两难问题儿童对策行为发展的实验研究

采用实验室方法,通过两难对策任务的情景模拟,研究学生个体在自然情景下的对策行为。结果表明:(1)儿童对策行为随年龄的增长而发生变化,小学五年级是儿童对策行为发生转折的关键期,表现出较高水平的合作策略。(2)性别对对策行为的影响不显著。(3)不同类型的决策者面临同样的决策任务时,会产生不同的对策行为。     

儿童应对权威的矛盾解决策略研究

本文采用两难故事法对儿童(7～17岁)在与三种权威(父母、教师与社会上的成人)发生两难冲突时所采取的矛盾解决策略进行了研究,结果发现儿童与权威发生矛盾时所采取的解决策略存在(1)显著的对象差异,即儿童对教师更倾向接受策略,儿童对父母更倾向协商策略,儿童对社会更倾向拒绝策略;(2)显著的年龄差异,即随着年龄增长,儿童从接受权威的观点发展为坚持自己观点;(3)男女儿童,不同地区儿童应对权威的矛盾解决策不存在显著差异。     

Effects of initial choices in the prisoner's dilemma

In the two‐person prisoner's dilemma game (PDG), there is considerable evidence that the tit‐for‐tat (TFT) strategy is most effective in inducing the other person to cooperate. One of the important features of the TFT strategy is that it cooperates on the first trial. We varied the initial choices of a simulated other, and tested the effects of (a) initial choices (cooperation or defection), and (b) persistence of initial choices: unilateral cooperation (or defection) on the first trial, first two trials, or first four trials. Results showed that a cooperative strategy—one that starts with cooperative choices—induced greater cooperation than a strategy that started with defections. The results of this study clearly show that (a) a cooperative strategy—one that initiates unilateral cooperation at the outset and then adopts a TFT strategy—is very effective in inducing subsequent cooperation from the other party, (b) the effectiveness of a cooperative strategy varies directly with the cooperative orientation of the other party (a cooperative strategy is more effective against a cooperative than a competitive person), and (c) initial cooperation is more effective if it is repeated more than once. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

“How many bad apples does it take to spoil the whole barrel?”: Social exclusion and toleration for bad apples

In social dilemmas, where personal welfare is in conflict with collective welfare, there are inherent incentives to act non-cooperatively. Moreover, there is evidence that the example of a few uncooperative group members (“bad apples”) is more influential than the example of comparable numbers of cooperative members (a bad apple effect). Two studies are reported that examine the functional relationship between the number of likely bad apples and individual cooperation, and whether and when the threat of social exclusion for uncooperative behavior may effectively counter the temptation to follow the example of such “bad apples”. It is shown that (a) the threat of exclusion is sufficient to counter the temptation to follow a few bad apples’ example, (b) such threats cannot, however, overcome the cooperation-degrading effects of large numbers (e.g., a majority) of bad apples, and (c) the effectiveness of such threats may be greater in relatively smaller groups.     

Responsible engineering: Gilbane Gold revisited

This paper addresses several concerns in teaching engineering ethics. First, there is the problem of finding space within already crowded engineering curricula for meaningful discussions of ethical dimensions in engineering. Some engineering programs may offer entire courses on engineering ethics; however, most do not at present and may not in the foreseeable future. A promising possibility is to weave ethics into already existing courses using case studies, but most current case studies are not well integrated with engineering technical analysis. There is a danger that case studies will be viewed by both instructors and students as departures from “business as usual”—interesting perhaps, but not essentially connected with “real” engineering. We offer a case study, inspired by the National Society of Professional Engineer’s popular video Gilbane Gold, that can be used to make the connection. It requires students to engage in technical analysis, but in a context that makes apparent the ethical responsibility of engineers. Further, the case we present marks a significant departure from more typical cases that primarily focus on wrongdoing and its prevention. We concentrate more positively on what responsible engineering requires. There is a need for more such cases, regardless of whether they are to be used in standard engineering courses or in separate courses in engineering ethics. This article is the product of the NSF/Bovay Endowment “Workshop to Develop Numerical Problems Associated With Ethics Cases for use in Required Undergraduate Engineering Courses” (NSF Grant DUE-9455141) held at Texas A&M University in August 1995. For further information about this project, contact Michael J. Rabins, Director of the Ethics and Professionalism Program in the Look College of Engineering at Texas A&M University. Additional case studies from this workshop are available on the Internet site http://ethics.tamu.edu. The writing of this article was supported in part by “Engineering Ethics: Good Works” (NSF/EVS Grant SBR-930257). Michael Pritchard teaches ethics and is co-author of Engineering Ethics: Concepts and Cases (1995) with C.E. Harris and Michael Rabins (Wadsworth, Belmont CA). Mark Holtzapple teaches chemical engineering and is author of Foundations of Engineering (McGraw-Hill) which includes an ethics chapter suitable for freshman engineering students.     

群体任务中合作行为的跨阶段演变

合作是电子商务时代群体工作的重要基础。本实验通过资源两难任务研究群体工作中的合作行为的演变。111名被试参加了实验。研究发现,在动态博弈过程中,群体其他成员行为的多个阶段反馈将成为决策者合作机制形成的主要基础,与决策者价值等内部因素和环境不确定性等外部因素,共同影响合作行为的演变     

Personality,Punishment and Public Goods: Strategic Shifts Towards Cooperation as a Matter of Dispositional Honesty–Humility

Contributions in the public goods game—a classical social dilemma situation—have been shown to depend strongly on the presence versus absence of punishment or sanctions for free riders. Also, there appear to be noteworthy individual differences in the degree to which decision makers cooperate. Herein, we aimed to bring these two lines of research together. Firstly, we predicted that both presence of punishment and high dispositional Honesty–Humility (as conceptualized in the Honesty–Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to experience model of personality) should yield higher contributions. Secondly, and more importantly, we expected an interaction, such that only those low in Honesty–Humility would condition their behaviour on the presence versus absence of punishment, thus employing cooperation strategically. In line with the hypothesis, the results of two experiments (one of which comprised a longitudinal design) corroborated that the degree to which decision makers shift towards higher contributions when punishment is introduced depends on their dispositional level of Honesty–Humility. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No Place to Hide: When Shame Causes Proselfs to Cooperate

Shame is considered a social emotion with action tendencies that elicit socially beneficial behavior. Yet, unlike other social emotions, prior experimental studies do not indicate that incidental shame boosts prosocial behavior. Based on the affect as information theory, we hypothesize that incidental feelings of shame can increase cooperation, but only for self-interested individuals, and only in a context where shame is relevant with regards to its action tendency. To test this hypothesis, cooperation levels are compared between a simultaneous prisoner's dilemma (where “defect” may result from multiple motives) and a sequential prisoner's dilemma (where “second player defect” is the result of intentional greediness). As hypothesized, shame positively affected proselfs in a sequential prisoner's dilemma. Hence ashamed proselfs become inclined to cooperate when they believe they have no way to hide their greediness, and not necessarily because they want to make up for earlier wrong-doing.     

选购两难中折衷效应的发生规律

当人们置身于两难困境时,折衷策略是一个合理的解决方案。研究者分析选购两难中消费者的信息处理与折衷效应的关系。研究发现：选购两难中信息的低精致化处理更易导致折衷效应,产品涉入贡献于精致化处理从而抑制折衷效应,产品的认知相似性和情感抑制精致化处理从而促进折衷效应。研究结果表明,当消费者面对选购两难时,信息的精致化程度和心理水平影响他对于中性产品的选择。