Dilemmas in brief therapy

This paper examines three central concerns for the short-term therapist at a time when therapy is widely available free of charge in the community, in a model that has been called ‘ serial life-span therapy’. Issues of referral-on, topping-up or extending contracts are experienced as dilemmas or as temptations, depending on what therapists believe their clients need and what their clients may demand of them. Short-term therapy has become accepted in many contexts, with therapy no longer used as a once-and-for all solution to clinical problems, but as a serial method over time which includes topping up and re-contracting. After an initial agreement of brevity, depending on the client's disturbance levels at assessment and on availability, there may be the need for referral-on at the end of a brief contract, when clients may be offered a different, long-term service, or they may be recommended to return later in life for more, if and when this becomes necessary. Flexible contracts rather than rigid rules about the termination of therapy are being practiced in many contexts, depending on ‘what works’ and how methods can be adjusted to new evidence. There is danger of collusion or control, and this can lead to therapeutic dilemmas, which involve taking acceptable risks, or to therapeutic temptations, which are due to the desire for narcissistic gratification, benefiting the therapist rather than the client in terms of power or Eros. Being able to let go of clients and manage issues of loss, grief and greed requires a measure of maturity in the therapist that aims for good-enough results rather than striving for perfect endings.     

A randomised Monty Hall experiment: The positive effect of conditional frequency feedback

The Monty Hall dilemma (MHD) is a notorious probability problem with a counterintuitive solution. There is a strong tendency to stay with the initial choice, despite the fact that switching doubles the probability of winning. The current randomised experiment investigates whether feedback in a series of trials improves behavioural performance on the MHD and increases the level of understanding of the problem. Feedback was either conditional or non-conditional, and was given either in frequency format or in percentage format. Results show that people learn to switch most when receiving conditional feedback in frequency format. However, problem understanding does not improve as a consequence of receiving feedback. Our study confirms the dissociation between behavioural performance on the MHD, on one hand, and actual understanding of the MHD, on the other. We discuss how this dissociation can be understood.     

Anaesthesia or psychotherapy: Eradicating thoughts or working them through

The author presents two sessions from the analysis of a depressive narcissistic doctor, which are characterised by a mixture of co-operation and pseudo-co-operation. The dialogue is in parts intellectualised, complicated, lifeless and schizoid. Points at which the patient shows surprising insights are then partly denigrated by him, on the basis that change is not to be expected. Semi-lifeless contact assists the defensive claustrophobia that he experiences in meaningful contact. It becomes very clear that he is then afraid of entering into an openly aggressive conflict that entails the existential threat of object loss. However, this has so far been avoided. The secret pleasure in an anal-narcissistic, sadomasochistic addiction to doubt persists in the partial denigration. The patient's artificially maintained self-doubt and doubt of the object reinforce a genuine confusion that consists in never knowing exactly what lies behind the helpful and needed object.     

Probability of reciprocation in repeated prisoner's dilemma games

Both social cooperation and self‐control require reciprocation. In social cooperation situations a single person's cooperative act, if not reciprocated by others, would be unreinforced both immediately and in the long term. Similarly, a single act of self‐control (refusing a single cigarette, for example), if not followed up by other such acts, would also be unreinforced immediately and in the long term. The present experiments varied probability of reciprocation in a prisoner's dilemma‐like game that could resemble a social cooperation or a self‐control situation. Participants earned points by playing against a computer. The computer offered the participant a choice between 5 or 6 points (‘cooperation’ by the computer) or between 1 or 2 points (‘defection’ by the computer). The participant's choice of the lesser alternative (‘cooperation’) or the greater alternative (‘defection’) on the current trial led, respectively, to cooperation or defection by the computer on the next trial with a probability (probability of reciprocation, PR) which could vary. When PR was greater than 63%, consistent cooperation maximized the participant's earnings. When PR was less than 63%, defection maximized earnings. Three conditions were studied: PR signaled by spinners; PR unsignaled; PR unsignaled with participants believing that they were playing with another person, not the computer. With PR = 100% (‘tit‐for‐tat’) and PR = 50%, the modal participant maximized earnings under all three conditions. With PR = 75%, participants maximized earnings only when PR was signaled. These results indicate that differences between people's tendency to cooperate with other people (social cooperation) and their tendency to cooperate with their own future interests (self‐control) may lie in differences in subjective PR. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Social learning under the labeling effect: Exploring travellers’ behavior in social dilemmas

This paper presents results of a laboratory experiment, in which subjects made choices between public and private transportation when managing Personal Carbon Allowances (PCAs). The objectives of this study were twofold. Firstly, it was aimed at investigating the labeling effect under the social dilemma context. Secondly, it showed insights into the decision-making process when feedback about others’ choices was provided. A combination of the labeling effect and feedback helped individuals change their commuting pattern and increase the number of trips by public transportation under the PCAs regime. Feedback on others’ choices resulted in social learning and incentivized choice of public transportation more frequently in social dilemma situations.     

Decision making in the prisoner's dilemma game: The effect of exit on cooperation and social welfare

The prisoner's dilemma game is a mixed‐motive game that offers two players the simultaneous choice between a cooperative and a defective alternative. An often neglected aspect of such a binary‐choice game, however, is that in many real‐life encounters, people can choose not only to cooperate or defect, but they also have a third option: to exit the social dilemma. Although in the literature a consensus has emerged that the addition of an exit opportunity benefits cooperation, there is only scant research into its effect on social welfare. In order to allow a direct comparison of cooperation rates and welfare levels across binary‐choice and trinary‐choice games, in this study, we used a design in which the same participants played similar games with and without an exit option (i.e., a within‐subjects design), and this in a range of structural variations. The findings of our study indicated that the aggregated outcome of both players is generally lower in games with an exit option than in games without an exit option. Moreover, our results showed that the efficiency of the exit option strongly depends on the specific outcome structure of the game (in terms of its endowment size, (a)symmetry, and level of noncorrespondence). In the discussion, it is argued that the implementation of an exit option as a strategy to increase social welfare should be critically assessed.     

合作指数与社会距离对合作行为的影响

利用囚徒困境范式,考察了合作指数CI（0.1~0.9）与社会距离（亲密、陌生）对个体合作行为的影响。结果发现,社会距离和合作指数均会对合作行为产生影响,两者的交互效应不显著;合作率会受到合作指数的促进作用,但不会随合作指数的增高立即增长;在CI = 0.1~0.9这9个水平下,亲密被试间的合作率均显著高于陌生被试间的合作率。这一结果说明,合作指数对合作行为的促进作用存在阈值;社会距离缩小可促进个体的合作倾向增强,并更快地达到合作水平;合作指数与社会距离相互独立地影响合作行为。     

Why do residents accept a demanding rule?: Fairness and social benefit as determinants of approval of a recycling system1,2

Abstract: This study examined why people accepted a demanding rule in a recycling system that was newly introduced in Nagoya City. We focused on two social psychological topics: social dilemmas and fairness. While the new system succeeded in reducing waste, it imposed a burden on citizens without providing incentives and sanctions. In a research survey, 1442 responses from a sample of 3000 (48% response rate) were obtained using a stratified sampling method. The results showed that the new recycling system was approved despite the demands placed on citizens, with a preference for more strict rules such as penalties and surveillance for noncompliance. The main determinants of approval of the new recycling system were social benefit and procedural fairness, whereas the main determinant of preference for strict rules was outcome fairness. We argue that (a) social benefit should be emphasized to facilitate cooperative behavior in a social dilemma situation and (b) the government should ensure sufficient discussion with citizens and acknowledgment of their opinions.     

连续性公共物品困境中信息结构对决策行为的影响

选取240名大学二年级的学生,通过局域网信息反馈,进行了模拟投资的小组实验。结果发现,1、在连续性公共物品困境和自协调序列规则下,先前决策者的合作行为在决策的早期和中期起到了明显的榜样示范作用,并导致后续决策者的合作行为增加;2、这种示范作用在决策后期不起作用,被试出于搭便车或者担心自己利益受损的心理会表现出较高的竞争行为;3、先前决策者的竞争行为在整个决策过程中都起到明显的示范作用,使后续决策者的合作率保持在较低的水平;4、在没有任何信息反馈的情况下,被试倾向于在初期就做出投资决策,并表现出一定程度的合作行为。     

Vigilant self‐regulation,cues of being watched and cooperativeness

The present research examined the interplay of individual differences in self‐regulatory mechanisms as outlined in regulatory focus theory (promotion‐ and prevention‐focus) and a cue of being watched in the context of cooperative behaviour. Study 1 revealed that the more individuals' habitual self‐regulatory orientation is dominated by a vigilant prevention focus, the more likely they are to act cooperatively (i.e. to donate money to natural conservation organizations) when a subtle cue of being watched renders reputational concerns salient. In contrast, when no such cue is provided individuals' habitual vigilant self‐regulatory orientation is negatively related to cooperative behaviour. Study 2 replicated the results of the initial study and examined interpersonal sensitivity (empathic concern) as a potential mediator of the observed effects. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.