the effectiveness of using qualitatively different reinforcers to teach self‐control to an adolescent boy who had been diagnosed with an intellectual disability. First, he was instructed to engage in an activity without programmed reinforcement. Next, he was instructed to engage in the activity under a two‐choice fixed‐duration schedule of reinforcement. Finally, he was exposed to self‐control training, during which the delay to a more preferred reinforcer was initially short and then increased incrementally relative to the delay to a less preferred reinforcer. Self‐control training effectively increased time on task to earn the delayed reinforcer.     

Social Discounting and Externalizing Behavior Problems in Boys

Social discounting refers to the fact that most people assign more value to the welfare of close affiliates than they do to the welfare of distant affiliates—they discount the latter compared to the former. We report the first study to apply a social discounting paradigm to boys. We were particularly interested in investigating the relations between social discounting, age, and externalizing behavior problems (antisocial behavior). Results showed that (1) preadolescent boys were more likely than adolescent boys to show atypical response patterns in allocating rewards to affiliates; (2) task behavior was well represented as social discounting once boys with atypical response patterns were deleted from the sample, and (3) boys functioning in the clinical range on indices of externalizing behavior problems demonstrated steeper social discounting compared to controls. We conclude that social discounting as a measure of perceived social closeness is feasible for use in adolescent samples. Social discounting may operate similarly to other forms of discounting in impulsive individuals. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Matching Law And Amount-dependent Exponential Discounting As Accounts Of Self-control Choice

Studies with humans have found evidence for amount-dependent temporal discounting, that is, that the sensitivity of choice to reinforcer delay varies inversely with reinforcer magnitude. To test whether similar results could be obtained with nonhumans, pigeons were trained on a two-component concurrent-chains procedure in which the durations of food reinforcement in the terminal links were equal within components but unequal between components. Terminal-link schedules were varied over four conditions to allow separate estimates of sensitivity to delay to be obtained for the large and small reinforcer-magnitude components. Although sensitivity to delay was greater in the small-magnitude component for all subjects, the effect was quite small. The difference in sensitivity was generally less than one standard error, and t tests on parameter differences failed to reach significance. Several models for temporal discounting, including an amount-dependent exponential function, were fitted to the data from the first four conditions. The resulting parameter estimates were used to make predictions for a self-control condition in which one terminal link arranged a smaller, less delayed reinforcer and the other arranged a larger, more delayed reinforcer. For all models, predictions were considerably more accurate when sensitivity to delay was the same regardless of reinforcer magnitude. The results support the independence of delay and magnitude as required by a version of the matching law, and provide strong evidence against amount-dependent exponential discounting as an account of self-control choice. A new two-parameter discounting function, consistent with the matching law, is proposed that has wide empirical generality for both human and nonhuman data.     

Some probabilistic models of best, worst, and best-worst choices

Over the past decade or so, a choice design in which a person is asked to select both the best and the worst option in an available set of options has been gaining favor over more traditional designs, such as where the person is asked, for instance, to: select the best option; select the worst option; rank the options; or rate the options. In this paper, we develop theoretical results for three overlapping classes of probabilistic models for best, worst, and best-worst choices, with the models in each class proposing specific ways in which such choices might be related. The models in these three classes are called random ranking and random utility, joint and sequential, and ratio scale. We include some models that belong to more than one class, with the best known being the maximum-difference (maxdiff) model, summarize estimation issues related to the models, and formulate a number of open theoretical problems.     

A user’s guide to the evolutionary argument against naturalism

Alvin Plantinga has famously argued that metaphysical naturalism is self-defeating, and cannot be rationally accepted. I distinguish between two different ways of understanding this argument, which I call the "probabilistic inference conception", and the "process characteristic conception". I argue that the former is what critics of the argument usually presuppose, whereas most critical responses fail when one assumes the latter conception. To illustrate this, I examine three standard objections to Plantinga's evolutionary argument against naturalism: the Perspiration Objection, the Tu Quoque Objection, and the "Why Can't the Naturalist Just Add a Little Something?" Objection. I show that Plantinga's own responses to these objections fail, and propose counterexamples to his first two principles of defeat. I then go on to construct more adequate responses to these objections, using the distinctions I develop in the first part of the paper.     

谈判中的时间因素

研究时间因素对谈判的影响有利于提高人们对时间重要性的认识,有效谈判策略的运用和整合结果的实现。时间因素对谈判者认知、行为和谈判结果的影响具体表现在：时间压力会降低谈判者的认知动机,使谈判者更加依赖认知启发式;暂停和中场休息是否会为谈判带来积极影响应该视不同的谈判事件和不同的心理状态而定;拉大谈判与结果实现之间的时间距离会提高谈判的共同结果,这可以从折扣效应和建构水平理论中得到解释。将来的谈判研究会进一步从时间向空间拓展     

ALTERING THE MAGNITUDE OF DELAY DISCOUNTING BY PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLERS

The present study explored the delay discounting of future and past monetary rewards by pathological gamblers. Using a multiple baseline design, following repeated exposure to choices between smaller immediate and larger delayed consequences, participants completed a relational responding task that attempted to alter the psychological functions of irrelevant stimuli and to affect subsequent delay discounting. Results support previous literature on the discounting of delayed consequences by pathological gamblers, illustrate that the discounting of past rewards occurs in a similar fashion to the well‐documented literature on the discounting of future rewards, and that magnitude of discounting can be altered.     

Associations between a one-shot delay discounting measure and age, income, education and real-world impulsive behavior

There has been discussion over the extent to which delay discounting – as prototypically shown by a preference for a smaller-sooner sum of money over a larger-later sum – measures the same kind of impulsive preferences that drive non-financial behavior. To address this issue, a dataset was analyzed containing 42,863 participants’ responses to a single delay-discounting choice, along with self-report behaviors that can be considered as impulsive. Choice of a smaller-sooner sum was associated with several demographics: younger age, lower income, and lower education; and impulsive behaviors: earlier age of first sexual activity and recent relationship infidelity, smoking, and higher body mass index. These findings suggest that at least an aspect of delay discounting preference is associated with a general trait influencing other forms of impulsivity, and therefore that high delay discounting is another form of impulsive behavior.     

From the casino to the jungle

Clear-cut cases of decision-making under risk (known probabilities) are unusual in real life. The gambler’s decisions at the roulette table are as close as we can get to this type of decision-making. In contrast, decision-making under uncertainty (unknown probabilities) can be exemplified by a decision whether to enter a jungle that may contain unknown dangers. Life is usually more like an expedition into an unknown jungle than a visit to the casino. Nevertheless, it is common in decision-supporting disciplines to proceed as if reasonably reliable probability estimates were available for all possible outcomes, i.e. as if the prevailing epistemic conditions were analogous to those of gambling at the roulette table. This mistake can be called the tuxedo fallacy. It is argued that traditional engineering practices such as safety factors and multiple safety barriers avoid this fallacy and that they therefore manage uncertainty better than probabilistic risk analysis (PRA). PRA is a useful tool, but it must be supplemented with other methods in order not to limit the analysis to dangers that can be assigned meaningful probability estimates.